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Abstract: Becoming Public(s): Practising the Public Programme in the 
Contemporary Art Institution 
 
From the informational to the informal, the practical to the performative, what a 
contemporary art institution’s public programme includes is seemingly limitless. 
Despite the increasing visibility of this practice, it remains side-lined in institutions 
and discourse. Yet, I argue it offers a unique vantage point from which to explore 
publicness, as it is produced by the art museum and its extended spaces – the 
contemporary art institution, art school and performance festival – in a manner 
distinct from exhibition making and other forms of the curatorial. I ask in this thesis: 
what can the space of the public programme tell us about what it means to become 
public in the contemporary art institution?  
 
It is my contention that publicness is both spatially and temporally constructed; we 
must observe and quantify the feelings, responses, actions of ourselves and others 
to truly understand it. Through a combination of queer theory, theatre and 
performance studies, I attend more fully to the sensuous, affective and felt 
dimensions of publicness, and trouble the abstract, singular public found in the 
construction ‘public programme’. Challenging pervasive spatial metaphors of 
publicness that curatorial discourses often have recourse to, I then argue for an 
alternative understanding of publicness as an emergent becoming. 
 
My understanding of ‘becoming public(s)’ emerges from the art museum and how it 
has been tied to publicness in rather uncomfortable ways, alongside close readings 
of specific moments during events I have programmed or attended that left me 
feeling uncomfortable, awkward, or uncertain how to respond. My findings are taken 
back into practice in a series called That Awkward Stage: Private Workshops for 
Public Programmers (2018–19). Inviting participants to share moments of discomfort 
in their double role as programmer and audience, I analyse anecdotes shared to 
answer my final research question: what could reframing publicness as a process of 
becoming do to our understanding of the public programme in the contemporary art 
institution? This thesis argues for embracing the discomfort around publicness as a 
way to rethink the space of the public programme in ways that no longer take 





All citations in this thesis follow the Harvard referencing system. Where text has been cited 
or summarised from the same source and page number over several sentences, an intext 
reference appears at the end of the relevant section. Where text has been cited from an 
online source, the intext reference will be (name date). Where text has been cited from a 
webpage and no date appears, usually in the case of organisations, the intext reference will 
be ‘(name of organisation/person n.d.)’. Where text has been cited from an online book with 
no page numbers, the intext reference will include the chapter and/or section number. 
 
Titles of events, performances and artworks are italicised, with the date in the first instance 
of citation, and the artist’s name where relevant.  
 
All quotations, from text or direct speech, are in single inverted commas. Quotations within 
quotations are given double inverted commas.  
 
I used two methods of recording speech: digital recordings of interviews, that I transcribed 
and kept on file for reference; hand-written notes in research workshops, where I took down 
short, verbatim quotations of direct speech as well as made observations, which are kept on 
file for reference. Quotations from interview material and written notes on direct speech in 
the workshops will either be referenced in the text, or have the name of the person quoted in 
parentheses and the year. Everyone quoted has given their consent, but for full anonymity, 
all interviewees, attendees to workshops and informal conversation partners whom I have 
quoted have been given pseudonyms and there is no direct reference to their place of work 
in the thesis. 
 
Where areas of discourse are referred to for the first time, they appear in lower case and in 
single inverted commas, such as ‘the curatorial’ and ‘the educational turn’. 
 
British spellings are used throughout, except in quotations from published texts wherein 
Americanised spellings are used. In these cases, the text is quoted verbatim. 
 
I use the present participle ‘practising’ when referring to the rehearsing and performing of the 
practice of public programming. When using ‘putting into practice’, I refer to both the practice 
of public programming, and the activity of practising – rehearsing or performing something. 
 
I outline and refer to the development of the museum as foundational to my object of study. 
But I use the terms ‘museum’, ‘art museum’ and ‘contemporary art institution’ 
interchangeably throughout, to trace the practice and development of public programming 
across all kinds of art organisation, unless I am referring to a specific, named place. 
 
I use ‘the public’ to denote the singular. I use ‘publics’ to denote the plural. I use ‘public(s)’ to 
speak about both the singular and the plural, holding onto both notions at the same time. 
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Prologue – A Public Programme in Five Acts 
  
Please be aware that tonight’s performance involves blocks of ice suspended from 
the ceiling. Be wary of melt water and falling ice. 
 
Heeding this warning, we arrange ourselves around the darkened theatre space and 
listen to the delicate clang of melt water droplets hitting a cascade of cymbals. A 
woman sits at a desk, softly reading into a microphone, sploshing her bare feet into 
bowls of water. Next she stands beneath a suspended harp, pulling invisible threads 
attached to its strings, eliciting their vibration. Later she disappears behind a 
projection screen to play with plants and their shadows. As each of these 




Undressed and wrapped in a towel, I am given a cup of sweet birch cordial and told 
to shower before entering the sauna. The sauna healer places soothing wet leaves 
on my forehead and tickles the soles of my feet, before caressing my whole body 
with branches. The strokes vary in intensity until I feel sharp tingles on my arms, 
thighs and sides of my trunk. When she opens the sauna door, letting light and cool 
air in, I hear a Finnish folk song sung in low tones, and have the strong sensation of 




‘Choose a one. Keep your eye on this one at all times. Now, get as close to your one 
as possible.’ Each of us quickly identifies someone, and in hot pursuit we form a tight 
circle whirling around itself. ‘Now chose a two. Get as far away from your two as you 
can.’ The group disperses, spreading into the farthest edges of the large room. ‘Find 
your one and your two, make an equilateral triangle between you.’ Off we scurry, but 
no sooner has the group settled, when our entire system breaks down and renews 
again its searching movement. Gradually, I understand our game as a metaphor for 






During the feedback session someone seems eager to demonstrate extensive 
knowledge of how empathy dissolves subject positions, and can be felt across the 
species divide. Another asks whether empathy can be arrived at, or is only ever in 
process? Someone else says it works because we don’t understand it intellectually. 





In the black-box theatre on Saturday night, a three-piece, high energy feminist punk 
band are giving us everything they’ve got. Wearing blue lipstick and oversized tabard 
costumes, the trio’s raw vocals are soundtracked by drums and keyboard. There 
aren’t enough of us to match their energy, and the audience splits into three groups 
– some dance like crazy; others shuffle shyly; children dart about in between, staying 






What brings these diverse, strange sounding or intimate activities together? They 
were all part of Edge Effects, a four-day public programme happening in and around 
Glasgow’s Centre for Contemporary Arts (CCA) in July 2017.1 Opening with Áine 
O’Dwyer’s sound performance installation Down at Beasty Rock (2017), Edge 
 
1 Edge Effects was curated by the Scottish Sculpture Workshop (SSW), an art organisation based in 
the village of Lumsden, Aberdeenshire (SSW n.d.). The programme brought SSW’s participation in 
Frontiers in Retreat (2015–18), an EU-funded collaboration project around questions of art and 
ecology, to a much wider public than their immediate and rural locality. I was commissioned by SSW 
to write a critical review of Edge Effects, published on their website in 2019. The five vignettes that 
appear in this prologue are extracts edited and adapted from my text. They are also indicative of the 
development in form and purpose of the public programme over the last fifteen years across 
contemporary art institutions large and small. This example at the CCA aligns with programming 
happening across national, middle-sized and small institutions like Tate, Serpentine Gallery and Arts 
Admin to name three London-based institutions. 
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Effects also included: a traditional Finnish ‘whisking’ session at Glasgow’s Victorian 
Arlington Baths Club, from sauna healers Mari Keski-Korsu and Maaria Alén; Mele 
Broomes’ Movement Workshop that mixed games, core strength and hip opening 
exercises with African diasporic social dance; a discussion on how empathy might 
reconnect us with our ecosystems, hosted by Interfaces for Empathy; Charismatic 
Megafauna’s Saturday-night gig.2 Despite their differing modes and scales of 
engagement, it is possible to bracket these five distinct experiences together.  
 
From the informational to the informal, from the practical to the performative, what 
the public programme of a contemporary art institution can now include is seemingly 
limitless; but at its heart, a public programme is about coming together to experience 
something. Yet despite the variety, vibrancy, and increasing visibility of the public 
programme, it receives relatively little scholarly attention and remains side-lined in 
practice and discourse. As a producer of publicness distinct from exhibition-making 
and other forms of the curatorial, this thesis argues for taking the public programme 
seriously as a unique vantage point from which to explore publicness in the 
contemporary art museum and its extended spaces. 
  
 
2 Besides these activities, a temporary library with a collection of books and reading lists was set up in 




Introduction – Public Problems 
 
During my seven years as Assistant Curator (2009–15), and later Curator, Public 
Programmes (2015–16) at Tate, London, I encountered many small and large 
challenges. Some cropped up time and again, particularly in the auditorium spaces 
at Tate Britain and Tate Modern most often used for holding large-scale public 
events.3 These included misspellings on holding slides, ticket machines and 
PowerPoint presentations failing, and members of the audience asking whether the 
roaming microphone was ‘on’ (it was) when asking a question. I began to see these 
recurring quirks as part of Tate’s Public Programme, developing a level of familiarity 
and ease with them. Other things like a speaker falling off stage, or the stage itself 
being inaccessible to wheelchair users (in Tate Britain’s auditorium), were, in the 
case of the former, surprising, and of the latter, deeply problematic and indicative of 
wider structural problems. Big or small, such things were nonetheless stressful, 
awkward and embarrassing to deal with in the moment as a public programmer. 
 
A more curious problem occurred outside the museum. Whenever someone asked 
what my job entailed, I described different forms the ‘programme’ might take, 
spending little time explaining ‘public’, as if its referent was self-evident.4 But ‘public’ 
does not just denote; it connotes. As an adjective it suggests that something is 
designated for use by ‘everyone’; like ‘public convenience’, ‘public transport’, or 
‘public right of way’. It is often mobilised by institutions to imply openness and 
accessibility, particularly when next to the word ‘programme’. In a similar manner, 
the public describes a mass, abstract group or generality, that ‘everyone’ is 
notionally part of. Perhaps because these assumptions of accessibility, mass 
inclusion and participation seemed obvious (which is in itself problematic), I didn’t 
reference them when explaining how the term ‘public’ connects with ‘programme’. Or 
perhaps I didn’t have the language to talk about ‘public’. At least, not yet. 
 
 
3 For clarity, I use capitals to refer to actual job titles, departments and teams, and lower case to 
speak about the public programme and other related work in general. 
4 I use single quotation marks to introduce ‘public programme’, ‘public’ and ‘the public’ in this section, 
because they are abstract entities, but they also have material qualities and effects. Once they are 
sufficiently introduced as concepts and things, I refer to them without quotation marks. 
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How might these unexpected or seemingly intractable ‘problems’ that repeatedly 
crop up in the practice of public programming, be connected to the difficulty in 
articulating and accounting for what being public, and part of a public, means? This 
thesis takes the space and practice of ‘public programming’ as it manifests in the art 
museum and its extended spaces of culture and knowledge production – the 
contemporary art institution, gallery, art school, and performance festival – as a 
unique vantage point to ask: what does it mean to effectively and affectively become 
part of a public there? I argue that it is precisely the small and larger unplanned or 
unwanted moments that tell us the most about this. These instances may feel funny, 
awkward, embarrassing, hopeful, intimate or upsetting. Yet, as I unfold below, much 
of the literature accounting for this significant, but under-theorised area of curatorial 
practice, is unwilling to describe or detail the messiness of the publicness it 
produces. Scholar and curator Mick Wilson even publicly called attention to the need 
to ‘get specific’ about what happens in the discursive and performative events of a 
public programme during a lecture in 2018. In answer to this call, and my own 
observations of gaps in the literature, I carry out an unflinching exploration of my role 
in, and feelings about, moments when it felt curious, unsettling or difficult to be 
public, and part of one, during a selection of events I have programmed and/or 
attended. I also include stories from other public programmers that are both common 
and unique to anyone working with publics in such spaces. 
 
In what follows then, I describe the practical and theoretical methodologies used to 
probe this specificity gap, and unfold my main argument. Namely, that it is through a 
deep investigation of the peripheral, awkward, uncertain moments of programming 
that we might articulate public as an emergent process of becoming, of relations 
between people that unfold over time, rather than a fixed space and state that we 
simply step in and out of. What this realigned notion of publicness as in becoming 
might mean for public programming practice is really the import of the thesis. I follow 
this with a chapter summary and conclude with why such a re-framing, through the 







Practice-led Approaches to Materialising Publics 
 
Alongside theoretical interventions into the existing literature, mapped after this 
Introduction, I do three things to depart from what has already been said around the 
public programme and answer my central research questions: 
 
1) I use myself as primary locus of publicness; I draw on autoethnography and action 
research to reflect on my positions, actions and feelings as a public programmer and 
audience member in writing; 
2) Via a specific body of curatorial practice, I hold workshops and conversations with 
other programmers, producing further material to analyse and theorise from; 
3) These also ‘put into practice’ my theory that attending to the periphery of the event 
teaches us more about what it means to become public(s) as a process. 
 
I expand the approaches of point one, before moving through points two and three 
together, though all three are intertwined. The concerns of this research emerge 
from my experience of a specific curatorial practice in the art museum, though the 
events and experiences I discuss do not all issue from its matrix. Each example is, 
however, indicative of programming that has been ascendant within it: the 
participatory performance, the summer school, the curatorially-reflexive symposium, 
the reading group, and the workshop. This is because the issues of the public 
programme in the contemporary art institution are necessarily expansive, moving us 
beyond its specificity into other spaces and practices of cultural production. This 
move also demonstrates the need and value of bringing theatre and performance 
studies to bear on public programming, to understand it more fully and probe the 
reluctance identified in the literature (mapped below) to get specific about what 
happens within it.  
 
Observing publicness as a process through the programmer’s perspective, I go 
beyond the surveyed literature that mainly offers perspectives on format, 
participation, disruption, dissensus, social practices from a safe, critical distance in 
line with the professional case study (Bishop 2004, 2012, Rogoff 2010). I move away 
from turning experience into theoretical material to be applied generally, or carrying 
out audience evaluation. These methods tend to reinforce the notion that a public is 
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a separate entity from the institution. Instead, I acknowledge that, as Andrea Fraser 
writes, ‘[e]very time we speak of the “institution” as other than “us” we disavow our 
role in the creation and perpetuation of its conditions [...] the institution of art is 
internalized, embodied, and performed by individuals’ (2005 p.283). This means that 
when working with my own experiences, or those of other programmers through the 
workshops and conversations introduced below, I am working with them as audience 
to their own programmes. These peers and colleagues might have roles and 
responsibilities within an institution, but are also part of the public produced by it. In 
my writing and practice, therefore, I propose a third way between the distanced 
curator/theorist and the researcher who talks to ‘audiences’ about their experiences.  
 
Starting from my experiences as a public programmer at Tate and my attendance at 
other kinds of events, I account for several moments that, for me at least, disrupted 
the smoothness of the ‘event’.5 From these moments I produce a detailed 
understanding of the publicness that emerged, without shying away from messy 
specificity. My use of the term ‘disruptive moment’ refers to something unexpected or 
unplanned happening during the process of the kinds of events routinely produced 
through public programming. Emily Pringle and Jennifer Dewitt have also described 
certain Tate Learning practices that ‘engineer’ ‘disruptive moments’ to ‘allow the 
learner to develop new understandings about art’ (2014). My analysis of 
performance practices also refers to situations designed to disrupt and unsettle. My 
point is not to distinguish, but use the potential of disruptive moments – often minor, 
even queer, because of their uncategorisable status as neither success or failure – 
that become significant through the process of telling, discussing and writing. These 
are sought and investigated by me as a researcher because, prior to this research, 
they had already impacted my reflective practice as a public programmer. Through 
the approaches I take, such impact may be traced materially and affectively. 
 
 
5 I use speech marks here to acknowledge that, like the public programme itself, the event is not an 
easily agreed upon thing. For example, the ‘event’ in Erin Manning’s theorising (discussed later) is 
rather more philosophically conceived as ‘according to a Whiteheadian concept of the actual occasion 
[...] the coming-into-being of indeterminacy where potentiality passes into realization’ (Manning 2016 
p.2). The public programme may be conceived of as an ‘event-based’ curatorial practice, and I aim to 




The series of workshops developed as part of this research, called That Awkward 
Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19), was conceived of as a 
para-professional space for programmers to share and discuss moments of 
‘becoming public’ from their own experience, and designed to go beyond data 
gathering or group interviewing that might produce material purely for my research. 
Between October 2018 and July 2019, I held three workshops with groups of eight to 
sixteen participants, with each workshop advertised to a particular group, or 
individuals from my own peer network, via email invitation. Prior to attending, 
participants were sent a provocation to think of two moments – one as a 
programmer, one as an audience member – where it felt like the ‘smoothness of the 
event’ had been disrupted by something unexpected happening. After introducing my 
research and the workshop’s aims, they were invited to choose one example to tell 
to a partner, followed by a simple group conversation about what they had discussed 
in pairs. None of the workshops were audio recorded; instead, I wrote immediate 
notes and detailed observations afterwards. This decision was consciously made to 
create a space where participants felt comfortable speaking about topics and 
feelings not permissible in other professional contexts. In addition, rather than 
harvesting tales of discomfort and uncertainty for my own research purposes and 
data-gathering, I aimed to create a reflexive space that could be of mutual benefit. I 
also held several one-to-one, reflective conversations afterwards with participants 
and would-be participants.6 With permission, these were digitally recorded and 
transcribed. I either quote directly from notes and transcriptions, or paraphrase what 
was said; but to allow participants anonymity I use pseudonyms, and do not name 
their workplaces. Chapter Four reflects more deeply on what these unrecorded 
workshops afforded, but they are drawn on at particular points throughout the thesis.  
 
The workshops and conversations ‘put into practice’ approaches from the written 
thesis by bringing collective awareness to disruptive moments issuing from practice, 
and creating their own mini-moments of ‘becoming public’.7 Undoing the fixed 
demarcations of institution, programmer, artist, participant and public, these 
gatherings moved us between different normative positions, rather than re-enacting 
 
6 There were several who could not attend but were eager to discuss my provocation. 
7 This experimental methodology draws on action research and reflexive practice carried out at Tate 
where I tested, refined and reflected on ideas directly through programming. 
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them, which often occurs in a ‘straight’ interview process. Designed to parallel 
spaces of professional development and practice-sharing, these workshops were 
never about ‘best practice’. Neither were they about sharing ‘worst practice’. Instead 
they created space to unpick what a group of professionals themselves understood 
by ‘public’ as it connects to ‘programme’, in whatever institution or mode of practising 
they were engaged. In their review of autoethnographic practice, its qualities and 
challenges, Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams and Arthur P. Bochner (2011) state that 
asking: ‘“How useful is the story?”’ and ‘“To what uses might the story be put?”’ really 
lies at its heart (2011 p.282). If the workshops held as part of this research aimed to 
create a useful space for programmers, this thesis aims to unpack unusual and 
useful stories about becoming public for a wider network of curators, programmers 
and scholars engaged in multiple practices of producing publics, and their 
institutions. 
 
The workshops and conversations involved colleagues from my time at Tate; the 
2018–19 cohort of artists from Open School East and its staff; and a miscellaneous 
group drawn from my, and an existing, professional network. I publicised them 
through direct invitations, and the channels of partner institutions. Drawing on 
professional and peer networks in this way, some participants were known to me and 
also count as friends. Ellis, Adams and Bochner note that the ‘relational ethics’ of 
autoethnographic work are often ‘heightened’ because this work is not done in 
isolation. It happens in and through dense social networks that include family, friends 
and colleagues, and inevitably ‘implicate[s] others in our work’ (2011 p.281). The 
workshops and conversations exploited the gap between the professional and the 
anecdotal running through the colleague/friend dynamic. It also introduced personal 
and professional risk, undoing the presumed distinction between the ‘objective’ ideal 
of the distanced researcher and the subjective reality of being a programmer among 
(known and unknown) others. 
 
Due to the sometimes awkward, sometimes intimate nature of the topics under 
discussion in this thesis, which expands the felt texture of publicness, my research 
has, at times, turned out to be quasi-therapeutic. In the workshops, openly sharing 
my own examples of disruptive moments and admitting uncertain feelings about 
them elicited the most honest and interesting responses from my peers. This was not 
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always easy; as Ellis, Adams and Bochner astutely point out, autoethnographic 
practice is often criticised by social science ‘proper’ for being ‘insufficiently rigorous, 
theoretical, and analytical, and too aesthetic, emotional, and therapeutic’ (2011 
p.283). Not enough on the one hand then, and too much on the other. This ‘too’ was 
initially a concern for my writing and practice-led approaches, reflecting a more 
pervasive uncertainty about what is ‘too much’ and ‘not enough’ permeating the 
problem of publicness. It certainly emerged through the workshops where, for 
example, we explored how the propriety of publicness may be threatened by an 
unpredictable public becoming ‘too emotional’ and ‘over sharing’. Rather than shying 
away from this excess, I argue it is exactly what needs exploring – to fully realise the 
potential of the public programme to offer something valuable to our understanding 
of publicness as a process of becoming. 
 
What emerged through the excavation of my and others’ disruptive moments is 
written through an autoethnographic approach. In keeping with the ethnographic 
tenet that ‘the social’ is ‘not an experimental science in search of law, but an 
interpretive one in search of meaning’ (Geertz 1973 p.5), I acknowledge that 
personal experience informs the relationship between me as ‘researcher’ and what, 
or who, is ‘researched’, guiding my interpretation.8 My approach is particularly 
inspired by Jack Halberstam’s conception of queer failure (2011), underpinned by a 
‘low theory’ that resides in ‘popular places, in the small, the inconsequential, the 
antimonumental, the micro, the irrelevant’. My methodology of gathering and sorting 
through stories from the periphery is emboldened by Halberstam’s ‘low theory’, 
which is propelled by ‘chasing small projects, micropolitics, hunches, whims, fancies’ 
(p.21). My research works on a similarly diminutive but granular scale, assembling 
‘eccentric texts and examples’ in a way that emboldens others to speak about what 
most often ‘flies below the radar’ of institutional and personal scrutiny (p.16).9 
Secondly, Halberstam writes that ‘[r]eally imaginative ethnographies [...] depend 
upon an unknowing relation to the other. To begin an ethnographic project with a 
goal, with an object of research and a set of presumptions, is already to stymie the 
 
8 In the same passage Geertz also says that ‘man is an animal suspended in webs of significance he 
himself has spun’, which feels fitting to the workshops and conversations (1973 p.5). 
9 Indeed, the practice of public programming itself is often acknowledged amongst practitioners to fly 
below the radar, especially in large institutions. 
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process of discovery’ (p.12). Such an ‘imaginative [auto]ethnography’ speaks to the 
practice of workshops and conversations described in Chapter Four, and indeed the 
entire thesis as a process generated and marked by a series of hunches. Indeed, my 
hunch that attending to the overlooked, awkward and uncomfortable parts of the 
public programme could reveal what is at stake within it, is really where this project 
began. 
 
Theoretical Approaches for Materialising Publics 
 
The existing literature, mapped below, variously renders the apparatus of the 
museum, curating and the participatory encounter visible and critically available. 
However, the specific ways in which becoming public within institutional spaces 
manifests itself remains relatively unscrutinised. Consequently, this literature tends 
towards the idea of delivering for a general, idealised public that art institutions both 
invoke, and are predicated on. Even the pluralising of publics segments them into 
neat groupings to be marketed to and extracted from, rather than embracing – or 
celebrating – their embodiment, contradictions and contingency. These literatures 
move from conviviality to antagonism, knowledge production to dissensus and 
transformation, yet each position reduces publicness to some kind of singularity. As 
suggested above and discussed in more detail below, resistance to getting specific 
about the messy contingency of becoming public could be about distancing 
ourselves from failure and implication. This limits thinking about what is at stake in 
such moments, and how they might re-construct our staid understanding of publics 
and publicness. The politics of this thesis is found in disturbing and disrupting the 
idealised notions of publics that are drawn on, and sometimes instrumentalised, by 
the art museum and its extended spaces.  
 
The main theoretical bodies I draw on to probe the gaps and problems issuing from 
the Literature Review are theatre and performance studies, queer and feminist 
theory, which often interact. However, I argue they have not been combined in any 
substantive way to interact with material from museum studies, the curatorial, new 
institutionalism, educational turn and discourses on participation and community. 
Though these areas suggest, even turn to the performative, queer or the situational 
(feminist) in their singularity, what happens when we combine them to make these 
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links explicit? For example, if queer criticality challenges and breaks down normative 
identity categories, could it break up the normative, monolithic construction of ‘the 
public’ to re-think how publics are produced performatively, even queerly? It is also 
through queer, feminist theorists such as Halberstam (2011) and Sara Ahmed (2004, 
2006) and theatre scholars like Nicholas Ridout (2006) that we find examples of 
where getting specific takes us. Applying these more embodied approaches to the 
disruptive moments I describe enables a nuanced understanding of publicness, 
moving it beyond an abstract state, or static space that we step in and out of.  
Summary of Methodological Approaches 
My project emerges from how the art museum has been tied, in rather uncomfortable 
ways, to normative, idealised notions of ‘public space’ and publicness. It understands 
publicness as a function of the art museum, not simply a given. Taking public and 
private as overlapping across bodies and architectures (Warner 2005), together with 
Allen’s suggestion to understand public as more a question of ‘when’ over a 
condition of ‘where’ (2015 p.178), I take a specific place – the contemporary art 
institution – and a specific practice – the public programme – to unpack publicness 
as an emergent and contingent process of becoming. I do this through a close 
reading of small and large ‘public problems’ I encountered as public programmer and 
audience member, described at the outset and re-framed as ‘disruptive moments’. I 
do this because the public is an abstract notion, which, as my Literature Review 
details, leaves it open to instrumentalisation. Indeed the experience of publicness 
itself often precarious, particularly for certain bodies for whom the right to appear 
publicly does not come easily, as Judith Butler (2015) has suggested. 
 
In order interrogate, challenge and resist this abstractness, this research looks to a 
specific practice that I have been professionally invested in for over seven years, that 
like publicness, has no fixed definition. A public programme might be called 
education, learning or engagement and may fall between several departments and 
agendas, including curatorial or marketing. It can take overlapping forms from the 
discursive, to the participatory, experiential or convivial, and can even be presented 
as entertainment. For the purposes of this thesis, it can generally be understood to 
open a temporary space of face to face gathering and reflection on an institution’s 
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main or core programme of exhibitions and displays. But this also explains why my 
examples range from participatory performances at a city-wide festival and during a 
panel discussion at a conference; the reading group as curatorial intervention in an 
independent gallery and studio complex; the lecture at curatorial summer school in a 
European art school; the avant garde performance at a national museum ‘late’. 
Examples retold from workshop attendees are similarly diverse, but all are indicative 
of the range of forms that a contemporary public programme might include, and 
variety of contexts in which it takes places. Lastly, my inclusion of examples from 
contemporary performance practice is particularly pertinent to my observation that 
theoretical material from this field presents many of the challenges, and therefore 
have something valuable to say about what is at stake in programmed moments of 
face to face gathering.  
In taking this practice, and the professional demarcation of public programmer, 
seriously, I claim it is a specific and valuable form of curatorial practice, rather than a 
mere aspect or adjunct to the exhibition, as it generally appears in the literature. As I 
also map in my Literature Review below, the specificity of this practice and what it 
really has to offer, has been missed. My research addresses this gap. But I do so in 
an unexpected manner – not by surveying and holding up examples of best practice 
to showcase public programming as an exemplary curatorial form. Rather, I 
undertake a close, autoethnographic reading of small and larger disruptive, 
unsettling or unexpected moments from my professional practice as a public 
programmer, and my experiences as audience to such programmes, to understand 
what is at stake in this process of becoming public, and further, what this practice of 
public programming is really capable of. 
Since this research comes out of my own embodied experience of a specific 
curatorial practice – public programming in the museum and contemporary art 
institution. My research paradigm, or rationale for carrying out this study in the way 
that I did, is bringing embodied experience(s) to bear on our understanding of 
publicness, eschewing its here-to-fore abstractness to develop a more tangible 
relation to it. I do this through a consistently autoethnographic and / or embodied 
approach: unpacking my own examples of disruptive moments; developing and 
sharing an anecdotal practice with other public programmers to work with theirs; 
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bringing queer, feminist and situated theoretical approaches together with 
performance and theatre studies to address the problems and gaps mapped in the 
literature accounting for the public programme, thereby emphasising the felt 
dimensions and messy reality of becoming public(s). This thesis demonstrates that is 
only by teasing out the affective registers of experience that we can ever challenge 
the ideal, abstract notion of ‘public’ assumed and invoked by art institutions, and 
institutions more broadly. 
 
Operating para-professionally, these workshops challenged the normative divisions 
set up by much of the literature between professional/audience, and the classic 
theorisations and disciplinary boundaries that stem from this. Consciously muddying 
the distinction between programmer, researcher and audience in my own 
autoethnographic writing practice, reinforces the idea that we are not separate from 
the institution we operate in, nor the publics we produce. This approach was 
mirrored through my use of a familiar format of the public programme – the workshop 
– to put into practice my model of paying attention to the periphery. It also created a 
situation where everyone present arrived with the professional demarcation of public 
programmer and became audience to each other, their own programmes, and co-
researcher with me. 
 
The criteria for selecting the examples I explore, and the methods used to arrive at 
the conclusions I draw from them, follow this practice-led, embodied approach. 
Firstly, the activities and situations from which these examples issue range from 
performances to lectures and other more recognisable public programme events. As 
suggested by my Prologue and detailed above, this demonstrates how expansive the 
public programme has become, and as such a range of practices must be 
considered to understand how it produces relations beyond official, dominant forms 
of sanctioned publicness. The examples of disruptive moments drawn from my own 
anecdotal archive of organising and attending events, and several stories emerging 
from the workshops, were selected via two criteria. Firstly, the heightened state of 
feeling at the time, and the tenacity with which they have stuck in my memory. 
Secondly, their uncertain categorisation and potential therefore for multiple retellings 
and readings. For example, the fact that I have never known quite what to make of a 
strong sense of shame during a participatory performance about race and 
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community, is what first drew me to write about it in depth and rich texture in Chapter 
Three. Suffice to say that all examples from my own experience, and those shared 
during the workshops that I selected to retell, all happened in public, in the temporal 
and spatial presence of others. Those selected from the workshops and 
conversations were chosen largely for how they rendered an ‘outside’ of what we 
might consider permissible or possible within our current working definitions of 
publicness from programmers themselves, or made the invisible boundaries of public 
‘space’ (a notion I am not entirely doing away with, as discussed in Chapter Four) 
visible.  
 
I unpack these examples without fixing their meaning, suspending their anecdotal 
status and avoiding turning them into ‘case studies’ as such. Rather I use theoretical 
resources that explore minor, periphery, and – in particular relation to the workshop 
practice – anecdotal and performative modes of speech and their productivity to 
arrive at my conclusions. Indeed, Gavin Butt’s writing (2005) on gossip’s role as a 
performative informational practice that produces a different, but equally important 
kind of art-historical knowledge, has been instructive in developing my approach to 
both the writing, and the workshop practice detailed below. Given that my work 
entails a centring of peripheral phenomena, Manning’s writing on the value of the 
‘minor gesture’ is key. She writes that ‘the minor’ both ‘exceeds the limits of the 
event’ and makes the event’s limits felt, and thereby ‘punctually reorients experience’ 
(Manning 2016 p.2). My conception of events is, on the surface at least, more literal 
– programmed forms of gathering in contemporary art institutions engaging both 
specific, and less defined publics. However, Manning’s recognition that a focus on 
the minor materialises the event’s limits informs my approach to writing about my 
experiences, as well as understanding what emerged through the workshops and 
conversations I held.  
 
The conclusions that I arrive at through these examples contribute to new knowledge 
in the specific field of public programming, but this research also impacts curatorial 
discourses through its specific focus, as well as challenging discourses on the public 
sphere in its reframing of publicness as a temporal process of becoming. My main 
outcome is a specific methodology of paying attention to the periphery of events and 
making this an anecdotal practice by sharing it with a professional peer group 
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through the series That Awkward Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers. 
I called this a para-professional space because it was not about show-casing best 
practice, or debriefing about worst practice in order to improve it. My centring of the 
anecdote within practice eschews this unhelpful binary to suggest a third way of 
considering what it is we are doing when we are producing publics. In doing so it 





In the next section, a Literature Review introduces my own practice-informed context 
for this work; outlines the critical contexts hailing from several overlapping literatures 
that account for the public programme; suggests their problems, gaps and 
opportunities for this thesis’ intervention. Building on this theoretical basis, and to 
cast the assumptions around publicness that attend the public programme into 
doubt, Chapter One begins my analysis of ‘disruptive moments’ with a piece of 
programming undertaken in 2011 that continues to provoke a sense of unease in 
me. I look back – not to get critical distance, but to re-inhabit an uncertainty that as a 
professional, I might ordinarily detach myself from. This approach is taken 
throughout the chapters, as I write from the various subject positions of public 
programmer, audience member, workshop facilitator and conversation partner. 
 
Chapter One – That Awkward Stage 
 
Through a detailed analysis of Aaron Williamson's performance Collapsing Lecture 
that I curated for Late at Tate Britain: Diffusions in 2011, I propose the public 
programme as a ‘stage’ where the art institution’s ‘awkward’ relationship to its 
publics is played out. After Muñoz (2013), I take this stage to be both a physical 
platform and temporal phase, which reveals the process of the institution instituting 
itself as well as our becoming public(s) within it. Unpacking the Collapsing Lecture’s 
catalogue of ‘queer failures’, after Halberstam (2011), reveals how staff, performer 
and public are implicated in the scene of publicness, but feel and respond differently 
to it, becoming public in a variety of ways through it. From this I unfold the key 
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aspects for understanding publicness as a process of becoming, or how we become 
public(s) in the contemporary art institution, addressed in the remaining chapters. 
 
Chapter Two – Paying Attention: Economics, Ethics, Embodiment 
 
In this chapter I examine how one of Warner’s keys claims – that ‘a public is 
constituted through mere attention’ (2005 p.87) – comes to bear on two common 
spaces created by the public programme: the summer school and the reading. How 
are these spaces ‘held’ by the event’s protagonists – the speakers, performers, or 
facilitators – and the multiple ‘actors’ (human and non-human) in the room: 
audiences, participants, institutional staff, furniture and technical equipment? Not 
only are they all vulnerable to the failures of Chapter One, but I unpack how ‘paying 
attention’ is both an economic and a public relation, extending my analysis with other 
examples of programming and contemporary art practice. I then suggest how a shift 
in attention from what is produced, to who and what is producing our attention, 
opens the potential to explore and value the difference we inhabit when coming into 
publicness with others via the public programme. 
 
Chapter Three – Performing Responsibility: Temporary Communities and 
Performance Art 
 
This chapter picks up the thread of responsibility introduced in Chapter One, and 
suggested in Chapter Two, since we cannot respond to that which we have not first 
attended. This chapter explores becoming public via two participatory performances 
that challenged the notion of a passive audience and made claims for a temporary 
community and group formation. Analysing my complex, ambiguous feelings about 
what I participated in, this chapter thinks through what it means to be responsible for 
each other and the spectacle, and how these two things are sometimes at odds. Are 
such situations that are constructed and contingent a mirror of our present neoliberal 
condition where everyone is responsible for their own success and failure? If so, 
what are the limits of our capacity to respond? How does the body of this researcher 
and the histories and presents she is implicated in come to bear on this? What does 




Chapter Four – Practice Makes Public  
 
In the role of public programmer, emotional meets professional labour in public. This 
chapter tests a central proposition of the thesis – the public programme as ‘awkward 
stage’ – through an emergent practice extending the written research. That Awkward 
Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19) was a series that ‘put 
into practice’ the shift in attention suggested by Chapter Two, inviting public 
programmers to collectively pay attention to the periphery of events they have 
programmed or attended. Participants shared and unpacked their own ‘disruptive 
moments’ as anecdotes that might otherwise be overlooked, for what they might tell 
us about publicness as a process of becoming. Creating a collective anecdotal 
practice, we were able to rethink the personal, professional and social demarcations 
that construct the public programmer, and the public to be programmed. Lastly, to 
explore the potential of a para-professional space for examining the uncertain parts 
of practice.  
 
Introduction Conclusion  
 
This research is not an historical or contemporary review of public programming 
practice, though it could lead to one. What emerges instead is how we may use the 
space it affords to unpack facets of publicness, which could come to matter in ways 
we cannot yet quantify. As I write this, during the summer of 2020, the ascendance 
of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement calls on white people to pay attention to 
the reality of Black lives, to realise that they are implicated in white supremacy, and 
must become actively anti-racist in order to dismantle it. In times like these art 
institutions make many promises,10 which the public programme is frequently used to 
implement or make visible, often through discussion-based events. At best, public 
programming becomes the instrument of commitment to systemic change; at worst, 
a spectacle of it. One of the most urgent shifts in public programming to emerge in 
the four years since I began this research is away from the desire to create ‘safe 
spaces’ towards the creation of ‘brave spaces’ (Arao and Clemens 2013, Palfrey 
 
10 As seen in the proliferation of statements issued by national and smaller scale art institutions in 
support of BLM over the summer of 2020, and indeed their critique (Greenberger 2020). 
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2017).11 The need to unpick what becoming public feels like in all its 
uncomfortableness, is part of this essential work. Because what is too often left 
unsaid, or unexplored, is how such moments of publicness are produced by 
institutions. This means we cannot yet understand, nor move beyond the 
assumptions made about the very experience of becoming public there. This thesis 
offers to peel back the layers of production and get specific about this process. 
Because the public programme is used by contemporary art institutions to promise 
so much, this research works towards realising its potential, as a space where all the 
affective realities of becoming public can be not just felt, but explored. Where we can 
collectively and reflexively pay attention to how people may appear, be heard, 





11 In part as a response to BLM’s demands, and in part in recognition of the fact that there is no such 
thing as a ‘safe space’. This has come up in several informal discussions with colleagues, and also 







This thesis is informed in great part by my experience of working within the Public 
Programmes team at Tate Britain and Tate Modern from 2009 until 2016.12 
Additionally, as this research has come about through a Collaborative Doctoral 
Partnership with Tate, with the mandate to critically investigate the public programme 
in the contemporary art institution, I have drawn a lot from my time there.13 My 
knowledge of public programming extends across a range of predominantly Anglo-
European museums and contemporary art institutions. My understanding of the 
‘public programme’ is as a set of event-based opportunities for ‘the public’ to engage 
with the art, ideas and range of different practitioners, most often organised in 
relation to an institution’s exhibition and/or collection display programme. An 
institution’s public programme may be named as such or come under a range of 
other titles such as ‘learning’, ‘education’ or ‘public engagement’. Tate’s Public 
Programme (named as such) is aimed at adults,14 and includes a ticketed 
programme of talks, symposia, tours, practical and discussion-based workshops and 
evening courses, as well as performances and film screenings.15 Two additional 
strands under Tate’s Public Programme umbrella are the Access Programme for 
adults with physical or sensory disabilities, and the Community Programme that 
supports local groups to visit to the museum.16 As such, recent forms of public 
programming at Tate and elsewhere, encompass different formats that range in tone 
from the academic to the playful and convivial.  
 
12 I left the role to begin this research in 2016. 
13 As a result, this thesis has been developed in dialogue with colleagues from Tate’s Public 
Programme and the wider Learning and Research Department. 
14 As distinct from audiences that Young People’s Programme, Early Years and Families, Schools 
and Teachers teams cater to. 
15 This programming overlaps at times with the Live, Film and other programming developed by the 
Curatorial Department, or, is produced collaboratively with them. 
16 This particular configuration was formed after a review of the Learning and Education Departments 
at all four Tate sites that began in 2011. One outcome of this review, entitled ‘Transforming Tate 
Learning’ and documented in an online resource of the same name (2014), was the merger of Tate 
Modern’s Learning Department with the Education and Interpretation Department at Tate Britain, 
creating the cross-site Learning Department, which became Tate Learning and Research Department 
after a further review in 2019. The outcome of the first review meant that explicit income-generating 
activities and ‘free’ (institutionally funded) programmes were brought together, something which, at 




Broadly speaking, the public programme in the contemporary art institution operates 
in relation to the artistic programme, adjunctive to the primary activity of exhibition-
making. When there is a dedicated role or team it sits, not always distinct from, but 
variously in or between curatorial, education and even marketing departments.17 This 
may highlight the promiscuity of the practice in larger institutions, whereas in smaller 
organisations, public programming is often something curatorial staff take on as part 
of their role.18 Over the last twenty years and particularly in the last ten, through 
socially engaged, performative, discursive and digital practices, the public 
programme has become foregrounded as the site and conduit for new 
agglomerations and kinds of art production. Though not exclusive to art museums, 
the proliferation of ‘late’ events across UK museums since the early 2000s opened a 
space for event-based art and programming that crossed participation, knowledge 
production and performance. As playful, performative and noisy programming took 
over the museum – galleries, foyers, cafes, learning and even back of house spaces 
– so called ‘Lates culture’ (Stockman 2018) expanded possibilities for engagement 
beyond traditional formats like ticketed talks (though these are almost always 
included).19 My prologue described the variety in formats, spaces and content of 
public programming now, all of which makes it a difficult, but interesting, practice to 
delineate and study, with its own set of problems and opportunities. 
 
Such ontological slipperiness in institutional practice is also mirrored in where and 
how aspects of the public programme appear across a variety of discourses and 
 
17 Despite the dedicated remit of Tate’s Public Programme team, sitting within the wider Learning and 
Research Department, a recent internal review showed Curatorial and Marketing Departments, 
alongside different commercial sites like Tate Shops, Bars and Restaurants, to all be generating 
public programmes. This unpublished internal Tate document was carried out by Madeleine Keep in 
2019, the then Convenor, Public Programmes. 
18 The ‘About’ page of The Showroom’s website and ‘Staff’ page of Chisenhale Gallery show no 
named or designated public programme, education or learning staff (The Showroom n.d. Chisenhale 
Gallery n.d.). 
19 The Serpentine Gallery’s twenty-four-hour Marathon events began in 2006, as a way to animate 
their annual architectural pavilion commissions. A year later their Park Nights programme expanded 
the gallery’s repertoire of contemporary art production (Serpentine n.d.). Building on these 
developments, Tate Exchange opened in 2016 as a physical space and programme at Tate Modern 
and Tate Liverpool, this time with a directly participatory remit: ‘for everyone to debate and reflect 
upon contemporary topics and ideas, get actively involved, think through doing, and make a 
difference’ (Tate n.d.), making such programming visible as a daytime, fluid, durational and ‘drop-in’ 
activity not requiring tickets. 
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literatures. The intersections between departments I described above point to the 
interstitial place of the public programme and, therefore, the intersecting literatures 
that speak to this uncertain delineation. Particularly in exhibition studies, the public 
programme is hierarchically bound to the exhibition as an under-theorised, under-
archived and altogether more slippery cultural object than the more orderly, bounded 
exhibition.20 Having offered my own professional perspective, below I map the 
discourses and literatures that account for elements of the public programme 
through museum and exhibition studies, the curatorial, educational turn and new 
institutionalism. While most do not directly address it as such, these discourses 
account for a space that might be described as ‘the public programme’, framing it in 
terms of disruption, expansion, performativity, inclusivity and an opening of 
knowledge production to wider publics. They also draw attention to, or critique, a 
number of key terms used within contemporary art institutions and public 
programming practice, such as ‘community’ and ‘participation’. Is participating in 
something and/or forming a community the positive experience and virtuous goal 
that it is purported to be? What are the possible political and institutional agendas 
behind the desire for fuller ‘public’ participation, and what are the effects of such 
agendas? Lastly, I encounter the problem of the illusive and elusive ‘public’ itself. In 
practice, and in most literature concerning museum and gallery audiences, the public 
is an ideal group of people, desired and addressed, but also abstract and often 
absent. In what follows I establish the normative assumptions that the delineation 
‘public programme’ is built on, and how these different issues take shape. I build my 
own rationale for why it could benefit from, and holds the potential for, a more 
thorough critical analysis than has previously emerged from the literatures I map, 
based on the gaps and problems identified therein.  
 
Museum and Exhibition Studies 
 
This thesis issues from the art museum and how it has been tied to publicness in 
rather uncomfortable ways. Emerging from the display of private collections of rare 
objects – frequently looted from other countries and cultures (Schoenberger 2020) – 
 
20 This is exemplified by the fact that, to my knowledge, there has not been a book-length study 
examining the role and function and potential of the public programme, despite an increase of 
curatorial and scholarly interest in it, as demonstrated by Alex Hodby’s PhD thesis (2017). 
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to a privileged few, in the nineteenth-century the museum opened its doors to a 
‘general public’ (Bennett 1995, p.59). Embedded in providing exclusive access to 
private property, the museum’s relationship to publicness is ostensibly about the 
movement of private wealth into public hands, as benevolent social improvement 
(Duncan 2013, Candlin 2010). Shifting from a notion of public good in the late 
twentieth-century, the museum becomes a hybridised space of commercial and 
social reproduction. Yet it maintains a special, and problematic, relationship with 
privacy: the twenty-first-century museum is routinely used to wash clean corporate 
and private wealth, protecting the interests of private persons (Cuno 2004), through 
capital projects, blockbuster exhibitions, public programming and benevolent ‘out-
reach’ for marginalised publics. Not only have privacy and private interests always 
been enmeshed in a notion of the museum as public good, but the exclusivity of this 
exceptional ‘public’ space has been hidden under a veil of universality, openness 
and accessibility that it connotes. 
 
Museum studies helps us to conceptualise this exceptional space in other ways. 
Carol Duncan describes art museums as ‘ritual structures’ where visitors perform 
ritualised gestures leading to a transformative experience moving them beyond 
normative ideas and ideals (1995 pp.1–2 and pp.12–13). Drawing attention to the 
power of the museum to produce subjectivities, Duncan contributed to a challenge, 
in the 1980s and 90s, to the dominant model of the museum as the keeper (curator) 
of rational knowledge, bringing the experience of an embodied spectator who walks 
those spaces into view. However, as Duncan acknowledges, the transformational 
ritual of the museum is best performed by those who fit into the representational 
regime of its collection (pp.8–9). As such, it is a powerful technology to reinforce 
subjectivity in relation to normative ideas of gender, sexuality, race and nationhood, 
as much as it may challenge and transform them. This is further explored as a ‘crisis 
of representation’ by Andrew Dewdney, David Dibosa and Victoria Walsh (2013). I 
return to their research addressing Tate Britain’s ‘problem’ of ‘missing 
audiences’/‘non-attenders’ (p.4), often classified as ‘minority’ in a dominant white, 
heteronormative culture, because it is crucial to the development of the public 




Tony Bennett explains how the ‘civilised subject’ is produced through the parallel 
development of the penitentiary system and the museum, with complex mechanisms 
of display and surveillance (1995 pp.59–86). Bennett argues the museum creates a 
looking subject that understands itself as looked at, by interiorising its panopticon 
gaze. As technology of surveillance, the museum sets up a powerful connection 
between seeing and knowing, producing a looping consciousness and self-regulation 
in the looking subject who (p.63), allowing us to consider it a specific technology of 
publicness. Today the kinds of publicness the museum produces are not only based 
around looking, as different forms of public programming, marketing and commercial 
activities demonstrate. But Bennett also allows us to think beyond an individual 
looking subject, to consider how the museum produces a ‘general public – witnesses 
whose presence was […] essential to the museum’s display of power’ (Bennett 1995 
p.59).  
 
Departing from a literature that, despite Bennett, largely speaks to the museum’s role 
in the production of individual subject positions, Simon Sheikh introduces temporary 
exhibition-making’s ‘production of a public’. As the producer of ‘the “new” bourgeois 
subject of reason’, the temporary exhibition employs specific modes of address to 
produce a public as ‘an imaginary endeavor with real effects’ (2017 pp.175–8). 
Describing and accounting for these ‘real effects’ becomes important if we are to 
move away from the public as an abstraction, towards a specific materialisation.  
 
The Curatorial  
 
In the 1990s an accelerated discourse on curating emerged through its 
professionalisation and entrance into higher education, along with international 
symposia, meetings of curators and the curatorial anthologies they produced (O’Neill 
2007 p.14).21 A more recent offshoot of this discourse is ‘the curatorial’ – a critical, 
theoretical field, moving beyond curating as practice, which Maria Lind positions as a 
mediating function ‘performed’ across a variety of fields (2012). Jean-Paul Martinon 
writes that ‘the curatorial disrupts knowledge in order to invent knowledge’ (2013 
 
21 Paul O’Neill has heavily contributed to the professionalisation and discourse of curating through his 
curatorial, educational and editorial work, producing several of these anthologies, also mentioned in 
this Literature Review. 
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p.30), and in a similar move, Rogoff states it is at best ‘when it is attempting to enact 
the event of knowledge rather than to illustrate […] knowledges’ (2013 p.46). 
Elsewhere, Bridget Crone describes the curatorial as inclusive of all kinds of ‘para 
activities’ that, we might otherwise describe under the umbrella of the public 
programme. For Crone, the curatorial is a ‘moment of encounter or staging’ where 
something is ‘made visible’. But though it is ‘intrinsically performative’, it is not 
theatrical (Crone 2013 p.209). How could such expansion into performativity and 
event-ness help our understanding of the space and possibilities of the public 
programme? If we understand the public programme as a performative encounter, 
we can also allow consider its ‘staged-ness’, and attendant failures, as constitutive of 
it. Instead of disavowing the theatrical, I argue for embracing it with literature from 
theatre and performance studies, to better understand how the public programme 
performs and produces publicness. In addition, the movement and expansion of ‘the 
curatorial’ moves us beyond spatial, architectural metaphors of public space, to 
imagine a more temporal, embodied process. 
 
Public Art as Process 
 
Paul O’Neill has recently explored his thoughts on ‘durational public art’ and ‘the 
concept of “attentiveness”’ as a way of positing our current condition as ‘post-
participatory’ through several talks (for example at CCA, Glasgow 2018). Miwon 
Kwon tracks the move from site-specific, to community-specific public art, pioneered 
by Suzanne Lacy (and others) drawing on Lacy’s definition of ‘“New genre public 
art,” […] [as] a “democratic” model of communication based on participation and 
collaboration of audience members in the production of a work of art’ (Kwon 2002). 
Lacy’s term describes public art as practised, rather than placed, favouring 
‘temporary rather than permanent projects that engage their audience, […] as active 
participants in the conceptualization and production of process-oriented, politically 
conscious community events or programs’ (Kwon 2002 p.6). This shift in ‘public art’ 
towards ephemeral practice and active participation also describes many of the kinds 
of activities in a public programme – such as workshops, co-produced art and 
performance – and emphasises increased investment in programming that is 
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processual in nature.22 This move prompts a shift in considering publicness, as 
political scientist Danielle Allen suggests, ‘in terms of “flows” first, and “spaces” only 
secondarily’ (2015 p.178). This, in turn, becomes important to my investigation of 
publicness as a process, over and above a fixed space or state. 
 
The Educational Turn 
 
‘The educational turn’, a move away from object-based towards time-bound, 
process-based forms of art and knowledge production that often mirror pedagogic 
formats, is suggested by Susan Kelly to operate in parallel with the curatorial. 
Happening across the university and art school, temporary exhibitions, and of course 
museum and gallery education departments, Kelly argues that the former rarely 
acknowledged, or interacted with the latter, despite their ‘fascinating radical roots in 
feminist politics and radical pedagogy’ (2013 p.138). For Irit Rogoff, ‘the notion of 
conversation’ brought about by the educational turn ‘has been the most significant 
shift’, though she points out the risk of aestheticising educational formats at the 
expense of what is produced (2010 p.43). However, if we can define ‘access’ as ‘the 
ability to formulate one’s own questions as opposed to those that are posed to you’, 
such discursive programming might begin to account for marginalised bodies 
normatively excluded by the institution (p.41).  
 
Moving to museum and gallery education, Felicity Allen (2009) unpacks a complex 
understanding of roles, positions and identifications within museum and gallery 
education.23 She writes that: 
 
[c]onventionally, museum curators identify with the “self” of the artist, while 
gallery educators are situated as identifying with the “other” of the visitor […] 
at Tate Britain, we regularly involve people – “visitors” – to take on the role of 
 
22 Putting aside, for now, the ensuing arguments concerning participation and agency, The 
Showroom’s Communal Knowledge, running since 2010, provides one example of this shift. It is an 
ongoing ‘programme of collaborative projects’ where ‘local and international artists and designers’ 
work with local residents and groups to build ‘an accumulative shared body of knowledge’ (The 
Showroom n.d.). 
23 At the time of writing Allen was Head of Education and Interpretation at Tate Britain, and draws on 
her institutional experience 
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artist or curator so that they, too, can play around, challenge and take 
authority (Allen 2009 p.2).  
 
This excerpt brings in another word for ‘audience’ or ‘public’ not often used in the 
literature,24 but by centring her analysis on the ‘visitor’, Allen shows how a particular 
kind of hosting affords a fluidity of roles and possibilities. Such a focus brings the 
public programme towards the curatorial, what Martinon calls a ‘space of concern for 
the other’. Martinon suggests curating fails at this, because it is concerned with ‘the 
exhibition, the artist, the curator and above all for the objects on display and then for 
the other or the audience’ (2013 p.27). The realignment of ‘the curatorial’ towards the 
otherness of the public has greatly informed my practice, and this research.25 
Indeed, how we operate within this ‘space of concern’ and still manage to ‘other’ the 




‘New institutionalism’ of the 1990s and early 2000s rethought ‘curatorial, art 
educational and administrative practices’ of middle-sized contemporary art 
institutions, following ‘new museology’ that emerged from reflexive museum critique 
of ‘hegemonial western, nationalist and patriarchal narratives and constructs’ to 
‘demand for a radical examination of the[ir] social role’ in the 1980s (Flückiger and 
Kolb 2013).26 Speaking to the traditional ‘disparities’ created by ‘[e]ducation, learning 
and public programmes […] [being] seen as secondary to, or servicing, exhibitions’, 
Sally Tallant presents the ‘new institution’ as an opportunity to place ‘equal 
emphasis’ on all aspects of production, including ‘archives, reading rooms, residency 
schemes, talks and events as well as exhibitions’ (2010 p.187). More recently, 
Alistair Hudson extended this remit to include all activities the institution is used for, 
 
24 Nor was ‘visitor’ much part of my vocabulary as a public programmer, and later researcher. Partly 
because my erstwhile job title already acknowledged its role in the production of publics, but also 
because at Tate the Visitor Experience Department is separate from, but works closely with, 
Curatorial and Learning Departments. Partly because this research operates on the periphery of 
museum and gallery education studies, though it has great import for these areas. 
25 Indeed, at Tate my role was primarily focused on the experience of audiences, in contrast to the 
primacy of the curator-artist relationship of the Curatorial team. 
26 The term was first used by art critic Jonas Ekeberg to describe the practices of middle-sized 
contemporary art institutions in Northern Europe in this period (Flückiger and Kolb 2013). 
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including shopping, eating and using the toilets (Hudson 2015).27 Considering uses 
and interactions beyond the informational and transactional, John Byrne (et al.) has 
asked ‘[w]hat would happen if museums put relationships at the centre of their 
operations?’ (2018 p.11). These approaches may allow a notional flattening, though 
may still be aspirational. However, they make the public programme more visible, 
when it is repeatedly overlooked elsewhere.28 But, as Gabriel Flückiger and Lucie 
Kolb have summarised, new institutionalism’s ‘key actors were theorists, curators 
and artists who discussed their own institutional practice’, and while some hoped to 
create a ‘politicized public or counter-public’ (2013), they largely failed to reach 
beyond ‘a relatively small, invited knowledge community’ (Farquharson 2013). This 
leaves the positions of curator, artist and visitor unchallenged, and hierarchical 
relations between intra-institutional practices largely intact. Going back to museum 
studies and the educational turn, we find the same notion made more explicit. 
Dewdney, Dibosa and Walsh describe the ‘[r]elatively marginal position’ occupied by 
the education department at Tate Britain (2013 p.63). While O’Neill and Wilson 
acknowledge the public programme has long been ‘peripheral to the exhibition, 
operating in a secondary role’; however, they do propose that discursive activities 
have now undergone a kind of ‘curatorialisation’ making them ‘the main event’ (2010 
pp.12–13).  
 
Both new institutionalism and the educational turn invoke the ‘transformative 
potential’ of art (Tallant 2010 p.191), as an aspiration of experimental programming 
and even institutions themselves (Vidokle 2010 p.149, Farquharson 2006). O’Neill 
and Wilson describe the emergent subjectivities of ‘these radically open transactions 
of do-it-yourself learning’ as rejecting ‘a normative production of the “good” subject’ 
(2010 p.18). Grant Kester remarks that the ‘the language of disruption or 
estrangement is emblematic’ in ‘curators, educational programmers, and gallery 
directors […] expressing their desire for “disrupting notions of subject”’ begging the 
question where the desire ‘to “challenge” viewers… [and] provide them with “difficult 
experiences”’ comes from and what might it reveal about institutional expectations of 
 
27 Speaking as former Director, Middlesbrough Institute of Modern Art (MIMA). 
28 For example, in her essay Radical Museology: or, What's Contemporary in Museums of 
Contemporary Art? Claire Bishop’s brief analysis of Reina Sofia’s education programme makes clear 
that it is supporting the radical programme of an art institution, without being considered the radical 
programme itself (Bishop 2013 p.9). 
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publics? (p.13). Shifting the function of art institutions from a model of producing the 
‘good’ or ‘civilised subject’ introduced and critiqued by museum studies, to disrupting 
and challenging what these categories even mean. The emphasis on disruption and 
its transformative potential is also useful for my research, which centres peripheral 
distractions and disruptions to the public programme. However, there is still a 
received notion of such programming affecting change, frequently evoked in positive 
terms. It is implied that such moments will be productive – but productive of what? 
Taking these literatures together, a concern for an ‘authentic’ educative experience 
seems at stake (that a curator is uniquely placed to facilitate): is one participating 
and learning, being challenged and transformed? Or is it merely a spectacular 
relationship to an aestheticised version of the educational? A similar concern is 
addressed by Jacques Rancière (2009) where he diagnoses the problem of 
spectatorship in theatre as an unresolved anxiety over the gap between passive 
viewing and active participation, discussed below in relation to notions of 
‘community’ that it is often connected to.  
 
Participation and Community 
 
The intersubjective nature of public programming and attendance cannot be 
separated from notions of ‘participation’ and ‘community’ emerging from philosophy, 
performance and theatre studies and their relationship to the political. This literature 
accounts for areas of the public programme approaching socially engaged, 
participatory art practices. Following Owen Kelly’s notion of cultural democracy 
(1984), Emily Pringle writes that late 1960s’ community arts in the UK developed ‘the 
notion of empowerment through participation in a creative process, a dislike of 
cultural hierarchies […] and a belief in the creative potential of all sections of society’ 
(2011 p.1). Creative collaboration between artists and communities where process is 
prized over outcome is still a common strategy of this kind of practice, with the 
worthy aim of increasing agency in participants.  
 
Indeed, international histories of community arts are the forerunners of the 
contemporary art practices Nicolas Bourriaud famously coined as ‘relational’ (2002), 
where social interactions are materialised as art. His largely celebratory reading of 
the conviviality produced through participatory artworks like Rirkrit Tiravanija’s 
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shared meals has, however, been widely criticised. As a riposte to the cosiness of 
Bourriaud, Claire Bishop (2004) provides a counter-narrative of relational practices 
that antagonise social interactions and highlight social inequalities in democratic 
society. Expanding her argument (2012), she points to the limits of socially engaged 
and participatory art practice when critique relies on moral judgements over aesthetic 
appreciation. Additionally, Bishop summarises the agendas for participation as: ‘the 
desire to create an active subject [...] empowered [...] to determine their own social 
and political reality’, the desire to cede ‘authorial control’ in favour of ‘egalitarian and 
democratic’ collective art making, and the desire for a ‘restoration of the social bond 
through a collective elaboration of meaning’ (2006 p.12). The latter she sees as 
brought about through ‘a perceived crisis in community and collective responsibility’ 
(p.12). For Bishop, the active/passive binary is so ‘riddled with presuppositions about 
looking and knowing, watching and acting, appearances and reality’ that it ends up 
dividing ‘a population into those with capacity on one side, and those with incapacity 
on the other’ becoming ‘an allegory of inequality’ (Bishop 2006 p.16).29 Similarly 
sceptical about the desires for, and possibilities of participation, Jen Harvie asks 
whether art and performance practices that claim to offer it ever provide more than ‘a 
spectacle of communication and social engagement’ and a dangerous ‘distraction 
from the social inequalities they claim to critique’ (Harvie 2013 p.3). She also points 
to the potential for these practices to be instrumentalised by producers of ‘neo-liberal 
governmentality’ (pp.3–4).  
 
Moving to another highly contested term often aligned with the public programme, 
both practically and conceptually – community – theatre scholar Miranda Joseph 
questions its celebratory invocation of collective identity and agency in contemporary 
society (Joseph 2002 pp.xxx-xxxi). Grant Kester references Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
writing on community to show how it has been ‘compromised’ by ‘twentieth-century 
totalitarianism’, and its fictitious ‘mass identity’ rendered unthinkable by post-
structuralist denial of a coherent self (Kester 2004 p.154). Kwon similarly argues that 
‘community [has been deployed] as a coherent and unified social formation’ to serve 
‘exclusionary and authoritarian purposes’. In fact, Kwon writes that just like ‘the 
 
29 Bishop summarises Rancière’s argument of the active/passive binary, which he connects to the 
agendas and desires for participation in contemporary art and theatre. 
41 
 
concept of the “public sphere,” the community may be seen as a phantom’ (Kwon 
2002 p.7). However, Nancy doesn’t do away with community entirely. He suggests 
how it might be reclaimed and redefined as ‘without essence’, ‘the community that is 
neither “people” nor “nation”, neither “destiny” nor “generic humanity,”’ (Nancy 1991 
pp.xxxix-xl). Taken together then, this literature questions what it might mean to 
participate under the troublesome notions of community that are often invoked and 
claimed by socially engaged art and theatre practices – especially, I would add, 
when under the auspices of the art institution, as part of a public programme.  
 
The Bourgeois Public Sphere 
 
The phantom Kwon refers to builds on philosopher Jürgen Habermas’ influential 
concept of the ‘bourgeois public sphere’ (1989). As Nancy Fraser summarises and 
critiques, Habermas described the development in eighteenth-century bourgeois 
society of a ‘discursive arena in which “private persons” deliberated about “public 
matters”’ (1990 p.70), that is, issues of societal importance. These discussions were 
held away from state influence or control, but crucially became ‘a site for the 
production and circulation of discourses that can in principle be critical of the state’ 
and were ‘distinct from the official-economy [...] of market relations’ (p.57). 
Importantly, this discursive arena had the power to challenge the state and 
contribute to societal change through rational debate. However, far from being an 
open space, it was created by and for an emergent middle-class elite from which 
women were generally excluded. 
 
The German word Habermas uses, Öffentlichkeit, has been translated as ‘public 
sphere’ and its root, Öffentlich, translates as ‘open’ in English. The bourgeois public 
sphere was both a notional ‘public space’ and distributed across actual places like 
coffee houses, private homes and salons where people met and discussed common 
affairs. It was fuelled and furthered by new forms of publishing, such as newspapers 
that, as Sven Lütticken has noted, were essentially private, commercial enterprises 
(2018). Indeed, as Lütticken has pointed out, for Fraser ‘[t]here are several different 
senses of privacy and publicity in play’ in the notion of ‘public sphere’. She lists these 
as ‘1) state-related; 2) accessible to everyone; 3) of concern to everyone; and 4) 
pertaining to a common good or shared interest.’ In addition, ‘[e]ach of these 
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corresponds to a contrasting sense of “privacy” [...] hovering just below the surface 
here: 5) pertaining to private property in a market economy; and 6) pertaining to 
intimate domestic or personal life, including sexual life’ (pp.70–71). Michael Warner 
goes further to highlight the heteronormative assumptions the Habermasian 
bourgeois public sphere is built on: ‘[it] consists of private persons whose identity is 
formed in the privacy of the conjugal domestic family and who enter into rational-
critical debate around matters common to all by bracketing their embodiment and 
status. Counterpublics of sexuality and gender, on the other hand, are scenes of 
association and identity that transform the private lives they mediate’ (2005 p. 57). 
Much of the literature drawn together for this review tends towards ‘bracketing [...] 
embodiment’, though we are often aware of the ‘status’ of who is writing: eminent art 
critics, theorists, historians and curators. Is it possible to rethink publicness through 
particular moments when we cannot escape our embodiment, and speak from other 
roles or subject positions – such as audience member or public programmer 
themselves? Might we learn from ‘counterpublics of sexuality and gender’ to better 
make use of our embodied knowledge in these roles? I return to these questions 
later through an extended discussion of the key aspects that emerge from Warner’s 
understanding of publicness, and how I propose putting them into practice. 
 
As well as critiquing these normative denominations of public and private at work in 
the Habermasian public sphere, feminist scholars have troubled the idealistic notion 
of ‘competence’ required to speak there. Mary Field Belenky and co-authors have 
shown that such competence, or access, is ‘produced by forms of material and social 
power’ that are not available to all. They argue instead for recognising the 
situatedness of the subject in discursive interaction (summarised in Kester 2004 
p.112). The notional consensus issuing from ‘rational debate’ in the Habermasian 
model has also received critique: Jorinde Seijdel remarks that, ‘the public sphere and 
publicness is no longer based on models of harmony in which consensus 
predominates’ (2008 p.4). Seijdel cites Jacques Rancière’s ‘dissensus’ and Chantal 
Mouffe’s ‘agonism’ as equally influential in emphasising ‘the political dimension of 
public space and its fragmentation into different spaces, audiences and spheres… 
[where] forms of conflict, dissensus, differences of opinion or “agonism” are in fact 
constructive’ (2008 p.4). For Mouffe agonistic pluralism differs from a traditional, 
Habermasian concept of liberal democracy ‘as a negotiation among interests’ where 
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people ‘leave aside their particular interests and think as rational beings’ with the aim 
of reaching consensus. Instead, freedom relies on allowing ‘the possibility that 
conflict may appear and [...] provid[ing] an arena where differences can be 
confronted’ (Mouffe in Castle 1998). In addition, Mary Louise Pratt’s term ‘contact 
zone’ that refers to ‘social spaces where cultures meet, clash and grapple with each 
other, often in contexts of highly asymmetrical relations of power’ (Pratt 1991 p.34), 
has been influential in radical pedagogies and museum studies to rethink the 
dynamics in the classroom and museum (Fischer and Reckitt 2015). The move in 
theory and practice from speaking about ‘the public’ at large to different ‘publics’ 
recognises this pluralist reality, exemplified by the relaunch of the Finnish curatorial 
agency Checkpoint Helsinki into PUBLICS, under the direction of Paul O’Neill in 
2017. Such revisions are not just a question of plurality however, but equality of 
access. These approaches expose the limitations of publicness, community and 
participation in art and institutional practices, especially when thought in terms of 
unification and consensus. Applied to the public programme in particular they might 
help us break up an abstract, monolithic public to be ‘programmed’, rupturing 




In recent years, the rise of temporary contemporary art institutions in the form of 
international biennials, triennials and quinquennials, alongside annual, explicitly 
commercial art fairs, have significantly shifted the landscape and visibility of the 
public programme. Shwetal A. Patel uses the term ‘biennialisation’ to describe ‘the 
often dialectical tension between redemptive world-making and bland homogeneity’ 
in many of these events (2020). Helping to counteract this, the biennial’s public 
programme signifies meaningful engagement with a particular locality, especially if 
we are to consider the sustained activity of, for example, Liverpool Biennial’s work in 
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poorer areas of the city like Toxteth or Everton (Liverpool Biennial n.d.).30 Polly 
Staple’s curatorship of Frieze Projects (2003–05) (Gronlund and Staple 2006), paved 
the way for public programming, comprising talks, screenings and performances, to 
become a fixture of the contemporary art fair.31 More recently, philosopher, curator 
and transgender activist Paul B. Preciado’s public programme Parliament of Bodies 
for documenta 14 (documenta 2017) considered the stakes of publicness for non-
normative bodies and experiences, becoming an important benchmark for public 
programming within the temporary institution (Preciado and Sari 2017). In all these 
forms, an increasing visibility of public programming, under the curatorship of lauded 
contemporary thinkers and celebrity curators, highlights the growing significance of 
this practice, as well as impacting practice in more permanent institutions.32  
 
The Neoliberal Institution 
 
‘Biennialisation’ could be considered another facet of the neoliberal institution. The 
museum is often referred to as a ‘public space’, building on the Habermasian ideal 
and its attendant problems. This prompts another consideration of how publicness 
and the museum – and by extension today’s contemporary art institution – have 
been tied together in complex, uncomfortable ways. If the nineteenth-century liberal 
institution was orientated towards a ‘public good’, the twenty-first-century neoliberal 
institution conceives of a public in terms of marketing segmentation and opportunity 
for commercial growth. Concerning both museum studies and new institutionalism, 
this shift is nested within a broader social context where neoliberalism has become 
the dominant governing ideology. For geographer David Harvey, neoliberal 
capitalism or neoliberalism, initially emerged as an activist political economic theory 
promoting the idea that ‘human well-being can best be advanced by liberating 
 
30 Programming under Education Curator Polly Brannan included permanent commissions such as 
Mohamed Bourouissa’s Resilience Garden (2018) and Koo Jeong A x Wheelscape’s Evertro (2015), a 
glow-in-the-dark skate park in Liverpool’s Everton Park. In providing collaboratively produced, long-
term engagements, such projects might help redress the problematic art tourism of ‘biennialisation’. 
Though characterised in largely positive terms as a regenerative tool (Franklin 2018), art tourism often 
felt by local residents to be a brief invasion of the art world elite that can bring problematic aspects of 
regeneration (Angotti 2012, Bolton 2013). 
31 The art fair’s public programme works more with art’s immediate constituents – artists, curators, 
dealers, critics – than a broad public, partly due to prohibitively high ticket prices. 
32 The anthology How Institutions Think: Between Contemporary Art and Curatorial Discourse (O'Neill 
et al. 2017) charts how traditional institutions kept up with more temporary, contemporary formats. 
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individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional framework, 
characterized by strong private property rights, free markets, and free trade’ (2005 
p.2). In practice, as Ben Walters describes, the ‘privatisation of public utilities and 
services, reduced financial regulation and lower, less redistributive taxation’ since 
1979 under successive UK governments, has significantly impacted society and its 
cultural production, generating ‘the celebration of individualism, entrepreneurialism, 
competition, risk, resilience, flexibility and consumption and the demonisation of 
collectivity, collaboration and activities that do not generate economic capital’ (2020 
pp.36–37). Anthony Davies described the effects and responses of state-funded 
cultural institutions ‘set to work by capital in ever more “innovative” (read: 
commercialised) ways’ as surfacing ‘a host of contradictions and antagonisms’. 
Davies concluded that some embraced ‘the liberating capacity of new revenue 
streams linked to consultancy, outsourcing, business incubation and enterprise 
activities’. Others sought ‘more tactical models of engagement, looking to new 
constituencies and standards of practice’ (Davies 2007). All of which suggests the 
public programme is an important tool for the neoliberal institution. 
 
Today, the compromised politics of the neoliberal art institution mean that the 
experience of publicness it promotes is betwixt and between: do we accept its 
complete neoliberalisation as part of the experience, or do we try and wrest back 
from it some moment(s) of public good? Grant Kester (2012) has analysed how New 
Labour’s ‘arguments in support of public art funding were increasingly framed in 
terms of art’s efficacy in transforming individuals from “marginal” populations (the 
homeless, long-term unemployed, “at risk” youth) into productive citizens’. Kester 
links the productive potential of these renewed subjects to the value entrepreneurial 
artists offer to the overall economy where ‘artistic production deserves public support 
because it will lift the UK out of recession’ (2012 p.15).33 In a similar vein, Dewdney, 
Dibosa and Walsh remind us that following the then Prime Minister Tony Blair’s 
famous ‘education, education, education’ speech in 1996, museum and education 
departments were ‘invested […] with a whole new import’ and charged with both 
delivering ‘policy objectives’ and ‘lever[ing] funding from other public-sector funding 
 
33 These arguments were based on Creative Britain (1998) by Chris Smith, the then Secretary of 
State for Culture, Media and Sport. Kester shows the irony in those whose personal notions of value 
may extend beyond the financial, becoming fiscally valuable, even vital, to the country’s economy.  
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agencies as evidence of social inclusion and public value.’ However, rather than 
giving education a more prominent place in the museum, New Labour’s spotlight 
‘paradoxically instrumentalised it further as a service department to offset policy 
agendas’ (Dewdney, Dibosa and Walsh 2013 p.62). These literatures, alongside Jen 
Harvie’s work (2013), place the public programme doubly at risk of 
instrumentalisation. It can be thought of as both an out-sourced service provision of, 
for example, education, community support and therapeutic care and a generator of 
new income streams. Unlocking lucrative sources of private funding and generating 
vital social capital, the public programme boosts the financial well-being of the 
institution while simultaneously being drastically underfunded and marginalised 
within it (Dewdney, Dibosa and Walsh 2013 p.63). These literatures recognise how 
the public programme is both of value, fiscally and socially, and devalued. 
 
If we are able to reclaim some public good from the neoliberal art institution, what is 
the quality of this experience? Nina Möntmann writes that the, ‘pressure [on art 
institutions] to attract a mass public and to deliver a visitors’ count to both sponsors 
and politicians’ is simultaneously, ‘contradicted by the need to produce new publics’ 
(Möntmann 2008 p.17). Under what Möntmann calls the ‘corporate turn’, 
relationships between institutional actors and publics are experienced by ‘many 
curators and directors’ as ‘fragile and awkward’ (p.19). 34 But aside from wincing at 
such awkwardness, how might dwelling on particular moments of discomfort be 
generative? Burton, Jackson and Willsdon also use awkwardness to characterise the 
way in which ‘public engagement’ for museums ‘mixes political practices of 
community organizing with marketable practices of aesthetic service,’ which they 
diagnose as ‘uncomfortable’ but ‘sometimes productive’ (2016 xvii). Not only this, but 
the fallen position of museum-as-public-good, built on nation-building and subject 
formation, is most recently underlined by urgent calls to decolonise it (Aitkins et al. 
2015 Schoenberger 2020).35 If the liberal subject of Western hegemonic 
 
34 My working knowledge echoes Möntmann: in Tate’s Public Programme, and indeed the wider 
Learning and Research Department, the clash between institutional agendas of inclusivity and income 
generation were at times a point of contention. 
35 Collaborations across the museum and the academy such as the seminar series Decolonising 
British Art: Decentering, Resituating and Reviewing Artworks and Collections (2020) show how the 
public programme is frequently utilised to demonstrate commitment to this work. The series is an 
initiative of the University of the Arts London’s Decolonising Arts Institute, inviting members of the 
British Art Network and supported by Tate and Paul Mellon Centre. It is delivered in partnership with 
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universalism enshrined in the notion of a public is no more attractive than the 
consumer subject projected by the neoliberal institution, then the question is, what 




Despite the shift from liberal to neoliberal institution, its notion of ‘the public’ still 
relies on a particular nineteenth-century formation of a mass, abstract entity out 
there ready to be engaged with and/or dismissed. Contemporary politics also 
problematically draws on, or claims to act on behalf of a singular, normative public.36 
I argue that a lack of understanding, or feeling, for this public is partly what led to the 
Leave result of the Brexit referendum in 2016. I propose that a similar lack in art 
institutions is equally pernicious. 
 
But in many ways the art institution is now plagued by a plural idea of publics: the 
missing, disengaged public, the uneducated, misinformed or unruly public, the 
culturally elite and exclusive public, not to mention its further fracturing into particular 
‘communities’ branded ‘minority’ (read: non-normative, non-dominant) to be 
addressed and/or targeted. Thomas Crow (1985) makes way for thinking this 
plurality by mapping early figurations of the multiple publics attending the eighteenth-
century Paris Salon, discussed below. Public programming in relation to, and 
alongside, museum and gallery education is now not simply a marginal or 
complimentary activity to the main business of preserving and displaying culture or 
producing knowledge. It is a powerful tool with which to both overcome and rethink 
the art institution’s problematic relationship to all of these publics, fulfil its 
responsibilities towards them, and leverage sought after and lucrative funding 
opportunities. Trusts and foundations such as Paul Hamlyn Foundation and 
corporations such as Bloomberg and Unilever have long been major sponsors of the 
arts, muddying the ‘comfortable old distinctions between public and private’ (Wu 
 
MIMA, Birmingham Museums Trust (BMT), Institute of International Visual Art (Iniva) and three major 
national collections Arts Council (ACC), British Council (BC) and Government Art Collection (GAC). 
36 When I began this research, the phrase ‘the people have spoken’ was used by both Leave and 
Remain campaigners to justify or admonish ‘the British public’ for their ‘decision’ to leave the 
European Union in 2016. 
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2003).37 These sponsorship relationships come with specific criteria for engagement 
that the public programme is often utilised to meet.38  
 
The problem of an amorphous, mass public presumed to be participating in these 
programmes,39 is superseded by a public that is elsewhere or missing entirely. 
Felicity Allen writes about a Tate partnership with The National Museum of 
Damascus, that ‘displayed antiquities to a public who mostly did not come’, 
undefinable because it refused the museum’s invitation (2009 p.5). Dewdney, Dibosa 
and Walsh addressed the problem of the ‘elusive public’, asking, ‘What is the 
contemporary British public and how does it become visible to the art museum’? 
Research revealed, ‘the problematic surrounding the representational role of 
audience, acting as a stand-in term, a “place holder”, for this public’. They also argue 
for, ‘visitor, audience and public [to be] disentangled’ and introduce the problematic 
of ‘visitors acting as consumers’ (2013 p.8).40 Jan Verwoert controversially suggests 
doing away with any obligation to address a public, thereby resisting its 
instrumentalisation for ‘strategic product placement through target group marketing’ 
(Verwoert 2008 p.67). While there might be some advantage to his approach, it 
seems a rather thinly veiled attempt to absolve responsibility of speaking to anyone 





37 Until recently oil companies like BP and Shell have regularly (and increasingly controversially) 
sponsored exhibitions and public programming in national cultural institutions. BP has sponsored the 
British Museum since 1996 (Available from: https://www.britishmuseum.org/support-us/supporter-
case-studies/bp). Tate ended its 26-year-long sponsorship relationship with BP in 2017 (Available 
from: https://www.theguardian.com/artanddesign/2016/mar/11/bp-to-end-tate-sponsorship-climate-
protests). Southbank Centre and British Film Institute (BFI) have been supported by Shell since 2006 
with sponsorship coming to an end in 2020 (Available from: 
theguardian.com/business/2020/mar/09/oil-shell-end-relationship-bfi-southbank-centre-british-film-
institute-climate-crisis). Lastly, the Design Museum’s problematic relationship with an arms trading 
company has been called into question (Charlesworth 2018).  
38 For example, Tate Britain’s BP Saturdays (2008–12) series of festival-style day-long events led by 
Public Programmes, Early Years and Families, and Young People’s Programme that ran at Tate 
Britain. 
39 Such as BP Saturdays. 




‘Publics are queer creatures’ 
 
Verwoert’s dismissal is also indicative of the difficulty in grasping the substance and 
essence of any public. Warner also acknowledges their slipperiness: ‘[p]ublics are 
queer creatures. You cannot point to them, count them, or look them in the eye’ 
(2005 p.7) In doing so, he gestures towards certain kinds of embodiment that can 
extend an understanding of publicness beyond the ‘rational-critical debate’ proposed 
by the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere. As Thomas Crow has shown, 
observers and critics of the eighteenth-century Paris Salon did not shy away from 
describing its public in sensuous, if derisive, terms. Writing in 1777 Pidansat do 
Mairobert conjures this striking scene of the atmosphere and intermingling of 
opposites in the Salon:  
 
[...] you cannot catch your breath before being plunged into an abyss of heat 
and a whirlpool of dust. Air so pestilential and impregnated with the 
exhalations of so many unhealthy persons should in the end produce either 
lightning or plague. Finally you are deafened by a continuous noise like that 
of the crashing waves in an angry sea. But here nevertheless is a thing to 
delight the eye of an Englishman: the mixing, men and women together, of all 
the orders and all the ranks of the state […] Here the Savoyard odd-job man 
rubs shoulders with the great noble in his cordon bleu; the fishwife trades her 
perfumes with those of a lady of quality, making the latter resort to holding her 
nose to combat the strong odor of cheap brandy drifting her way; the rough 
artisan, guided only by natural feeling, comes out with a just observation, at 
which an inept wit nearby bursts out laughing only because of the comical 
accent in which it was expressed; while an artist hiding in the crowd unravels 
the meaning of it all and turns it to his profit’ (Mairobert in Crow 1985 p.4).  
 
Smell and breath are pungent metaphors in Mairobert’s observation, signalling a 
burgeoning fear of contamination in the rarefied space of the eighteenth-century 
Paris Salon. Indeed, contamination and unruliness have been recurrent themes for 
the museum’s public (Candlin 2008 p.279). Mairobert is also concerned with the 
competing affective and intellectual responses to the artwork on view. He does not 
simply satirise the clash of cultures and classes, but as Crow observes, insists ‘on an 
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undifferentiated whole while attending in detail exclusively to heterogeneity, to the 
particular and the private’, exemplifying the inherent contradiction that ‘the “public” is 
both everywhere and nowhere in particular’ (Crow 1985 p.4). In the Salon, as we see 
in today’s museum and its extended spaces, private interests and commercial profit 
were not disentangled from the activity and presence of unpredictable, lively and 
multiple publics. 
 
Salon artist and critic Charles Coypel emphasised the point in a different manner: 
‘this place can offer twenty publics of different tone and character in the course of a 
single day: a simple public at certain times, a prejudiced public, a flighty public, an 
envious public, a public slavish to fashion […] a final counting of these publics would 
lead to infinity’ (Coypel in Crow 1985 p.10). Focussing on ‘tone and character’ rather 
than individualising details, Coypel employs novel, but general characterisations to 
discredit an unpredictable public opinion that could threaten his position as artist. 
Coypel’s assessment is so on point it could be contemporary; describing, for 
example, the publics at a contemporary museum’s late-night event. As an 
eighteenth-century perspective however, it demonstrates how notions of publics 
have become narrower, rather than broader, over the last two centuries. What 
seems like a flippant account from Coypel takes on a queerer angle when read 
alongside Warner’s earlier assertion. Instead of a singular, general public, both 
Coypel and Warner playfully evoke the slippery nature of publics – that are plural, 
infinite, and resist categorisation – which is what makes them queer.  
 
The word ‘queer’ has a long, complex history. Since the early nineteenth-century it 
has been used to abuse and shame bodies that did not conform to what Adrienne 
Rich termed ‘compulsory heterosexuality’ (1980), or traditional binary gender norms. 
It has been reclaimed and actively used as a self-identification by queer theorists 
and activists since the 1990s (Walters 2020 pp.19–20). As David Halperin writes, the 
power of queer identity is that it ‘need not be grounded in any positive truth or in any 
stable reality […] Queer is by definition whatever is at odds with the normal, the 
legitimate, the dominant […] a positionality vis à vis the normative’ (1995 p.62).41 My 
 
41 ‘Unlike gay identity […] rooted in the positive fact of homosexual object-choice’ (Halperin 1995 
p.62). However, Halperin also notes that the radical unspecificity of queer leaves it problematically 
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use of queer in this thesis does not deny or bracket the connection to a lived 
experience of homosexuality and gender non-conformity. Rather, following Halperin 
and Warner et al, I wish to suggest how the ‘[un]stable reality’ of queerness might 
pose possibilities for publics as a useful deviation from ‘the public’: a mass, abstract 
and normative grouping belonging to, and claimed by, a dominant heteronormative 
culture. In doing so, I appeal to Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s description of queer as ‘the 
open mesh of possibilities, gaps, overlaps, dissonances and resonances, lapses and 
excesses of meaning when the constituent elements of anyone’s gender, of 
anyone’s sexuality aren’t made (or can’t be made) to signify monolithically’. 
Sedgwick suggests queer has other resonances and possibilities for opening up 
‘race, ethnicity’ and other ‘identity-fracturing discourses’ (1994 pp. 8–9). Similarly, 
José Esteban Muñoz uses Nancy’s notion of ‘being singular plural’ to address ‘the 
way in which the singularity that marks a singular existence is always conterminously 
plural’. It is my hope that a conscious, and careful application of queer to ‘the public’ 
opens up the possibilities for particularity and difference within and between entities, 
which are also ‘always relational to other singularities’ (Muñoz 2009 pp.10–11). With 
these understandings, how might ‘queer’ be mobilised to expand possibilities but 
also, to describe an ‘undifferentiated whole while attending in detail exclusively to 
heterogeneity, to the particular and the private’ (Crow 1985 p.4) within the public and 
publics? How might a more sensuous, affective mode of attending to publicness see 
queerness as belonging to publics in their becoming, rather than already being or 




Despite their slipperiness and resistance to categorisation, Warner offers ways of 
grasping their coming into being. Perhaps most importantly, to begin with, publics 
are not simply always already out there ready to be engaged with. They exist only 
‘by virtue of their imagining’, are produced through an address (2005 pp.7–8) and 
through the ‘mere’ fact of someone paying attention (p.87). It is these things that, 
 
‘available for appropriation by those who do not experience the unique political disabilities and forms 
of social disqualification from which lesbians and gay men routinely suffer’ (p.65). 
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among other key factors, allow the possibility for strangers to enter into dialogue with 
one another about something they share in common (pp.10–11).  
 
Warner also debunks the stricter demarcations of public and private Hannah Arendt 
described (1958), demonstrating their continual overlap across our bodies, home, 
leisure and workplaces. Though socially defined and constructed, public and private 
are not merely abstract categories but physical, somatic realities.42 As Warner writes, 
‘[t]he word “public” also records this bodily association: it derives from the Latin 
poplicus, for people, but evolved to publicus in connection with pubes, in the sense 
of adult men, linking public membership with pubic maturity’ (original emphasis). 
‘Pubes’ may now be a crude reference to pubic hair, but as Warner also points out, 
‘privates’ is another euphemistic name for the genitals, and ‘the privy’ an old word for 
‘toilet’. Mapped across the body, public and private are the vectors through which we 
understand our own ‘self-hood’, gender and sexuality, and I add, our interpersonal 
relationships (Warner 2005 pp.23–24). And so, the transitioning between private and 
public is in many ways intimately connected to bodily processes, and other bodies. 
Unlike puberty, however, publicness is not only a developmental phase, but a 
transition returned to on almost a daily basis.  
 
As well as the sexual, desiring body, the link between pubic maturity and public 
membership recalls an occupational hazard for the public programmer: mixing up the 
words ‘pubic’ and ‘public’ in an email, document to be published or presentation.43 
Mistakenly alluding to the private, the sexual, when you are in public, performs a 
violation of these norms (Warner 2005 p.23), which I suggest is also tangled up with 
sexual maturity brokering publicity. If coming into adulthood is partly coming to terms 
with one’s own visibility and participation in a wider community beyond the familial 
unit, among other things, this is inescapably an embodied experience. I suggest that 
when we are public – whether we make ourselves public or are made public by 
something or someone else – we are reminded what this feels like. We might sense 
 
42 It is only through language and training in social norms, of personal hygiene for example, that we 
come to think of what is private and what is public as ‘natural’ (Warner 2005 p.23–24). 
43 This is a mishap I’ve fretted over many times, particularly on this research journey. It was returning 
to the scene of the darkened auditorium, heart thumping as I waited for my presentation to appear 
and imagining the words ‘Pubic Programme’ writ large across the screen, when I first wondered 
whether such a slippage might be more than just an anxiety-inducing anecdote? 
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a hyper-awareness of our physical body: how it takes up space, how our voice 
sounds, and worry about the impression such our presence is making on others.44 
 
If the adolescent body coming into a sexual maturity – a temporal, bodily process – 
brokers a public relation with others, then we can begin to see how publicness might 
not just be about the space we inhabit, or the words that we use there, in the 
Habermasian construction of the bourgeois public sphere. This fleshy, bodily reality 
of puberty to publicness reminds us that how we appear, and feel about such 
appearance, is just as important. If we can understand the experience of publicness 
as necessarily uncertain, the public programme might become an intimate form of 
relating that doesn’t escape embarrassment or awkwardness.45 In fact, as we shall 
see, it may be seen to embrace these feelings, and certainly to produce them. 
Inspired by Crow’s mapping, and Warner’s nuanced account, I am calling for 
specific, processual, embodied understandings of publicness, as they are produced 
by the public programme of the museum and contemporary art institutions.  
 
Getting Specific  
 
Why hasn’t this already happened in the thorough way that I am proposing? Is there 
a problem with, or a fear of, getting specific about this process? From the conviviality 
of Bourriaud, to the avant-garde antagonism of Bishop or knowledge production of 
‘the curatorial’ and ‘educational turn’, each position reduces publicness to a singular 
possibility. Even the pluralising of publics draws on idealised notions, foreclosing on 
 
44 Ron Mueck’s Ghost (1998) seems to encapsulate this experience of self-consciousness: a 
sculpture of a teenage girl over two metres tall, dressed in a bathing costume, leaning awkwardly 
against the wall with down-cast eyes. As Tate Collection’s summary text suggests, the sculpture’s 
large scale reflects teenage anxiety at being ‘the subject of others’ attention’ (Martin 2015). Susanna 
Greeves similarly writes that ‘Ghost is the embodiment of teenage self-consciousness, the projection 
of a stage at which our bodies become suddenly large and strange and acutely embarrassing to us’ 
(Greeves and Wiggins 2003 p.59). 
45 Incidentally Tate’s Public Programme sometimes appears uncertain about its own remit and 
audience, especially when overlapping with large-scale peer-led events organised by the Young 
People’s Programme that regularly attract an audience over the specific age-group of 15–25 they are 
aimed at. It is almost as if the institution is unsure about how audiences transition from young people 
into adults, and how to respond. This might be true of peer-led youth programming at the other 
institutions that were involved in the Tate-led five-year research project Circuit: Firstsite, Colchester; 
MOSTYN, Llandudno; Nottingham Contemporary; The Whitworth, Manchester; and Wysing Arts 
Centre and Kettle’s Yard, Cambridgeshire (Tate n.d.). 
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a more complex understanding of what is at stake within these spaces. It seems that 
the distanced critic is still in place.46 The danger in naming the public programme as 
such, is that it creates another object of distanced critical analysis, rather than 
getting any closer to the messy crossing of private and public that such programming 
entails. Not only this, could an increased focus on, and definition of, public 
programming – resulting from research like mine – risk losing what makes it such an 
interesting space? While I recognise these problems, I believe the promise of 
embodiment in some of the literature reviewed points towards a more affective 
analysis, as taken up by Jennifer Fischer and Helena Reckitt account for ‘the feeling 
of exhibitions’ (2015 p.361). Such an approach expands not only our understanding, 
but the possibilities for both practice and discourse around the public programme.  
 
Perhaps another problem with accessing the specificity I call for is the possibility of 
failure and implication it opens up, something I suggest performance and theatre 
studies may liberate us from. Nicholas Ridout (2006) has theorised the failures of 
theatre – that it is ‘uncomfortable, compromised, boring, conventional, bourgeois, 
overpriced and unsatisfactory most of the time’ – as constitutive of it (p.3). These 
failures are not only intrinsic to the experience, but worth attending to ‘as a fruitful 
area of theoretical and political enquiry’ that might otherwise be missed (p.7). Since 
the ‘events, encounters and phenomena’ in Ridout’s study are almost routine, like 
‘experiences of being scared, embarrassed or overcome with giggles’, he risks 
‘being thought stupid, banal, literal minded, or worse: unprofessional’ by colleagues 
and peers. However, scholarly interest in what ‘the non-professional theatre-goer 
might take an interest in’ probes what Ridout sees as a significant gap in theatre 
studies (Ridout 2006 pp.14–15). My project also examines the failures, awkwardness 
and disruptions to the smoothness of the public programme – at the risk of my own 
professional standing – which I similarly argue are constitutive of the practice. 
Moreover, these are the moments when we are able to understand – perhaps only 
ever fleetingly – the stakes of being in, and becoming part of, a public. The fact that I 
 
46 For example, Irit Rogoff summarises the public programming of Academy, a collaborative research 
project between Goldsmiths, University of London and Van Abbemuseum that asked ‘What can we 
learn from the museum?’, into several neat paragraphs outlining the questions that emerged from 
each sub-team on the project (Rogoff 2010). With no details about what happened in the process that 
was surprising, unsettling or even uncertain, we are simply given to understand the programme as 
productive of useful knowledge. 
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asked peers and colleagues to join me in discussions about the disruptions and 
discomforts of our professional practice only increases the risk that Ridout names, 
which I unfold in more detail below. 
 
There are other, grander failures at stake in the museum, which are also constitutive 
of it, and have already been addressed by scholarship. Dewdney, Dibosa and Walsh 
have already called out the failure of museums using ‘racial and minority ethnic 
categories [...] as a means of targeting specific groups to improve diversity statistics 
in museum attendance’ showing how in fact they ‘fail to change core museum 
attendance demographics’ (2013 pp.4–5). Much ‘ticketed’ public programming 
largely attracts the white, middle-class and liberal audience the museum is already 
predicated on, which in itself limits the radical, idealised forms of communing 
heralded by the literature. But this does not mean that I am calling for a detailed 
understanding of who makes up this public via more audience research. Rather, I 
call for an examination of the feelings generated in these spaces, because the 
‘queasiness’ and ‘ambivalence’ Ridout finds in the theatre, mirrors the feelings that 
often came up for me as a public programmer. Not only are these harder to define or 
write about, but the discourses that hold transformative ‘dissensus’ in high regard, 
gesture towards, but do not adequately describe specific experiences of it. This limits 
what might otherwise be said about more minor feelings of discomfort and unease. I 
align my approach with studies like Jemma Desai’s (2020), that unfolds from her 
uncomfortable feelings as a ‘cultural worker embodied in difference’ working within 
majority white arts organisations and systems. Desai also writes from the 
professional demarcations of writer, curator and public programmer. 
 
Ridout draws attention to something else that clarifies why, despite Desai’s important 
work, this approach is not more widespread in his close reading of Michael Fried’s 
disgust at theatricality of ‘literalist’ (better known as minimalist) art of Donald Judd, 
Robert Morris and others that: ‘forces the spectator to acknowledge… “the 
beholder’s body”’. Ridout suggests Fried’s italicisation draws on a prevalent notion 
that our, or another’s body is ‘the last thing we might expect to find engaged in the 
aesthetic encounter’ (2006 p.8). Fried’s suspicion of theatricality was highly 
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influential for art criticism and theory eschewing any connection with theatre.47 
Rather than complete aversion, there is still a lingering discomfort with theatricality in 
today’s art world, as Catherine Wood and Jérôme Bel have discussed (2014). But for 
Ridout, in the actual theatre ‘the encounter with another person, in the dark, in the 
absence of communication’ is fruitful because it is also ‘an encounter with the self, 
and thus the occasion for all sorts of anxieties […] to discuss under headings such 
as narcissism, embarrassment or shame’ (pp.8–9).  
 
While a public programme is not generally presented as theatre, it can be theatrical 
in both subtle and striking ways. Our participation in it means we are no longer 
disembodied eyes roving the gallery, but a body, with processes, feelings and 
responses. I look at public programming through the lens of theatre and performance 
studies and practice, therefore, to open up what these ritualised public gatherings in 
spaces of culture can tell us about becoming public as a process, and as Ridout 
encourages us to think about, an encounter with the self, as well as others. I argue 
that, rather than an incidental inconvenience to be overlooked in the name of a 
greater goal (criticality, objective knowledge, larger visitor numbers) an awareness of 
one’s own body and feelings in co-presence with others, is exactly what the public 
programme offers. It is in such moments that we get an opportunity to ask, who am I 
amongst these others? What is my role and responsibility here?  
 
Opportunities and Theoretical Approaches for Materialising Publics 
 
This thesis looks at an under-theorised, but specific curatorial practice with a 
mandate to address and question the ‘problem’ of the public as it is found in the 
twenty-first-century art institution. I have found that the overlapping discourses 
surrounding the public programme rarely address the affective complexities of public 
situations generated within it. My research addresses these gaps in scholarship, 
alongside the public programme’s marginal position in relation to exhibitionary and 
display practices and histories. My writing and curatorial practice mobilise it as a 
unique opportunity to understand what it means to be and become part of a public in 
 
47 As Jonas Barish charts in his book The Antitheatrical Prejudice (1981), a resistance to the theatrical 
where it appears in literature, art and culture more broadly is nothing new 
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today’s neoliberal art institution. This requires a reflexive research methodology 
comprising theoretical, autoethnographic, critical reflection on practice and practice-
led enquiry. Addressing the opportunities for intervention issuing from the Literature 
Review, these methodologies also suggest ways of unpicking the complex affective 
relations involved in specific moments of publicity issuing from mine, and others’, 
practices and experiences. 
 
Firstly, the idea of a mass abstract public out there waiting to be engaged with still 
dominates much museum and public programming practice. Attempts have been 
made to address abstractness through revisions of the Habermasian public sphere, 
but in practice, public programming is often tasked with materialising a ‘general’ 
public for the institution. Also prevalent is a ‘missing’ public (Dewdney, Dibosa and 
Walsh 2013), previously termed ‘hard to reach’ by many museums and cultural 
organisations.48 Such groups are catered for – or ‘targeted’ – through ‘community’ or 
‘youth’ programming, subsections of a more generic ‘public programme’ that is 
notionally open to all. The report ‘How can we engage more young people in arts 
and culture?’ (Asif et al 2019) suggests strategies that cultural organisations may 
use to secure funding, drawing on a ‘cultural deficit’ model that has been heavily 
critiqued (Dewdney, Dibosa and Walsh 2013, Hylton 2007), but persists in policy. 
Through these efforts we encounter complex notions of value: economic, social, 
institutional and personal. We also run into the problematics of the ‘awkward’ 
relations between institutions and their addresses to generic, or segmented publics 
that they are trying hard to ‘reach’.  
 
Bringing Warner (2005) to exhibition studies, Sheikh proposes that imagining and 
producing such counterpublics through exhibition-making may, ‘entail a reversal of 
existing spaces into other identities and practices, a queering of space…’ (Sheikh 
2007 p.182). Building on this, I open up the literature mapped with queer and 
performance theory and practices to move away from spatial models and normative, 
fixed identity formations of a singular public. This allows for a more nuanced and 
 
48 Jessica Symons outlines the difficulties of this once prevalent term and its mobilisation by cultural 
institutions and local governments in her journal article, ‘We’re not hard-to-reach, they are!’ Integrating 




lively (literally, more alive) understanding of contemporary publics. This theoretical 
move is partly inspired by Crow’s mapping of social commenters and art critics of the 
eighteenth-century Salon in Paris that captured its atmosphere in sensual terms, as 
well as segmenting the public by occupation and social class. Through them we gain 
a sense of how an art-viewing public was produced and judged by the then Parisian 
art world. As discussed above, we also get to know the vivid, burgeoning fear of the 
contaminating crowd, which later invades the art museum. Has such a public of 
‘types’ ceased to exist, or are there other reasons why we cannot name and identify 
the public who is wanted, and not wanted (by Verwoert and perhaps others), within 
the space of the art institution? How might a recourse to more sensual and 
embodied notions of publics and how they inhabit the institution open up a richer, 
more radical understanding of what it means to become public there? 
 
Contemporary curatorial discourse and practice may now revolve around publics, 
often without accounting for the move from singular to plural. Burton, Jackson and 
Willsdon employ Leo Steinberg’s definition of the public ‘not as a group of people but 
as a function’ explaining that their ‘utilization of the plural, “publics,” [...] emphasizes 
that a “public” should never be understood monolithically’ (2016 p.xxv). They also 
consider the polyvalent nature of the word public with the nouns it often qualifies: 
‘sphere’, ‘space’ and ‘sector’ that signals how ‘[f]rom one perspective publicness is 
about freedom, but from another, it is the embodiment of constraint’ (p.xv–xvi). 
Eschewing the dangers of a constraining and monolithic understanding then, I also 
avoid the marketing segmentation logic of the neoliberal institution, to consider how 
specific moments of publicness are produced – rather than pinning down who is 
producing or produced by them. Following their and Steinberg’s approach, and 
alongside Sheikh’s assertion that exhibitions produce publics as an ‘imaginary 
endeavor[s] with real effects’, I attempt to examine these ‘real effects’ in an 
embodied and situated way. Donna Haraway (1998) used the term ‘situated 
knowledges’ to reveal pure scientific objectivity as a myth and acknowledge the 
positionality of the speaking subject in all kinds of research. Thus, my position as 
public programmer and audience member runs throughout this thesis. The identity 
markers of able-bodied, cis-gendered, straight, middle-class, white woman are also 
important for me acknowledge too, as they intersect in ways that give me a certain, 
often privileged, experience of the world and my professional field. Though I also 
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suggest we can extend our understanding beyond these rather fixed demarcations, if 
we choose. This moves us from generic forms of address producing ‘the public’ to be 
‘programmed’ towards specific and plural materialisations of ‘publics’. As O’Neill and 
others have already shown, much of the discourse around curating, and indeed the 
public programme, is produced through it and similarly my work draws on, and 
contributes to, this growing field of theory and practice.  
 
Next, though practical and theoretical concerns around performance and 
performativity appear in the literature on the curatorial especially, an explicit 
engagement with performance practice and scholarship is not readily taken up. This 
is a missed opportunity I aim to remedy. Work that examines the stakes within 
moments of performance can help unpick relations between institutional actors and 
publics – the programmers and the programmed – in relation to already complex 
terms like community and participation and newly reconsidered notions of response 
and responsibility. 
 
In addition, queer and feminist approaches to emotions such as Sara Ahmed (2004, 
2006) together with Sianne Ngai’s study of negative affect (2007), which centres on 
‘unprestigious’, less dramatic feelings, move us towards a radically embodied notion 
of what is happening in certain moments of publicity, and the emotional labour 
involved in producing them. I suggest that Muñoz’s literal and metaphorical 
discussion of queerness as an awkward ‘stage’ in development (2009), can help to 
open up the ‘inherent performativity’ of public programming, and how uncomfortable 
relationships between institutions and their publics are ‘staged’ through it. Up until 
now, I believe it to be true that, as Crow writes: ‘[a] public appears, with a shape and 
a will, via the various claims made to represent it; and when sufficient numbers of an 
audience come to believe in one or other of these representations, the public can 
become an important art-historical actor’ (Crow 1985 p.5). But, as I argue throughout 
this thesis, it is an unruly actor continually testing what it might mean to be in, and 
become part of, a public. The theoretical and practical approaches I use serve to 





Lastly, literature stemming from the educational turn and new institutionalism points 
to a fetish for disruption and dissensus that is sometimes problematically linked to 
transformation, which may obscure the complexity of affective responses and 
relations between people. If the aestheticisation of pedagogical modes via the 
educational turn rarely paid heed to the ‘fascinating radical roots in feminist politics 
and radical pedagogy’ of museum and gallery education departments (Kelly 2013 
p.138), I add that the complex labour involved in producing these spaces of 
publicness, hasn’t been attended to widely enough.49 From my experience, and the 
literature hailing from new institutionalism, this may be because public programming 
and education departments still occupy the periphery of an institution’s core 
programme. Instead of recuperating public programming from margin to centre, 
through an autoethnographic and practice-led approach, I follow Erin Manning 
(2016) to consider what paying attention to the periphery of the ‘main event’ may 
afford. 
 
The attempts made to complicate positivist notions of community and participation 
and move beyond the passive viewing versus active participation binary (Bishop 
2004, 2006, 2012, Rancière 2009) still privilege the ‘disinterested’ critic, a position 
complimented by the ‘disembodied eye’ roving the museum. Both positions have 
been debunked by the affective turn in contemporary art theory, inspired by Brian 
Massumi (2015) and others, with some scholars acknowledging a more embodied 
understanding of the experience of being in the museum (Fischer and Reckitt 2015), 
and others framing it in terms of subject production (Duncan 1995, Bennett 1995). 
But the space opened up by the public programme involves being in the museum 
and gathering together, present to one another. Traditional modes of viewing, or 
audiencing, in the strictest sense, still privilege looking and/or listening. With recent 
interdisciplinary scholarship on attention, I rethink models of ‘attendance’ to include 
the interaction of other senses and subjects. From this Literature Review, and the 
gaps I propose to open up summarised above, emerge my central research 
questions. What can the space of the public programme tell us about what it means 
to become public in the contemporary art institution? What could reframing 
 
49 Though we may find it explored in, for example, the Feminist Duration Reading Group’s 
assessment of its methodologies (Reckitt ed. 2019), discussed in Chapter Two. 
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publicness as a process of becoming do to our understanding of the public 
programme there? The following chapters unfold my findings in relation to these 





Chapter One – That Awkward Stage 
 
Nina Möntmann blames the ‘corporate turn’ – the competing pressures on the 
institution of being both a public good and a commercial enterprise, of attracting both 
‘a mass public’ and diversifying itself to include ‘new publics’ – for creating an 
‘undeniably awkward’ relationship between the contemporary art institution and its 
public(s) (Möntmann 2008 p.17). In this chapter I draw on experiences from my time 
as Assistant Curator, Public Programmes at Tate to explore these uneasy relations. 
As Möntmann suggests, the proliferation of positions that the contemporary, 
neoliberal institution (described in my Introduction) creates – visitor, 
viewer/audience, participant, consumer, stakeholder – can conflict to produce an 
uncertain, awkward publicness. José Esteban Muñoz (2009) describes the queer 
stage as both a theatrical structure on which to perform possible queer selves, and a 
temporal phase of development. In this chapter I conceptualise the public 
programme as an awkward stage, in both structural and temporal senses, across 
which uneasy relations between institutions and their publics are played out. 
Through this motif I focus on an extraordinary, but indicative, example: Aaron 
Williamson’s Collapsing Lecture (2009–11), a performance I curated as part of Late 
at Tate Britain: Diffusions (2011). In its unfaltering commitment to collapse and 
lengthy duration, this lecture performance was experienced by audience and Tate 
staff alike as extremely awkward. As well as recounting what happened, I evoke my 
transitioning emotional states in witnessing what I had planned, with Williamson and 
the technical team, to unfold as a spectacular failure and describe various 
unexpected responses to it.  
 
If this research highlights the public programme of the contemporary art institution as 
a unique space to understand publicness as a process of becoming, then our 
relation to that setting needs unpacking. This example, alongside others, is used to 
unpick our attachments to the contemporary art institution and what it means to 
become public there, expanding upon Möntmann’s assessment of the fragility and 
awkwardness of relations between institutions and their publics under the ‘corporate 
turn’. The public programme – often the only part of the institution labelled ‘public’ – 
is tasked with producing face-to-face public encounters in relation, or addition to its 
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‘core’ programme of exhibitions and displays.50 These encounters are not always as 
smooth nor convivial as we might hope. From professional experience, I understand 
them to be tangled in a complex web of transactional exchanges, desires, fulfilments 
and disappointments and have observed many times how misaligned expectations 
may lead to discomfort.51 In this chapter I unpick and nuance both the effects and 
affects that materialise from these misalignments, what they reveal about our 
attachments to the contemporary art institution, and the kinds of publicness that 
emerge through them.  
 
Thus, a central problem of this chapter is how we think of, and relate to institutions. 
‘Institution’ describes a set of practices or relationships between bodies and things 
that have a particular organising function in society and culture. As Pascal Gielen 
writes ‘[o]n the one hand the institution refers to concrete organizations of people, 
buildings and things. On the other hand the concept of the institution is extended to 
the whole system of values, norms and customs considered significant in a society’. 
That it is also ‘primarily experienced as an external reality and objectivity’ means it 
has become ‘one of the most examined subjects in sociology’ (Gielen 2006 p.5). 
However, externality is not absolute; the word can also designate a person 
particularly associated with a place: ‘she was an institution in the theatre’ (Merriam-
Webster, original emphasis). The idiom neatly embodies a contradiction: no single 
person makes an institution by themselves, but institutions are quite often 
conceptualised as a singular body. During the first in of a series of workshops I led 
as part of That Awkward Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–
19) with Tate’s Public Programme team, some colleagues expressed feeling a split 
consciousness of ‘embodying the institution’ at the same time as ‘being themselves’ 
 
50 The most recently advertised job description for Public Programmes (October 2019), describes the 
aim of the Assistant Curator role as: ‘to inspire new ways of learning with art, and specifically with 
Tate’s collection, for all our audiences [...] working with artists and partners to develop and produce a 
programme of activities, resources and events at Tate Modern and Tate Britain that have enjoyment 
at their heart and reflect the diversity of artistic and cultural practices, and the communities we are a 
part of [...] The Public Programmes team offers a wide range of income-generating and free events for 
diverse local, national and international adult audiences. These include talks, courses, workshops, 
tours, symposia and special projects on modern and contemporary art and visual culture.’  
51 One example of misaligned expectations between institutions and publics commonly occurring 
through public programming is when promotional copy generates expectations that are not met by the 
actual event, something I experienced many times. 
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during public events.52 This chapter explores the queasiness of individual and 
collective relations to institutions during ‘an unanticipated turn of events’, to quote the 
copy describing Collapsing Lecture (Tate Britain 2011).  
 
As my Literature Review highlights, discourses on theatre and performance already 
have a rich focus on audience experience. This is somewhat lacking from discourses 
on contemporary art and institutions; even more absent is the perspective of the 
programmer as audience to their own work. I suggest this matters because with the 
distanced critic, or the professional case study, we are often left unsure about what 
actually happened in the room. However, rather than carrying out audience research, 
I take up the role of programmer and audience to provide an unflinchingly honest 
account of my ambivalent feelings about what happened during Collapsing Lecture. I 
also include insights and observations from: another staff member playing an integral 
role in the performance; direct responses gathered on the night; an account from an 
audience member obtained more recently. In this chapter, and entire thesis I address 
the specificity gap by centring my experience as both programmer, and part of the 
multiple publics produced through my programming.  
 
I also model another approach taken throughout the thesis: an explicit engagement 
with performance practice and scholarship, and queer theory, to examine the stakes 
within moments of performance, as part of the public programme. I do this to unpick 
relations between institutional actors and publics – the programmers and the 
programmed. Drawing on a history of artists’ performative experiments with the 
lecture format, often aligned with institutional critique (Milder 2010), my description of 
Collapsing Lecture at Tate Britain (2011) also brings together many concerns 
discussed in the Literature Review. By (re)performing a traditional public 
programming format – the artist’s talk – it (re)presents the problem of 
spectacularising education, as foregrounded in, and critiqued by, the educational 
turn (Rogoff 2010). Secondly, if the curatorial can be thought of as ‘all that takes 
 
52 I delve into the workshop practice more fully in Chapter Four, but draw on this particular workshop 
in this chapter. For anonymity I use pseudonyms when summarising and directly quoting what was 
shared during this unrecorded workshop. I also use pseudonyms to quote and summarise material 
from a separate recorded conversation with a former colleague, and an email conversation with an 




place on the stage’ of the exhibition (Martinon and Rogoff 2013 p.ix), I consider how 
the ‘staged-ness’ of the public programme might be constitutive, rather than a by-
product. This brings the technologies of the institution designed to focus attention on 
the artist as producer of knowledge, normally concealed or ignored, into view. Lastly, 
Claire Bishop’s suggestion (2004) that performances that ‘antagonise’ social 
relations might be more valuable than those romanticising the convivial is applicable 
here. In the guise of an artist’s talk, Collapsing Lecture did not initially present itself 
as a classic piece of participatory performance. However, it antagonistically brought 
up questions around civic and institutional responsibility for myself, as institutional 
programmer and, from what I observed, the audience as institutional public. 
Unpacking these, alongside two stories derived from the aforementioned workshop, 
the institution and the public come into view – not as impenetrable or abstract 
monoliths, but as relations between the fleshy, feeling bodies in the room, the 
technologies of the institution, and the expectations of safety and support projected 
onto it. Introducing the attendant notions of personal and professional responsibility, 
also explored later in this thesis, I show how these awkward but embodied relations 
reveal the contemporary art institution not as a fixed site, and ‘the public’ not as an 
abstract group always already there, but forming in relation to one another and what 
is taking place. 
 
Failure as Performance Art 
 
‘Why aren’t you helping him?’ a woman in the audience swivelled round in her seat 
and stage-whispered to my Tate colleague, a look of questioning horror on her face. 
She was anxiously referring to that evening’s speaker, the artist Aaron Williamson, 
who was having exaggerated difficulty with his PowerPoint presentation, without any 
apparent institutional assistance. Following an overly long, pompous and dryly 
delivered introduction from said colleague, Williamson, who we were informed was 
running late, had eventually burst through the auditorium doors offering loud 
apologies and dragging a suitcase clattering down the steps toward the stage. After 
hurriedly and haphazardly emptying its contents and plugging his laptop in at the 
lectern, he was now struggling to get his presentation to show up on the large 
screen. As a patient audience watched him navigate the cursor agonisingly slowly 
around his messy desktop, error messages kept popping up to thwart his progress. It 
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was now about twenty-five minutes in, the lecture hadn’t really started, and no one 
from Tate Britain appeared to be offering help. 
 
Titled A Language in Search of its Meta-language in the printed programme for the 
event, in consultation with Williamson, I wrote a small piece of copy for what was 
really Collapsing Lecture, as follows: 
 
In this lecture performance artist Aaron Williamson shares his wide-ranging 
practice and ideas on how an unanticipated turn of events can unexpectedly 
become alien, confusing or awkward (Tate Britain 2011). 
 
With only a small hint about what it might include, before the lecture performance 
even began, expectations of institutional perfectionism were subtly undercut by two 
small mistakes on the holding slide that read ‘Aaron Williamson: A Language in 
Serch of It’s Metalanguage’. After an excruciatingly slow start, the performance 
gradually ratcheted up as all manner of mistakes, glitches, silences and faults 
erupted. Gratuitous lateness notwithstanding, Williamson peppered his act with a 
catalogue of speaker incompetencies: fiddling with notes, losing his place and 
sending sheets of paper flying across the stage, wandering away from the 
microphone, giving way to an attack of nerves and a bout of coughing, spilling his 
water everywhere. Despite these mini-disasters, over the next hour or so Williamson 
was left almost entirely to his own devices, aside from the fruitless intervention of 
one Audio Visual (AV) technician. Sauntering nonchalantly to the lectern, he fiddled 
silently with a cable, shrugged, and returned to the AV booth at the back of the 
auditorium.  
 
Soldiering on against all odds, this farce was eventually drawn to close by a 
strangely poignant moment where Williamson paused in the middle of his sentence 
as he crossed the stage. Frozen mid-stride, it was as if he were trapped in a 
daydream or asleep on his feet. Wondering what on earth could happen next, 
everyone held their breath. After what seemed like several minutes someone took 
the initiative to begin a tentative applause. After gradually gaining momentum, the 
pitter patter of uneasy clapping signalled the end of a 90-minute ordeal. Finally, an 
exhausted audience filed out of the auditorium. A friend told me the four people 
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sitting in front of her didn’t seem to have a clue what was happening throughout. I 
caught sight of my sister and asked her with a tense grin what she thought? She 
simply replied: ‘I hated it’.   
 
Williamson’s lecture performance was part of a programme of performance, film, 
talks and music that I had curated called Late at Tate Britain: Diffusions, my first 
large-scale event since taking up the role of Assistant Curator, Adult Programmes in 
2009. I had heard about Collapsing Lecture through a friend who had recounted the 
catalogue of mistakes – lateness, technical faults, nerves and general incompetence 
– she had witnessed as a Goldsmiths student when Williamson had been invited to 
speak there. Describing the tense atmosphere and general hilarity that ensued when 
everyone ‘got it’, I was intrigued. Feeling familiar enough with the conventions and 
formats of the institution to mess around with them a bit, the context of a Late at Tate 
(as it is commonly known) seemed the perfect setting for Collapsing Lecture. Begun 
at Tate Britain in 2000, this now familiar museum format, in which event lighting, 
alcohol, music and activities like performance, film screenings, workshops and talks 
come together, attracts a higher proportion of younger visitors to the galleries. 
 
When I invited him to discuss the idea, Williamson explained how the performance 
was developed through several specific speaking invitations between 2009–11. It 
was seeded many years earlier through Williamson’s experiences as a D/deaf 
student sitting through art school lectures.53 Without proper sign language provision, 
Williamson was simply expected to lip-read and glean what he could. These 
experiences ended up providing rich material for what was to become Collapsing 
Lecture. In an article detailing its development, Williamson writes: 
 
to counter the boredom I would spend the hours observing peripheral 
distractions such as the lecturers’ body language, attitudes and interactions 
with their lecturing apparatus. Above all, I watched closely for those moments 
when the objective of the lecture – to educate and inform – was disrupted or 
 
53 According to the charity Sign Health, deaf with a small ‘d’ refers to people who lose their hearing 
and learn British Sign Language as secondary to spoken English. Deaf with a capital ‘D’ refers to 
people born without hearing, whose first language is generally British Sign Language. D/deaf may be 
used to refer to people and their culture that blend the two. 
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stymied by intrusions, technical breakdowns, or simply by a loss of nerve [...] 
the lecturers’ performing of ‘knowing’ – was often predicated upon essentially 
transparent forms and methods of address that, sooner or later, like any over-
inflated edifice, are inclined to fall apart (Williamson 2017). 
 
Tuning into other kinds of information circulating around the main event of the art 
school lecture, Williamson began to weave together the leaky meta-performances of 
‘performing knowing’, and their inevitable failures. The things we usually try to ignore 
during such events – the speaker’s nerves, presentation ticks, technical hiccups and 
delays – became the main event of his lecture performance. He not only mined his 
own experience, but canvassed friends and colleagues for theirs. The vignette 
ending the performance I have described came from an account of ‘a Conference 
Lecturer […] so acutely jetlagged, he literally fell asleep on his feet midway through 
and had to be startled awake’ (Williamson 2017).  
 
A week prior to this particular iteration of Collapsing Lecture, Williamson visited Tate 
Britain’s auditorium with me to quiz the AV technicians about everything that could 
go wrong there. The Head of the AV beamed with delight at permission to 
manufacture a litany of mistakes that would usually cause professional 
embarrassment and inevitable tension between technical and programming staff. On 
the night, watching Williamson riff off the auditorium’s possibilities for failure like a 
proficient jazz musician felt like an odd bonding experience between our two teams. 
United not only by being ‘in on the joke’, but also by watching the disaster unfold 
from the AV booth, we were effectively shielded from the intensity of the auditorium. 
Becoming aware of the army of Tate staff watching from behind the glass screen, 
several audience members threw indignant glares our way.  
 
As the performance concluded, I wanted to feel a sense of relief from the tension 
that had eventually begun building in the AV booth as steadily as inside the 
auditorium. Throughout the performance my feelings had fluctuated between 
childlike glee at the unfolding slapstick rubbishing the professionalism of the 
institution and an underlying anxiety around whether or not the audience were 
‘getting it’. Furthermore, how exactly might they feel when they did – shocked, 
amused, angry? But that relief never came. To my memory only one or two people 
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had walked out during the performance, though I suspect many more had wanted to. 
I was later informed by the colleague who had introduced Williamson that a woman 
got up and left halfway through, ‘visibly upset’. Was this the one who had anxiously 
asked, ‘why aren’t you helping him?’ I will never be sure. I’ll also never know whether 
she was consumed by anger at the institution for not helping the poor, struggling 
artist, or ashamed and aggrieved for having her empathy mocked when she finally 
did ‘get it’. What I do know is that an uncomfortable sense of regret began to bloom 
in my chest, dulling my mischievous enjoyment, alongside a sense of my own 
bewildered responsibility. 
 
The Lecture Performance as Genre 
 
The lecture performance, or performance lecture, has moved from avant-garde, 
radical gesture to become a distinctive, programmable form of performance that can 
fill a whole evening or populate a festival.54 I will not attempt a comprehensive history 
or genealogy of this now distinctive genre of performance, but it could include John 
Cage’s part-score, part-script Lecture on Nothing (1949); Joseph Beuys Information 
Action (1972), described as a lecture by the artist and a performance by the then 
Tate Gallery (Westerman 2016); Andrea Fraser’s infamous Official Welcome (2003) 
parodying the ‘thank you’ speech, which saw her stripping naked and ending up in 
tears; choreographer Jerome Bel’s performed history of his own work The last 
performance (a lecture) (2004); Mark Leckey’s Turner Prize-winning Cinema in the 
Round (2006–08); Sharon Hayes’ Love Addresses (2007–08) delivered on street 
corners with a microphone; Guillermo Gomez-Pena’s Performance As Reverse 
Anthropology – A Lecture (2003) presented at the British Museum; Hito Styerl’s 
performance lectures extending her writing and film practice into live, institutional 
contexts: I Dreamed a Dream (Part 1) (2013) and The Secret Museum (2014) 
commissioned by, and performed at Stedelijk Museum Amsterdam; and Rabih 
Mroué: An Evening of Performance Lectures (2018) showcasing three of the 
eponymous artist and theatre maker’s distinctive lectures delivered sitting at a simple 
black desk, at The Showroom.  
 
54 For example, Hayward Gallery’s An Evening of Off-the-Wall Artist’s Lectures (2007). Patricia Milder 
(2010) gives an overview of the performance lectures at Performa 09 (2009), New York’s annual 




Rather than giving a potted history, I cite a list indicating the development and 
characteristics of the genre, albeit an overwhelmingly white, male and able-bodied 
line up. This could be indicative of how the genre draws on traditional forms of 
patriarchal address, though has been challenged by a younger generation of artists 
and theatre makers.55 Within the well-worn performance lecture format, some artists 
(I use the term expansively as the genre crosses art and theatre) choose to parody 
authorial, academic knowledge production; others utilise it to express ideas and 
artistic research in a more experimental and expansive fashion. Most of the 
performance lectures listed above were advertised as such, foregrounding their 
experimental approach to presentation and knowledge production, but undercutting 
some of their disruptive potential. The performance lecture might not be the radical, 
disruptive gesture it once was, but is usefully and liberally adapted to more 
experimental, performative presentations of artistic research and ideas.56 Collapsing 
Lecture was also billed as a lecture performance, under the title: A Language in 
Search of its Meta-language, but didn’t manage to communicate anything that 
remotely counted as knowledge. However, that wasn’t necessarily what made it so 




Looking back on my time at Tate, Collapsing Lecture foregrounds many of the 
contradictions inherent in becoming part of a contemporary art institution’s public. I 
put the experience to one side at the time,57 but in reviving my memories of what 
happened, several issues come into focus that link to wider concerns of this 
research. For example, the anxious attachments and expectations of publics to 
institutions, and institutions to publics, and their misalignment. I already suggested 
that misaligned expectations materialised through the public programme might 
reveal both the institution and the public as in becoming in relation to each other, 
 
55 Such as Season Butler’s Happiness Forgets (2015–16); Ivy Monteiro’s A performance lecture on 
queer spirituality and Afrofuturism (2019); Martin O’Brien’s Until the Last Breath is Breathed (2020), 
performed in the very same Tate Britain auditorium as Collapsing Lecture. 
56 It could even be said to have become a staple of the contemporary artist’s repertoire. 
57 Indeed, unless they receive written complaints the uncomfortable responses that Collapsing 
Lecture received often go unnoticed by the institution and are quite quickly forgotten. 
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rather than monolithic entities always already there. But my work with Williamson 
also drew attention to the conventions I worked under and the unpredictability of the 
public(s) I was working with.  
 
Sociologist Pascal Gielen has defined the role that museums play in the art world as 
a global institution, that are: 
 
expected to be well-oiled organizations and to simultaneously take on the role 
of the ‘guardian’ and ‘facilitator’ of specific artistic values and practices. This 
might sound pompous, but it is an accepted idea in sociology that cultural 
practices keep in step with a powerful societal hierarchization of values and 
norms (Gielen 2006 p.5). 
 
While the institution of art may be broadly expressed across a variety of forms, and 
embodied by multiple practices and relationships between people, as Andrea Fraser 
has described (2005 pp.278–83), the museum still acts as an important role model 
for other organisations and is expected to run smoothly. In my experience, this 
expectation is quite often up to the public programming team to uphold through a 
certain kind of ‘slickness’ of event delivery. 
 
When I started my job as Assistant Curator of Adult Programmes, Tate Britain in 
2009 I was trained on the administrative systems and introduced in minute detail to 
the order of set-up for an auditorium event.58 This precision extended to guidelines 
on shepherding the audience who, as Assistant Curators, it was our job to corral.59 
When the Adult Programme team at Tate Britain merged with the Public Programme 
Team at Tate Modern, I learnt the specificity of set up for Tate Modern’s Starr 
 
58 This included: designing the event holding slide; uploading speaker PowerPoints with the AV 
technicians; displaying paper signage about the event front and back of house; setting out individual 
water bottles and glasses for each speaker; a complex arrangement of reserved signs and roped-off 
rows designed to guide the incoming audience towards the front; discretionary use of timing signs to 
indicate speakers had ‘5 minutes’, ‘1 minute’ or must simply ‘FINISH’ (something I never quite 
mastered). 
59 When it came to ‘mic running’ I was carefully instructed as to the intricacies of eye contact, hand 
and body gestures designed to assist the speaker or chair shaping the question-and-answer session 
from the stage – rather than being led by particularly animated members of the audience. In this 




auditorium.60 When time allowed, the Curator and Assistant Curator would reflect on 
the previous night’s proceedings to find room for improvement in set-up systems and 
event management. However, subtle shifts in practice were often down to the 
individual and within the ritualised set-up and running of events in the different 
auditoria, various embodied practices proliferated.  
 
This was especially true with regard to the formality of welcoming the audience and 
speakers through the practice of introductions. These had a set template, but varied 
from person to person. Customarily beginning with ‘Good evening everyone, and 
welcome to Tate Britain’, an intervening section introduced practical information 
about the event, safety features of the auditorium, reminders to the audience to 
switch off mobile phones and wait for the microphone before asking a question. Then 
came a list a speaker’s publications and most important exhibitions, roles or 
achievements – nuggets of information that aimed to create an aura of importance, 
but which I often selected for ease of reading aloud. Nevertheless, it was easy to 
rush through the introduction and find my breathing out of sync with my words. This 
problem was often accompanied by a wavering voice, a cause of sharp 
embarrassment. As host, I understood my role to be about providing an official 
welcome, making sure the event ran smoothly, holding it together if it did not, and 
drawing it comfortably to a close. I was also aware that my introduction was 
generally considered the least important part of any event, so what did I have to be 
nervous about? I eventually learned that communing with the audience – engaging 
eye contact – was the key to holding my nerve and confidently setting the tone for 




My curious nervousness with auditorium introductions not only resonates with 
Alexia’s experience of delivering her overly long welcome to Collapsing Lecture, but 
says something about the requirements and responsibilities of holding public events 
in general. The specific practices I describe are often overlooked, but are in fact 
integral to what is commonly known in therapeutic discourse as ‘holding space’ (The 
 
60 As part of the aforementioned Transforming Tate Learning Review in 2011. 
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Gender & Sexuality Therapy Centre 2020). This term has become part of the 
vocabulary of many museum and gallery learning professionals (Turvey 2016), as 
well as artistic, curatorial and critical practices more broadly.61 Conveying the feeling 
of carrying out these practices matters to my research because they are learned and 
embodied through doing, and as described, some of them had an effect on my body. 
In addition, these practices of holding space are largely a set of immaterial gestures 
that are generally only sensed as a comfortable feeling, and an uncomfortable one 
when they are absent. More than just the ability to carry out certain tasks, holding 
space requires sensitivity and attunement to the total situation. Over time I learned to 
hold spaces at Tate according to certain institutional conventions and norms. These 
practices may be largely invisible to an audience, but the work of a public 
programmer usually only becomes visible when they give an introduction, 
instructions about tea and toilet breaks, or remedy something that goes wrong. If 
they are incomplete or missing however, their absence is usually felt as a general 
sense of disorganisation, a lack of direction or disorientation, or as mentioned above, 
discomfort. Yet, as I also learned, holding any event relied not merely on carrying out 
tasks in a certain order, but on timing, social etiquette, empathy and the ability to 
remain both calm and responsive as the event unfolded.  
 
Alongside running in a ‘well-oiled’ fashion, institutions come with other expectations, 
not least a duty to tend to the needs of those within them. One of the most disturbing 
things about the Collapsing Lecture was the lack of attempts by the institution to 
remedy the collapse, or draw it to a close.62 Soon after giving her intentionally 
lengthy, pompous introduction, Alexia left the auditorium. Having been instructed not 
to respond by the artist himself, unbeknown to the audience, she was performing her 
role perfectly. But the mounting tension and persistent stares from audience 
 
61 Holding Space (2017–18) was ‘a one-year programme of research and support for eight UK-based 
artists’ (The Showroom n.d.), used as a case study in Alberta Whittle’s expansive reading of ‘the hold’ 
through ‘an intersectional queer theory lens’ to make visible forms of curatorial support for ‘black, 
People of Colour (PoC) and Queer Trans Intersex People of Colour (QTIPoC) artist-curators’ (Whittle 
2020). 
62 After my rigorous training I began noticing how timing lags lead to an anxious sense of not being 
held when attending events elsewhere. This is because holding space is as much about setting the 
tone as it is about drawing things to a close. Thus, another disorientating aspect of Collapsing Lecture 




members imploring her to help him, meant that holding space for Williamson became 
harder as the performance wore on. 
 
An important touchstone for gallery and museum educators (Turvey 2016) is 
paediatrician and psychoanalyst Donald Winnicott’s notion of the ‘good enough 
mother’ who creates a ‘holding environment’ for her child that extends outwards from 
the primary caregiver’s body: ‘the mother's arms, the parental relationship, the home, 
the family including cousins and near relations, the school, the locality with its police 
stations, the county with its laws’ (Winnicott 1984 p.310). Leanne Turvey, Convenor, 
Schools and Teachers at Tate, draws on Penny Wilson’s description of her practice 
that incorporates Winnicott’s ‘holding environment’ (2016 p.35). In Wilson’s playwork 
practice, the ‘good enough mother’ cannot meet all the needs of the child, but 
‘adapts the parameters of the holding environment’ to their changing needs, creating 
a flexible space that is ‘safe and allows for exploration’ (Wilson 2009 p.28). In her 
role at Tate, Turvey draws on both playwork and psychoanalysis to extend the notion 
of the ‘holding environment’ into the art gallery or museum as an ‘indeterminate 
space’ for learning about the self through art and play (2016 pp.35–6). The kind of 
auditorium-based event that Collapsing Lecture subverted, created and bounded by 
the practices described above, is rather more restrictive than the flexible holding 
environment created in the galleries by Schools and Teachers colleagues. However, 
ultimately what binds together these different formats and learning spaces is that, as 
Winnicott suggests above, the responsibility for ‘holding’ them is not solely located in 
one person, but it extends outwards from a central ‘care giver’. Therefore, we may 
extend the gesture of ‘holding’ to all the people in the room, and beyond – to the 
architecture, furniture and apparatus of the auditorium, and museum itself. All play a 
role in creating a holding environment, within which learning and exploration can 
unfold. Challenge and exploration are facilitated by flexible parameters, but when 
someone or something is not playing their part, the holding environment can begin to 
feel unsafe. In the case of the Collapsing Lecture, many people and things were not 
playing their expected part, and the unease was palpable, even for those who were 
in on it.  
 
I am not suggesting that people entering an institution come with conscious 
demands about what they expect to happen there. More that, in line with what 
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Patricia Falguières writes, institutions are ‘[p]erceived from the angle of silent 
restraint… [and their] effects [...] are felt without prior requirements of 
conceptualization or consciousness’ (2017 p.28). Just as the labour of holding space 
is invisible, expectations of being held by an institution remain largely unconscious – 
until moments of un-holding start to appear. Ben Cranfield (2014) has shown how a 
psychoanalytic understanding of play – or as Winnicott preferred ‘playing’ – as 
facilitated by the ‘good enough mother’ and ‘holding environment’ has shaped the 
contemporary art institution and museum. If the museum’s holding environment 
creates a safe space for playing with art and ideas, then the good enough ‘mother’ 
(playworker, education curator or public programmer) is vital because ‘she’ doesn’t 
crush creativity by holding too tightly. However, if ‘she’ holds too loosely, creative 
exploration is also crushed by a lack of support. Going back to Gielen, I suggest that 
if moments of uncertainty in the auditorium are not remedied, they may precisely be 
‘felt’ as a ‘silent restraint’ on the audience. This might lead to a desire to intervene 
and re-shape the holding environment, without knowing exactly how. As guided by 
the artist, my expectations of the audience were that they would cope with the 
uncertainty of his performance. But despite the programme copy announcing a 
‘lecture performance’, many seemed to be expecting a lecture, and it only gradually 
dawned on (some of) them that the farce they were witnessing was the ‘lecture 
performance’ they signed up for. Here my, and by extension, the institution’s 
expectations of its public, were misaligned with the mixed feelings about, and 




As previously explained, Collapsing Lecture draws on Williamson’s experiences of 
boredom and fatigue during art school lectures where no sign language 
interpretation was provided. From previous work together, I was used to Williamson 
lip-reading with our occasional use of a notebook if things became complicated. 
Though I understood Collapsing Lecture as emerging from Williamson’s experience 
of D/deafness, and lack of support in lecture settings, prior experience perhaps 
coloured my expectation of others’ responses to the performance. Did the audience’s 
reaction to Williamson’s perceived plight not only have to do with their expectations 




As the misspelt title ‘A Language in Serch of It’s Metalanguage’ on the holding slide 
suggested, there were several languages simultaneously at play in the lecture 
performance. The dominant language was spoken English, which didn’t get anyone 
very far; the language of institutional convention was turned on its head; coded 
interactions with technical, material apparatus faltered too. At some point Williamson 
turned to a flip chart attempting to draw a diagram, gesturing emphatically towards it 
with his pen – another language that fell flat. Then there was his meta-conversation 
with sign language interpreter Chloe.63 Her sulky responses to his frustration 
thickened the tension around professional responsibility. In addition, despite acting 
as a theatrical ‘aside’, the BSL conversation staged an unusual exclusionary 
experience for the majority of the able-bodied audience – that of being unable to 
hear a conversation going on in front of them – unless there were other British Sign 
Language (BSL) speakers in the room. As such, all these languages failed to 
communicate the knowledge promised. Or rather, it was only through a patchwork of 
the collective linguistic failures that some semblance of a message appeared. Even 
then, its reception could not be guaranteed. So, how might the artist’s D/deafness 
and his play with languages have affected the audience’s response to the lecture 
performance in ways that I did not anticipate? And how did D/deafness per se disrupt 
the liberal institution’s notion of its ‘general public’ as able-bodied? 
 
The role D/deafness plays in the performance and its reception was touched on in 
my conversation with Alexia. We discussed what Williamson’s intention of the 
Collapsing Lecture might have been: 
 
to make you think about the moments in your life when you feel 
uncomfortable? […] That was exacerbated because he’s D/deaf 
and so […] I assumed he was playing with [...] when you’re on the 
 
63 During the latter stages of this research, Williamson told me via email about a William Pope.L 
lecture at Tate Modern during Live Culture (2003), a four-day programme of performances and talks 
produced in collaboration with the Live Art Development Agency. The public programming team had 
provided Williamson with two BSL interpreters, but Pope.L spoke ‘in a completely unrecognisable 
language which turned out to be... Klingon! [The interpreters] sat on stage completely baffled and 




[…] edge of intervening in a really awkward situation and you just 
don’t know which way to go […] and asking yourself all of those 
questions […] why am I reticent to intervene? (Alexia 2018). 
 
Referencing Williamson’s ability to play, Alexia highlights something not afforded to 
the audience, some of whom were even upset by what was going on. This could be 
said to replicate a mode of curating that privileges the primacy of the artist/curator 
relationship, discussed in my Literature Review. If the institution only ‘cares’ about 
the artist’s ability to ‘play’ then the public is missing from the equation. As Alexia also 
suggested, Williamson aroused the audience’s empathy, and perhaps even their 
pity. His D/deafness might have exacerbated their awkwardness at his failure to 
communicate, and their not being able to understand him. Some might have even 
felt guilty about this. Most of the audience was not known to Williamson, and were 
unaware that his D/deafness is not ostensibly a barrier to communication with non-
BSL signers, because he lip-reads and speaks clearly. The catalogue of mishaps he 
faced could have happened to anyone, but did the audience feel doubly bad 
watching a D/deaf person failing to make themselves understood?  
 
As suggested in my Literature Review, we might be betwixt and between the liberal 
and the neoliberal art institution, but Alexia’s comment suggests that the museum 
still attracts a notionally liberal audience. Even though they witnessed him struggling, 
might this liberal audience have felt uncomfortable intervening in a lecture by a 
D/deaf artist? Could their expectations have become a kind of double-bind, or form 
of self-policing? A recent testimony gathered via email from a curator called Maree, 
who had also worked with Williamson before, would seem to support this idea. 
Though informed of what would happen, she hadn’t known how ‘brilliantly 
excruciating’ it would be. Maree described a ‘mix of emotions in the room’ that 
included ‘discomfort, polite tolerance, nervous giggling, outrage that the technical 
aspect wasn’t working’. She remembers ‘feeling uncomfortable at other’s discomfort 
for Aaron, but appreciating [that] the over zealousness to try and “save” him comes 
from not considering it might be deliberate. Or that disability can do satire’ (Maree 
2020). Would a similar performance work within other institutional settings, ones with 
different class and political dynamics? Perhaps the lecture performance plays on 
notions of political correctness around disability, eventually encouraging an audience 
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to laugh at their own meekness at the end – but only when, and if, they have fully 
understood it to be a ‘performance’. All of this still relies on prior knowledge of the 
genre of lecture performance described earlier on this chapter. As I witnessed, and 
Maree testified, a handful of audience members never quite reached that point: ‘I 
think a couple of people walked out, one person shouted out to “help him”, but if you 
stayed till the end it came together’ (Maree 2020). In that case, does the 
performance ultimately succeed in failing so perfectly because Williamson is D/deaf, 
and his presence disrupts the liberal audience’s expectations of how an institution 
should care for him?  
 
Alison Kafer (2013) traces the affinities between feminist, queer and crip theories 
and her lived experience of disability. Her discussion of normative ableist culture that 
casts differently-abled bodies as deviant and in need of cure is useful for unpacking 
Maree’s observations. Kafer calls this the ‘curative imaginary, an understanding of 
disability that not only expects and assumes intervention [...] but cannot imagine or 
comprehend anything other’ (p.27, original emphasis). Tate staff were ‘in’ on the 
knowledge that the advertised lecture was actually a performance, and explicitly 
instructed by the artist not to intervene. Despite being described in the printed 
programme for the event as a ‘lecture performance’ that would explore how an 
‘unanticipated turn of events can unexpectedly become alien, confusing or awkward’, 
the audience were clearly not prepared for just how awkward things would become 
when the institution failed to perform its curative intervention. As indicated through 
my description of routine event management at Tate Britain, my usual role would 
precisely be curative if anything went awry. I was so focussed on not intervening 
however, that perhaps I did not pay enough attention to the points at which a 
‘curative imaginary’ emerged in the audience. I actively ignored the urgent looks in 
Alexia’s direction, the walkouts and pleas for help, the woman who appeared visibly 
upset, the person who took responsibility for drawing the performance to a close by 
beginning the applause. But for Maree, this was in itself to be applauded:  
 
[a] lot of performance lectures stay in the suspense mode of “appreciation”. 
As in “Ah we get this. A lecture yet not a lecture”. The Collapsing Lecture took 





I had not understood this at the time, much less anticipated it. But assessing the role 
D/deafness played in the performance is key to understanding how it disrupted not 
only the audience’s expectations of the institution, but the institution’s (liberal) 
understanding of its general public. Kafer’s notion of ‘crip time’ is another key 
concept that pushes further the disruptive potential of disability within the 
performance. She aligns crip time with ‘queer time’, which, as Elizabeth Freeman 
(2010) also argues, understands temporal and sexual dissonance to be intertwined. 
Kafer explains that both crip and queer time function outside of a normative, linear 
understanding of progression and productivity: ‘[f]uturity has often been framed in 
curative terms, a time frame that casts disabled people (as) out of time, or as 
obstacles to the arc of progress’ (2013 p.28). For Kafer, both crip and queer time are 
read as deviant by normative society for their non-normative relationship to time and 
(re)productivity.   
 
Though not an expressed part of the lecture, or indeed the performance as such, 
Williamson’s D/deafness could certainly have been perceived as an obstacle, or 
frustration, to normative linear progression and productivity. Frustration is multivalent 
here – it is both an obstacle blocking the way and a feeling that circulates. If, as 
Adam Phillips has written, obstacles reveal the object of our desire (1993), then the 
many obstacles frustrating the normative, linear path of knowledge production that 
evening might be said to reveal the collective desire for clarity of communication – 
for communing, even – that was never fulfilled. I felt this myself, and picked it up 
anecdotally from audience members I spoke to afterwards. The seed was sown by 
the inordinately long introduction, expressly there to cover the fact that Williamson 
was (intentionally) running late. As Kafer writes, ‘the temporal orientation of “crip 
time”’ is often ‘an essential component of disability culture and community […] a wry 
reference to the disability-related events that always seem to start late or to the 
disabled people who never seem to arrive anywhere on time’ (p.26). Williamson’s 
D/deafness was not mentioned by Alexia, nor directly referred to by the artist himself, 
but when he eventually arrived, loudly apologising for his lateness, his speech was 
unmistakably that of a D/deaf person. The side conversations with sign language 
interpreter Chloe also became more prominent as the lecture descended into chaos, 




Indeed, both the lecture and the performance – if they may be split as such – unfold 
more or less in accordance with Kafer’s definition of crip time. Rather than being 
productive according to a normative knowledge-transfer model, the lecture is 
intensely frustrating because, over the course of an hour, nothing that feels like 
knowledge is communicated. That is not to say that nothing is produced. According 
to Kafer we need to think of ‘the flexibility of crip time as being not only an 
accommodation to those who need “more” time but also […] a challenge to 
normative and normalizing expectations of pace and scheduling’ (p.27). One of the 
ways we might – tentatively – read the performance as productive is that it evokes 
an extreme sense of this ‘flexibility’ for the audience. They might not recognise it as 
such, but since Collapsing Lecture itself makes no ‘sense’ – and could even be 
described as nonsense – these accumulating failures become the only thing to 
follow. Together with the stretching of time, the mounting frustrations and failures 
exceed even Kafer’s description of crip time’s ‘challenge’. But with them, Williamson 
offers something outside of normative desires and expectations for the artist’s talk to 
‘make sense’: the collapsing gestures of ‘performing-knowing’ perversely became 




Alexia described the audience to Collapsing Lecture as suspended on the ‘edge of 
intervening in a really awkward situation’, which is confirmed by Maree’s testimony of 
her discomfort at others’ discomfort, from the auditorium itself (full to its capacity of 
190 seats). Indeed, such elongated awkwardness might best be described as a 
suspension of (normative) time. After Kafer, I suggest this suspension is facilitated 
by the intervention of crip time. But what does it mean to sit alongside others in a 
packed auditorium for over an hour with such awkwardness?  
 
It seems self-evident that awkwardness is first and foremost a feeling. But as Adam 
Kotsko (2010) describes, it is a curiously nebulous one, which is inherently social. 
Awkwardness is a feeling that circulates between people creating ‘a weird kind of 
social bond’ (p.9). Whomever or whatever the cause, what it reveals is a thinning of 
the social order governing a given situation: ‘[a]wkwardness shows us that […] [we] 
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have no built-in norms: the norms that we develop help us to “get by,” […] 
awkwardness is what prompts us to set up social norms in the first place – and what 
prompts us to transform them’ (p.16). Put simply, awkwardness reveals that there 
might be another way of doing things, by exposing the precariousness of the 
structures we build to mitigate it arising in the first place. In addition, it’s appearance 
reveals how these structures work for some and not others. Those who don’t know, 
or aren’t able to follow, the rules governing a certain situation, are at risk of 
disrupting them and becoming the cause of awkwardness. 
 
What Alexia described comes closer to Kotsko’s designation of ‘radical 
awkwardness’ (original emphasis), which he calls ‘the panic brought about by the 
lack of any norm’ as opposed to ‘everyday awkwardness […] the violation of a 
relatively strong norm’ (p.17). This was set up by the advertised lecture performance 
‘violating a relatively strong norm’ of the institution’s understanding of its public as 
able-bodied, which aligns with who the ‘general ticketed’ public programme of most 
art institutions is assumed to be for. In the liberal institution anyone who deviates 
from the norm is provided for with a special programme. For example, Tate’s Public 
Programme encompasses Access and Community Programmes, yet despite 
collaborations with colleagues working across these strands, such categorising 
usually prevents particular audiences from mixing. Therefore, ‘A Language in Search 
of its Meta-language’ was already an exception to standard practice, because it 
presented a D/deaf artist to a general public without advertising it as a special BSL 
event as part of Tate’s Access Programme. Separating audiences into groups serves 
another function within the liberal institution – to assuage any awkwardness around 
able-bodied privilege for this general public. But this event included a BSL interpreter 
to accommodate a D/deaf public within the general public.  
 
And what of the artist himself? Was he the victim of many mishaps, or just as 
incompetent as the staff? Who was to blame for all the things that went wrong that 
evening? This may be illuminated by the following passage where Kotsko describes 
the ‘awkward person’: 
 
there are people for whom awkwardness is a kind of perverse skill […] We are 
only able to identify someone as awkward, however, because the person 
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does something that is inappropriate for a given context. Most often, these 
violations do not involve an official written law – instead, the grace that’s in 
question is the skilful navigation of the mostly unspoken norms of a 
community. Severely awkward individuals are those who have a particular 
difficulty relating to their social context (Kotsko 2010 pp. 6–7). 
 
In one sense Williamson is what Kotsko characterises as the awkward person – the 
one most obviously ‘to blame’ for the awkward situation. He embodies awkwardness 
through his doomed interactions with his lecturing apparatus and stuttering failure to 
articulate anything. But the Collapsing Lecture is also set apart from what Kotsko is 
describing above, because it is not merely a social situation. It is a staged, public 
event that has a different kind of script. So the awkwardness is perhaps not so much 
about Williamson’s ‘difficulty relating to […] social context’, which might suggest an 
informal situation, but rather his difficulty delivering a scripted, public performance. 
Or, was his performance of awkwardness a peculiar kind of perfection? In which 
case, can we locate the source of awkwardness in the audience for their lack of 
‘appreciation’, which Maree suggested ordinarily attends the lecture performance? 
 
Kotsko’s analysis of television performances by Ricky Gervais in The Office (2001–
03) and Larry David in Curb Your Enthusiasm (2000–ongoing) later does away with 
the opposition between social grace and awkwardness, describing them as a ‘kind of 
grace – [...] that allows us to break down and admit that we are finally nothing more 
or less than human beings’ (p.89). If we take a standard dictionary definition of grace 
as ‘smoothness and elegance of movement’ and ‘attractively polite manner of 
behaving’ (Oxford English Dictionary 2005), this notion also links to the invisible 
labour of public programming, a lot of which is orientated around creating a feeling of 
smoothness. To have this smoothness repeatedly disrupted very quickly becomes 
disturbing. Yet, if we can think of Williamson’s performance as graceful in any way, 
this moment came when he appeared to fall asleep on his feet. After an hour of 
mishaps and blunders building an exhausting tension, I distinctly remember this 
moment as unexpectedly moving. Appearing to forget himself entirely, Williamson’s 
brief pause brought a surprising frailty to the stage. It was swiftly punctured by the 
sound of gradual clapping that brought the extended awkwardness to an end. Having 
told me he would go on until it felt finished, Williamson had finally pushed the 
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suspension of convention and institutional structure to the limit. As well as drawing 
the performance to a close, the applause restored the norms of the auditorium.  
 
In the first of a series of online seminars for Open School East (2020), Matthew de 
Kersaint Giraudeau has offered some thoughts about applause that are useful in 
grasping the import of this moment:  
 
clapping together designates the co-clappers as an audience. An audience is 
always clapping for something. But what are we clapping for? […] Clapping is 
a performative act and like all performatives, it gathers its meaning from its 
circumstances. […] Clapping is a way to show appreciation for an event that 
has finished [...] It is also […] a sign that we are no longer going to direct our 
attention towards the performance […] Clapping is not language, but it does 
something to language (de Kersaint Giraudeau 2020). 
 
If, as Kotsko suggests, awkwardness creates a ‘weird kind of social bond’ then the 
release of clapping may also allow a group of uncertain individuals to reconstitute 
themselves as an audience proper – the only role available in the entire scenario of 
Collapsing Lecture to be normatively carried out. As de Kersaint Giraudeau 
highlights, there are a host of reasons why we are clapping, all of them social, but 
exceeding language or definitive explanation. Did the clapping that drew Collapsing 
Lecture to a close signal the welcome end of awkwardness and the beginning of 
appreciation, or simply the exhaustion of attention? Was it the only way for the 
audience to adequately, as a group, hold space for the artist – and the institution – 
and make it all OK in the end? Silence would perhaps have constituted a new and 
different form of publicness, even more awkward that what had gone before, 
designating the entire thing a resounding failure. As it was, the normalising function 
of clapping might just have saved Collapsing Lecture from total collapse. 
 
That Awkward Stage 
 
In Collapsing Lecture Williamson both under- and over-performs, bringing his 
fallibility and vulnerability to the fore. Apparently committed to doing something 
pointless, he disrupts the figure of the expert, the one who has useful knowledge to 
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impart. Such commitment is both humorous and frustrating. Queer theorist Jack 
Halberstam says of the critical productivity of failure: 
 
[w]e can also recognize failure as a way of refusing to acquiesce to dominant 
logics of power and discipline and as a form of critique. As a practice, failure 
recognizes that alternatives are embedded already in the dominant and that 
power is never total or consistent; indeed failure can exploit the 
unpredictability of ideology and its indeterminate qualities (2011 p.88).  
 
Could the abject failures of Williamson’s performance actually be exploited as a 
productive ‘form of critique’, allowing us to see the workings of the institution and the 
textures of a public coming into being, as the ‘alternatives [...] embedded’ in their 
dominant logics? For me, Kotsko’s analysis of awkwardness and Halberstam’s work 
on failure both reveal an emergent consciousness that things might be done 
otherwise – that other futures are thinkable. This fleeting positivity connects to José 
Esteban Muñoz’s evocative description of the queer stage as both a phase of 
development:  
 
the way in which worried parents deal with wild queer children, how they 
sometimes protect themselves from the fact of queerness by making it a 
“stage,” a developmental hiccup, a moment of misalignment that will, 
hopefully, correct itself (Muñoz 2009 p.98). 
 
Later Muñoz describes the queer stage as a space to practice other possible selves 
on, or ‘imagine a self […] in the process of becoming’ (2009 p.100). But, like crip 
time, the queer stage is only possible because heteronormative temporality casts 
queers as out of time. Muñoz’s description of the ‘wild queer child’ is a reminder that 
teenage years are referred to as an ‘awkward phase’, recalling Michael Warner’s 
connection between ‘pubic’ and ‘public’ (2005), discussed in my introduction. 
Muñoz’s use of language to denote the frustrations to normative progression – the 
‘stalling’ and ‘hiccupping’ of queer becoming – provide a compelling parallel to the 
glitchy interactions with the lecturing apparatus that Williamson performed. I also 
connect the ‘moment of misalignment’, which parents hope will be corrected, to the 
kinds of mismatched expectations described between the institution and its publics, 
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which can lead to a sense of things missing the mark, falling short, or taking an 
unexpected turn. And yet, Muñoz’s queer stage is also one of hope – a space to 
understand himself as a processual being. Might, then, we find some redemptive 
hope in the public programme as an awkward stage?  
 
Awkward Stages and their Retelling 
 
It is perhaps no surprise that I decided to name my series of workshops after Muñoz. 
In Chapter Four I go into detail about the process and practice of these workshops 
and what they produced, but two stories arising from the first in the series of That 
Awkward Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19) with Tate’s 
Public Programmes team speak precisely about the awkwardness of disability 
meeting able-bodied privilege during a public event.  
 
Mark spoke about attending an audio-described theatre production at the Bridge 
Theatre with a blind friend. For this special evening during the play’s run, a 
downloadable mobile phone application was available so blind and visually impaired 
people could listen to a live narration of the action on stage, at the same time as 
hearing the actors delivering their lines. Becoming aware that ‘extra content’ was 
available during the interval, some sighted audience members also downloaded and 
logged into the application to consume it. As a result, during the second act the 
application crashed due to the higher than expected level of user traffic and caused 
a ripple of disturbance. Several members of the audience began fiddling with their 
phones all of a sudden, screens lighting up their faces as they whispered to their 
companions. Mark described how in response to the extra noise and flashing 
screens ‘the sighted public began “tutting”, audibly frustrated at their theatre 
experience being ruined by the people who cannot see’ (Mark 2018).  
 
Mark’s assessment of the situation was that in their greed to consume all the things 
on offer at the theatre the ‘over-privileged’ able-bodied public ruined it for the ‘under-
privileged’ disabled public. As he pointed out, the latter are only ever afforded a 
semblance of the theatre experience the privileged, able-bodied enjoy. However, it 
was the disruption caused by the blind people concerned with their mobile phones 
that made the visible and audible disruption to the sacred theatre experience. Mark 
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explained that this put the under-privileged people in the position of ‘ruining it’ for the 
over-privileged, as if their disability meant that they didn’t know how, or weren’t able, 
to adhere to the rules of the space. Following Kotsko’s definition, the blind people 
were blamed for ‘violating the norms’ of the theatre. Not only for ruining the spectacle 
for those who could ‘see’, but arguably for disturbing the very logic of the space – 
which, like the gallery, privileges the visible, the spectacular. What remained invisible 
until the very end of the performance, however – when theatre staff made an 
announcement revealing what had happened – is that, in fact, the over-privileged 
had ruined it for the under-privileged and themselves by accessing content that they 
neither needed, nor were the intended public for.  
 
In this story, the workings of privilege in relation to the visible and in relation to 
audiences are both layered and complex, something that will be drawn out further in 
Chapter Three. As described in more detail in Chapter Four, the quotations I draw on 
from these workshops come from written notes I made, where I took down verbatim 
what people said. In Mark’s words, this incident ‘showed how those with privilege 
consistently take more privilege, and this creates an “us and them” situation’ (Mark 
2018). As will be explored more fully in Chapter Two, it is also an example of the 
‘vulnerability’ of the spectacle, easily disrupted and derailed by the audience 
gathered to watch it (Mulvey 1989 p.4). The application was designed to allow blind 
and partially sighted visitors to be accommodated into the visual regime of the 
theatre, without sighted visitors noticing their presence, or becoming aware of their 
own privilege in being able to see everything that was going on. Though not 
expressly part of the theatre performance, Mark’s story sets up how the unexpected 
awareness of disability and able-bodied-ness disrupted its smoothness in ways that 
could neither be reconciled nor accounted for in the moment. The source of 
frustration to the normative production of the event may be different, but the outcome 




The disruption to normative notions of public that these kinds of mixed audience 
groups create for the institution is also another altering to normative time, that Kafer 
might describe as ‘crip time’. ‘Audio-described’ or ‘relaxed’ performances often 
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provide a space for audiences with different abilities and needs to mix. The latter 
welcomes people with autism or Tourette’s and their carers, or mothers and babies – 
those deemed by the institution as liable to make inappropriate noise, need softer 
lighting, space to lie down, rest or breastfeed (Underwood 2020). These activities 
and responses – making noise, lying down, eating – are not normatively appropriate 
in the cultural institution where you are expected to pay respectful, quiet attention to 
the spectacle or display. Far from an everyday practice, relaxed performances are 
more standardly practiced in theatres and cinemas, but often take place during the 
day. A further assumption becomes visible here around the time of day during which 
normative and non-normative publics may choose to, or are able, to access culture.  
 
Late at Tate Britain emerged as a way to broaden access to the art museum for a 
wider public, by extending opening hours until 10pm on the first Friday of each 
month. This extension is purported to be a chance for those working during the day 
to see the exhibitions and collection galleries ‘after hours’ at a time that was quieter 
than the busy weekend, as well as for those on lower incomes to gain entry to 
exhibitions at half-price. Late at Tate Britain also introduced a ‘programme’ to the 
extension of opening hours – including music, talks, performances and film 
screenings – alongside bars serving alcohol within galleries. It became a regular 
‘event’ with a fairly loyal following who would show up, often without paying particular 
attention to what was going on.64  
 
This strategy of extending opening hours to broaden access has quite significant 
implications for widening the art museum’s ‘general’ public. One genesis of the 
contemporary Late at Tate Britain is undoubtedly the successful petition for the 
introduction of gas lights in museums in the 1800s to aid the extension of opening 
hours by working-class would-be visitors. In 1865, Lord Ebury presented the wishes 
of ‘the Early Closing Association, and of Working Men of Islington, for the Opening of 
Public Museums [...] three evenings in the week between the hours of seven and ten 
o'clock’ (UK Parliament 1865), and it was upheld. Before then, museums had only 
 
64 To date, there has been no report or scholarly study on this particular programme at Tate Britain 
that I may draw on. Therefore, I write this brief history from my extensive working knowledge of the 
programme, which includes conversations with Adrian Shaw, Curator, Young People’s Programme, 
who initiated Late at Tate Britain in 2000 in his previous role as Information Assistant.  
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been lit by natural light. The introduction of gas light enabled people to attend 
museums in the evening after work (Kriegel 2007). Recognising perhaps the ‘public 
good’ denied them, this new public of the museum drew attention to a major obstacle 
blocking their more frequent access, and petitioned Parliament to remove it. The 
Victoria and Albert Museum proudly announces the precedent it set in being the first 
national museum to extend its opening hours with gaslight in a blog commending the 
then director Henry Cole for his ‘innovation’ (Smith 2013). There is no mention of the 
petition, but the museum was another early adopter of ‘lates’ programming in the 
early 2000s (Stockman 2016). 
 
As the petition showed, shifting attention away from the museum’s content to its 
structural and temporal conditions and how they blocked access, opened up who the 
art museum’s general public might encompass. If the normative time of the museum 
assumes a particular class and age of people – from the middle-class student to the 
affluent senior citizen – then late openings increase may access, both to those who 
cannot visit during the day, but also to those for whom the coded behaviour of ‘quiet 
contemplation’ is also a social barrier. Museum ‘lates’ are also undeniably a sign of 
the liberal institution becoming neoliberal. Culture24’s report A Culture of Lates 
(Stockman 2018) has shown how programming across the sector does attract a 
more diverse public than the usual daytime demographic.65 However, this report is 
explicitly interested in museums increasing access to unusual demographics for the 
contribution ‘a culture of lates’ can make to the ‘night time economy’. Culture24’s 
unashamedly neoliberal logic asserts that extended opening hours, mixed with 
alcohol and programming, leads to increased profits for museums, and diversifying 
‘the offer’ of any given city’s wider night-time economy.66 This report cannot 
demonstrate that lighting, programming and alcohol make a significant dent in the 
barriers preventing certain groups from visiting museums, and unfortunately there is 
little scholarship in the area of museum late events. But it does bring us back to the 
 
65 Culture24 describes itself as a charity ‘supporting arts and heritage organisations to connect 
meaningfully with audiences’. It also provides consultancy and ‘strategic advice and practical support 
to museums, galleries and other cultural organisations’ and is therefore heavily invested in promoting 
‘museum lates’ (Culture24 n.d.). While this does not discredit their research findings, it has been 
created for a specific agenda of encouraging a new cultural market. 
66 The report praises Sheffield’s Business Improvement District for ‘funding a series of Museum Lates’ 
as ‘a strong example of culture and retail working together to extend productive trading hours and 
diversify the night-time economy’ (Stockman 2018 p.24). 
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issue the gas light petition raises: how a temporal and structural adjustment in the 
material conditions of the museum can both affect its ambience and the perception 
of who it is for. 
 
One of the most significant changes Late at Tate Britain makes to the feeling of 
being in the galleries is, in fact, through its lighting. With overhead lighting tracks 
dimmed, or switched off altogether in the main hub spaces – around the bars, 
musical acts and DJs – coloured lights are positioned to shoot light up the walls and 
diffuse it on the vaulted ceilings. A softer more relaxed atmosphere is evoked and 
the museum experience is orientated less around the art on the walls (which is less 
visible), and more around new kinds of social relations that are now possible – 
particularly flirtatious ones. This sense of a lighter, social atmosphere eschewing the 
museum’s daytime seriousness is the main reasons I chose Late at Tate Britain as 
an appropriate context for Collapsing Lecture. However, I hadn’t taken into account 
how the rather staid architecture of the auditorium upheld the museum’s daytime 
rigour, despite the temporary relaxation of rules elsewhere. This only made it more 
appropriate for Williamson’s intentions. Nevertheless, my assumption was that the 
kind of audience who shows up on a Friday evening for more relaxed art viewing 
would be the kind of audience who would ‘get’, even enjoy, his performance. 
 
Not only was I proved wrong, but Collapsing Lecture can be taken as a microcosm of 
what is happening more broadly. The logic of Late at Tate Britain, where a different 
kind of consumer experience rubs up against the institution’s normative, educative 
function, is one effect of the ‘corporate turn’ promoted by Culture24’s report and 
described by Nina Möntmann. This long-running, monthly programme (since 2000) 
neatly exemplifies the competing pressures on the contemporary, neoliberal art 
institution of being both a public good and a commercial enterprise, of attracting both 
‘a mass public’ and diversifying itself to include ‘new publics’ (Möntmann 2008 p.17). 
However, a shift in atmosphere does not necessarily shift the expectations of 
curative intervention that a public brings to an institution, revealing what A Culture of 
Lates glosses over: there is still a conflict between a desire for the convivial 
(Bourriaud 2002), avant-garde antagonism of challenging programming (Bishop 
2004, 2012) and the instructional, edifying role of the museum that the public puts its 
‘trust’ in (Cuno 2004). I suggest this conflict underpins the competing positions that 
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the neoliberal institution under the corporate turn creates: the roles of consumer, 
stakeholder, audience, citizen, visitor, participant, learner are variously taken up by 
this public with uncertainty, producing a publicness that is undeniably awkward. Just 
as de Kersaint Giraudeau encourages us to pause and ask ‘why are we clapping?’, I 
suspect many of those at Collapsing Lecture were asking themselves the same 
question. If they weren’t learning anything, were they simply being mocked? Was it 
the stuffy art museum that was being sent up, or the blind faith the public puts in it to 
educate and improve them?  
 
The questions of access that Williamson's performance and his D/deafness posed 
only extended the awkwardness of the corporate turn. It surprised a general public 
usually shielded from recognising their privilege, showing up the ableist assumptions 
of participation that moments of publicness like the conventional artist’s talk are 
normatively and comfortably shrouded in. These ableist assumptions are not only 
embedded in our social structures, but our architectural ones: as mentioned in my 
introduction, Tate Britain’s inaccessible stage still prevents disabled artists from 
presenting there.67 In Collapsing Lecture however, my discomfort also had to do with 
my role as enjoyable content creator under the corporate turn, clashing with the 
more avant-garde end of the educational turn – of ‘disrupting’ and ‘transforming’ the 
audience’s assumptions of the ‘curative’ institution.68 
 
Just Doing my Job 
 
The uncertainty of such contradictions leads back to the specificity of the role of 
public programmer, and the impossibility of resolving them. Mark’s second example 
was an event he organised for blind and visually impaired visitors in Tate Britain’s 
garden. As part of the activity, the group were encouraged to touch the plants and 
smell them. Mark remembered with horror how one participant leant forward and 
touched a nettle, immediately leaping back yelling ‘I've been stung!’ He described 
feeling horribly guilty at not having protected this person from the shock and 
unexpected pain of being stung, something that he as a sighted person could have 
 
67 As hinted at earlier, I found this an irresolvable contradiction of putting on public programmes there. 




anticipated. As another colleague pointed out, ‘the public have their own agency and 
can make their own decisions’. But this did not assuage Mark’s sense of 
responsibility for what had happened; his personal feeling of guilt could not be easily 
separated or explained away by such professional detachment. Perhaps because it 
might be rather awkward to admit a sense of guilt about his sightedness as much as 
a professional guilt at failing to provide the curative intervention expected of the 
institution, which, in this case, he embodied.  
 
The latter vignette raises a number of questions: who is responsible for what? What 
are the limits of the institution’s responsibility? When do the public take responsibility 
for their own actions, assumptions and responses? Where does the person end and 
the institution begin – and how does it feel to walk this line? These questions are 
more fully fleshed out in Chapter Four, but the feeling of walking this line came up in 
a number of the workshops and conversations, referred to as a ‘split’ sense of 
‘embodying the institution’: representing its values and brand, while retaining a 
critical stance and personal approach (Workshop September 2018). Being both 
professionally and personally accountable is not easy, particularly when these things 
are not in alignment.  
 
In our conversation about her involvement in the Collapsing Lecture Alexia also 
touched on the impossibility of professional and personal alignment, from the 
perspective of role-playing. The Tate staff members involved in the performance that 
evening were asked by Williamson to play an extremely unhelpful version of 
themselves in their institutional role. I asked how she felt about this?  
 
Oh my God I was horrified, absolutely horrified! I can’t believe I agreed to do it 
[…] especially because this is a room full of my people [...] other museum 
people, other professionals, and I have to go up and be really bad (Alexia 
2018).  
 
The difficulty playing her assigned role in the performance, in front of colleagues 
from her professional field, came up several times. It reminded her of taking part in 
another performative intervention that also happened during a different Late at Tate 
Britain. Along with ten others (some staff, some friends of the artist), Alexia was 
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asked to wear a Tate invigilator uniform. The group were instructed to gather in 
doorways bordering galleries, appearing to lazily ‘hang out’ in them. Whenever a 
member of the public wanted to move through the doorway and asked what they 
were doing, the invigilators would separate in different directions, collecting at 
another threshold. Though not at the level of publicity that introducing Williamson 
exposed her to, she described a similar experience of excruciating embarrassment 
at having to do ‘a bad job’, the cause of real anxiety. Alexia described her part in 
Williamson’s performance as ‘career suicide’, and he also considered ‘sabotaging 
professional reputation’ in his own reflections on Collapsing Lecture (2017).  
 
This additional performance remembered by Alexia, though challenging in similar 
ways to Collapsing Lecture, is not an anomaly. Both performances draw on a history 
of artist interventions critiquing institutional conventions. For example, Andrea 
Fraser’s live tours of the Philadelphia Museum of Art, in character as Jane Castleton, 
the overzealous museum docent, later reproduced for her film Museum Highlights: A 
Gallery Talk (1989). Fraser’s film Little Frank and his Carp (2001) documents the 
artist making an unannounced, unsanctioned intervention in the Guggenheim 
Museum Bilbao. In a now infamous performance of the ‘visitor’ relation to the 
museum, Fraser listen’s to the audio guide’s authoritative male voice, and takes his 
directions to explore the museum’s architecture literally. Rubbing herself sensually 
against its smooth walls, the shock and surprise of staff and other visitors is captured 
by hidden cameras. Though she critiques the uncritical nature in which certain 
conventions and roles are carried out, she also relies on their complicity.69 Similarly 
Collapsing Lecture needed to rope others in: unacknowledged staff and unknowing 
audience members.70 Both Fraser and Williamson make the function of certain 
positions within the apparatus of the museum visible through parody or subversion. 
 
69 Fraser’s institutional critique has been acquired by museum collections including Tate’s, becoming 
part of the canon and institution of contemporary art. Incidentally, she has more recently distanced 
herself from these early works, over concerns that rather than critiquing the institution, they end up 
mocking an unsuspecting audience. 
70 Though a collaborative effort, especially on behalf of Alexia, the AV technicians and myself as 
curator, the performance was of course very much Williamson’s work. But given that the nature of the 
lecture as performance must not be revealed, Tate staff were asked to play themselves, albeit an 
extremely incompetent, unhelpful version. We were neither credited anywhere, publicly thanked 




However, Collapsing Lecture left both staff and audience unsure as to whether any 
spectacle was available for enjoyment at all.  
 
The difficulty in reconciling this is suggested by Alexia, who felt compromised at 
performing her disengagement with the artist, and disinterest toward the audience: 
 
some people in the audience were getting quite animated, we were given very 
strict instructions not to respond at all which is obviously counter intuitive to 
every instinct that you have [...] I do remember thinking: this is unbearable 
(Alexia 2018). 
 
Despite knowing the artist was not actually in need of her help, Alexia’s lack of 
response was directly at odds with the kind of attentiveness institutional staff, 
especially those explicitly tasked with working publicly, are expected to exude. Helen 
Charman (2005), charts the professionalisation of the museum’s education curator, 
describing various shifts that took place after the 1960s. Exhibition designers 
employed to consider how visitors would experience an exhibition, and education 
services repositioned to address the needs of a broader public than school children 
showed the museum placing greater emphasis on the experience of its visiting 
public. Responsibility for the collection remained with the museum curator, whereas 
the visitor’s experience was meted out to education department colleagues, which is 
now what distinguishes them professionally: 
 
[r]esponsibility, especially in relation to the public, can be recast as a form of 
duty of care which embraces not just the intellectual experience of our visitors, 
but also cares for their emotional and physical well-being whilst at the 
museum (Charman 2005).  
 
Naturally this ‘duty of care’ extends to programme contributors too, of which 
Williamson was one. But for Collapsing Lecture to succeed in failing so 
catastrophically, it was imperative that everyone working at Tate played their part in 




As the curator of this performance, which was part of an entire Late at Tate Britain, I 
sidestepped taking an explicitly public role in it by asking Alexia to give the 
introduction. However, I didn’t escape being roped into a cameo role in another faux 
artist’s talk by Liu Ding during Tate Tanks: Fifteen Weeks of Art in Action (2012).71 
My small part was to rigorously announce the time left at three five-minute intervals. 
My minimal ‘script’ was in no way out of the ordinary, except that my timekeeping 
was rather overzealous. Though a minor intervention, I had to play it believably in 
front of colleagues and acquaintances from my professional field, at my place of 
work. Embarrassed at having to over-perform my usual self, I resented not having 
the chance to explain I had been playing a role, especially when an audience 
member told me he had thought me ‘really pernickety’. Like Alexia, I accepted this 
cameo as part of my job, resigned to the fact that somebody had to do it.  
 
All of these performances play on infringements to the implicit, micro-contractual 
agreements between the public and the institution that are made every day. Playing 
a distortion of the professional role and oneself in the workplace, where one 
normatively desires to come across as both capable and competent, is just one. But 
these examples are also part of the requirements of the contemporary art institution 
to maintain and uphold an avant-garde legacy that expects their publics to keep 
apace. Claire Bishop (2004, 2012) explicitly names this as ‘antagonism’, revealing 
the irresolvable tension between the (arguably laudable) intentions of socially-
engaged practice – to encourage participation and empower audiences – and 
artworks that intend to destabilise, disrupt or even prevent audiences from carrying 
out their role as they know it. What Bishop’s critique doesn't account for is the fall-out 
from these situations and who is responsible for picking up the pieces or providing a 
more detailed understanding of what happened. If informational material produced 
around a performance cannot account for it, audiences may simply be expected to 
return, bewildered and a little disgruntled, to their daily lives. Perhaps because of the 
imperative to uphold this legacy of challenge, I couldn’t acknowledge the guilt I felt 
that a member of the audience had left Collapsing Lecture, ‘visibly upset’. Relying on 
the artist’s accounts of other audience responses, I expected that, however 
gradually, everyone would eventually ‘get it’. I hoped some might even enjoy the 
 
71 The inaugural programme of these new museum spaces for live work. 
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awkwardness; as Maree confirmed, this anticipation was not completely out of kilter. 
But according to Charman I was not entirely in sync with my professional 
responsibility of care for the emotional and intellectual well-being of the audience 
either.  
 
Perhaps what all of this points to is the institution’s perennial problem with its 
unpredictable, unruly publics. Hilary Floe (2014) describes the unexpected ‘over-
participation’ of the public in three exhibitions designed to encourage visitors to 
physically engage with artwork on display. While the article revolves around the 
liberating possibilities of play in the museum and contemporary art gallery, the three 
case studies where visitors were invited into physical contact with artwork seem to 
suggest how proscribed that interaction was. The unexpected reactions of the public 
were only registered when, as Floe cites, ‘everything was getting smashed’ and the 
institutions – Tate Gallery, Institute of Contemporary Arts and Museum of Modern Art 
Oxford – had either to close exhibits early, or rethink the implications of their 
invitation. Floe’s analysis shows that even (or especially) when institutions invite a 
mode of interaction other than looking, certain normative expectations of who the 
public is and how it will behave remain in place. But, as my extended analysis of 
Collapsing Lecture shows, failure can mean very different things for the artist, 
institution and audience. If we take these failed interactions together, what can they 
tell us about our attachments to the contemporary art institution and what it means to 
become public there? 
 
Conclusion – Collapsing Lecture, Becoming Public(s) 
 
In this first chapter I have described at length Aaron Williamson’s Collapsing Lecture 
as performed at Tate Britain to expound the potential I see in paying attention to 
unexpected or disruptive moments when they arise within public programming. I look 
at them in detail for what they reveal about publicness as a temporal, emergent 
process rather than a given space, or fixed state that we step in and out of. Much of 
what I described revolved around awkwardness, which I used, firstly, to address 
what Möntmann designates as the ‘awkward’ relations between art institutions and 
their publics. Through this lens we see the neoliberal art museum coming into view, 
both out of, and in conflict with, the values of its liberal parent. These values were 
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challenged by the Late at Tate Britain format colliding with Collapsing Lecture, and 
extended using notions of crip and queer time (Kafer 2013, Freeman 2010, Muñoz 
2009), as both flexible and productive according to non-normative logics. They 
helped me demonstrate how Williamson’s glitchy interactions with the neoliberal 
institution and D/deafness disrupted its traditional, liberal perceptions of general 
public, and that public’s understanding of itself. Focussing on my uncomfortable 
feelings as programmer, also observed in other responses to the performance 
lecture, further undid received notions of the monolithic, unfeeling institution and the 
compliant, abstract general public it relies on.  
 
In keeping with Bishop (2004, 2012), I tried not to evaluate Collapsing Lecture with 
moral judgements; rather, to examine what the different responses to it tell us about 
publicness in the contemporary art institution. I also showed how my complex and 
competing feelings in the moment of experiencing it – exhilaration, amusement, 
uncertainty and guilt – rubbed up against one another, to texture the experience of 
public programmer becoming audience to her own programme, forming a new 
understanding of her relation to the professional. In later chapters I mine more of 
these moments for how they reveal publicness as an emergent process, and not 
simply an ideal, easy or given function of the art museum. Some of the awkwardness 
I describe arose from the competing ways publics are interpellated and expected to 
relate to the contemporary art institution. From the art aficionado wanting intellectual 
stimulation, to the consumer wanting to be entertained, to the disabled visitor with 
particular access needs, to the participant in an experimental performance 
wondering what this all means. Some of these are idealised roles, all of them are 
reductive, and, at the same time, necessary to hold in mind. Rather than being fixed 
positions, they are reminiscent of Coypel’s ‘twenty publics of different tone and 
character’ referenced in my Introduction (Coypel in Crow 1995 p.10). After Muñoz 
(2009), with Collapsing Lecture I have conceptualised the public programme as an 
‘awkward stage’, across which these roles and relations are played out. The failures 
and possibilities of these awkward moments will be returned to throughout the thesis.  
 
Three facets come out of this extraordinary example that, I argue, are integral to 
understanding publicness as it is produced by the public programme of the 
contemporary art institution. In the following chapters I look at publicness through the 
97 
 
intersecting lenses of attention/distraction, responsibility/community and the 
professional/personal in practice. As described above, to create Collapsing Lecture 
Williamson employed a strategy of shifting his attention to the micro-gestures of 
‘performing-knowing’ during his art school lecture. This led me to a consideration of 
the micro-gestures of response and ‘performing-caring’ that, in different ways, 
institutional staff and the audience were prevented from, or failed at, carrying out. 
Shifting attention away from the proper ‘content’, towards the technologies and 
structures designed to focus it, demonstrated how integral holding space and 
attentive care are to the public programme.72 I explore the link between a shift in 
attention and practices of care more deeply in Chapter Two. 
 
Having described the labour that goes into holding spaces and ensuring the smooth 
running of a public programme event, I also portrayed what it might mean for things 
to ‘go wrong’ when expectations of ‘curative intervention’ (Kafer 2013) are 
overturned. In a sense, this vague sounding notion is oddly specific, in that we know 
it when we see it, or more accurately, feel it. But as Muñoz notes, referring to J. L. 
Austin’s theory of performative speech acts, ‘going wrong’ is not necessarily 
antithetical to ‘going right’: ‘failure or infelicity [...] is built into the speech act […] even 
though we know in advance that felicity of language falters, it is nonetheless 
essential’ (Muñoz 2009 pp.8–9). Could the faltering of Collapsing Lecture, the 
glitches, mistakes and the failed attempts to communicate and care all be part of the 
process of publicness? That we must go wrong to go right, is not only an 
uncomfortable notion; I argue it is integral to each space created through the public 
programme. But rather than accept it, I suggest we wrestle with this idea, and 
therefore I return to it throughout the thesis. 
 
In this first chapter I have been writing of ‘the public’ and ‘the institution’, as separate 
but overlapping entities, describing some of the inbuilt expectations each has of the 
other. However, I also align with Fraser’s refusal to speak of the institution as 
separate from ourselves, because, as she asserts, it is ‘internalized, embodied, and 
 
72 This attempt to understand the centrality of holding and attentive care is also central to recent 
attempts to rethink the function and responsibility of cultural institutions and art practice itself, such as 
Evan Ifekoya’s Reimagining Care (2020) for the Black Cultural Archives, and Linda Brothwell’s 
ongoing series Acts of Care (since 2013). 
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performed by individuals’ (Fraser 2005 p.283). Similarly, Paul O’Neill, Lucy Steeds 
and Mick Wilson take up Mary Douglas’ ‘theory of institutions being a social 
construct’ to show that ‘however critically we imagine ourselves to be thinking – we 
are already implicated in an instituent process, and are formed, or even confined, by 
our experience of institutions’ (2017 p.21). What I have described here, and draw on 
throughout the thesis, are, I suggest, not only awkward or uncomfortable, but 
‘instituent’ moments. The feelings of split subjectivity that come up for programmers 
during them are precisely when we understand ourselves as having, in Fraser’s 
words, ‘internalized, embodied, and performed’ the institution.  
 
Going deep into the awkwardness of instituent moments within Collapsing Lecture at 
Tate Britain, and briefly into other examples of performed institutional critique, 
allowed me to introduce the different facets of the role public programmers perform. 
In particular, how care, responsibility and guilt are all intertwined by an emergent 
notion of ‘the professional’, examined in greater depth in Chapter Four. Perhaps 
what came across most clearly during Williamson’s performance, was the public’s 
attachment to the ‘curative intervention’. This can of course be tied to the etymology 
of curator, coming from the Latin word curare, to care. If the public expects to be 
taken care of by an institution, this job has often fallen to the educational and public 
programme departments as those that most care about deepening and expanding 
visitor experience through explicitly public, face-to-face forms of engagement. But 
what happens when these members of staff, and others, appear not to care? The 
discomfort in the auditorium that evening might reveal an attachment to the paternal 
museum as caregiver. But as Fraser points out, if we are the institution, doesn’t this 
put responsibility back onto the public? If so, then we find ourselves in the perfect 
neoliberal institution, explored further in Chapter Three. In this chapter responsibility 
and its cousin ‘response-ability’ are rendered through the participatory performances 
of Jamal Harewood and Ann Liv Young, which challenge the notion of a passive 
audience. I write about them from the position of a distinctly uneasy audience 
member, unravelling my ambivalent feelings toward becoming part of the ‘temporary 
community’ that both artists purport their work creates. Chapter Four departs from 
the entanglements of responsibility and community to further develop the notion of 
holding space for publicness introduced above. It reflects on my research practice 
carried out through workshops and conversations with other public programmers to 
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gather and unpack their awkward moments of publicness. With this material I ask 
what kinds of labour are at work in programming publics, and how do we know when 
they are emerging?  
 
What cannot be escaped in this chapter, and indeed the whole thesis, is the 
importance of presence – being there and being present within the moments of 
public becoming I choose to work with.73 I look at these fraught moments of co-
presence through the lens of theatre and performance studies, in addition to queer 
and feminist theory. As previously outlined, this is because much of the literature 
around the public programme appears fearful of getting specific for the failure it can 
connote, and what it might make embarrassingly present – the self. But if we are 
serious about understanding publicness, and deepening and improving our 
relationship to it within the contemporary art institution, I suggest taking the (personal 
and professional) failures of public programming, as ‘not anomalous, but somehow 
[…] constitutive’ (Ridout 2006 p.3). In line with Halberstam (2011), I also argue that 
the critical potential of these failures calls for exploration. Indeed, it is my contention 
that publicness is only revealed for the process that it is through the awkward, 
disruptive, even transformative moments that, as programmers or audiences, we 
might more readily dismiss. An interrogation of the specific, nitty-gritty of intimate 
relating that goes on through contemporary public programming practice, has 
therefore been made present to the attendees of my workshops, and is presented to 
the readers of this thesis. I do this in the hope that putting these scenes of writing 
and research into practice, has something to say about, and does something to, 
becoming public(s) in the contemporary art institution. 
  
 
73 Indeed, this thesis is only possible because I was ‘there’, and asked others to tell me what it was 
like when they were. 
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Chapter Two – Paying Attention: Economics, Ethics, Embodiment 
 
Attention is not something that is completely directed by a subject within this 
museum, but something that emerges from the event, from what is 
happening. It is activated by the specificities and directions of what happens 
(Arlandis 2018 p.71). 
 
One of Michael Warner’s key claims about the formation of publics is that they are 
‘constituted through mere attention’ (2005 p.87, my emphasis). Whether the 
readership of a newspaper, weekly viewers of a Saturday night TV show or followers 
of a niche musical genre, membership of all of these groups depends on noticing a 
mode of address as addressed to you, both in particular and in general. The power 
of this address is that it forms a public, in which it is possible to feel called on both 
individually and as part of an unknown community.74 Yet an address has no power at 
all if we don’t attend to it. What, then, might be revealed about ‘becoming public(s)’ if 
we pay more than ‘mere’ attention to this facet of publicness, if it becomes the 
particular focus of an entire chapter? In doing so, I argue it is not minor or incidental 
to moments of publicness. Rather, it is integral. In this chapter, I draw attention to an 
experiential, processual understanding of becoming public(s) by asking: what does it 
mean to pay such attention together through the many and various formats offered 
by the public programme?  
 
If the museum is a technology of attention, the public programme is part of that 
technology, which focuses attention in a particular way by employing time-bound, 
collective forms of engagement. The value of the public programme is often 
predicated on the notion that co-presence and shared attention are important 
experiences, as opposed to the more private and distributed attentional logic of 
exhibition and collection galleries. Yet, as suggested by Arlandis above, and as 
Aaron Williamson’s Collapsing Lecture at Tate Britain (2011) demonstrated, attention 
(in the museum) emerges from what is happening, and cannot necessarily be 
contained. How, then, does attention connect us with others (or not) in these 
temporary spaces of togetherness, and what are the implications of such 
 
74 Warner (2005) has written on the strangeness of this in detail. 
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connection? Lastly, what happens when we don’t pay attention, when we ‘look away’ 
(Rogoff 2005), stop listening and allow ourselves to become distracted by something 
else? 
 
Inspired by Williamson’s methodology of paying attention to ‘peripheral distractions’ 
(2017), the museum’s technologies of attention and their failure, this chapter follows 
the different attentional threads of the public programme. Through everyday usage, 
as well as in the literature on it, attention is largely configured in economic terms: as 
a payment, or exchange of engagement for information. This links us back to the 
awkwardness of the corporate turn suggested by Möntmann (2008), explored in the 
previous chapter. A major source of tension in the contemporary art institution is the 
liberal notion of a public good clashing with the neoliberal, transactional space of 
consumerist desire that it has become. But the common conceptualisation of 
attention as payment props up what can be a rather crude reading of attention that 
commonly appears in the literature around media consumption, otherwise known as 
the ‘attention economy’ (Davenport and Beck 2001). Other facets, such as its 
agential, ethical and erotic implications, are just as important, yet commonly receive 
less attention. I address this gap via specific moments of publicness produced by the 
public programme, to nuance our understanding of attention. This leads to thinking 
about responsiveness, responsibility and response-ability in Chapter Three.  
 
After introducing the idealised forms of attention that the museum and public 
programme are predicated on, I briefly map the literature on attention from different 
fields, to consider attention outside of an active/passive binary and a notion of 
payment. Then, rather than a studious commitment and dedication, Gavin Butt has 
asked how a ‘flirtatious’ or ‘non-serious’ approach might be generative (2006 
pp.187–192)? A flirtatious mode of attention moves us away from the universal, 
liberal looking subject, towards a more specific, embodied engagement. Perhaps 
because paying something a particular attention is not only about caring, but also 
about an arousal of interest, opening up the possibility of being both ‘tuned in’ and 
‘turned on’. To look at, listen to or feel something with a new kind of effort, desire and 
will to understand and articulate it differently. And so, acknowledging the hovering 
presence of an attentional erotics, I attempt to disrupt its normative, transactional 
function within programmed moments of publicness and information exchange. 
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Shifting attention from a given focus towards the technologies and labour processes 
producing and shaping it, and the various distractions interrupting it, allows attention 
to be reconfigured as a complex field of desiring moments stretching us in different 
directions. I then consider what it might be to queer attention through the public 
programme, and later in the chapter, entertain a sustained focus on several 
moments of distraction (or re-attunement of attention) during moments of public 
programming to consider what such a shift from the centre to the periphery of a 
public situation can produce. I do this to show how moving away from a notion of 
payment, towards a more embodied understanding of an attentional field, allows a 
more thorough understanding of publicness as an emergent process. I suggest that 
attention is not only underpinning the spectacular and participatory aspects of a 
public programme, but its flickering embodiment mirrors the processual nature of 
becoming public(s), shifting our notion of publicness away from a static entity or fixed 
space. 
 
Attention and The Museum  
 
If attention is integral to certain forms of publicness, then it is important to look at 
how it is drawn and enacted within the museum. Indeed, it could be argued that the 
museum has always been a technology of attention: of attracting, directing and 
sustaining the attention of multiple publics. Deciding which objects are worthy of 
attending to and how, quiet contemplation and studious reverence have long been 
accepted forms of comportment there. As a result, the museum is a powerful space 
of ‘civilised’ subject production (Duncan 1995). In an inversion of the Foucauldian 
panopticon, the looking subject produced by the museum, also understands 
themselves to be looked at (Bennett 1995). The self-conscious way in which we 
attend in the museum, then, creates a particular kind of attentive subject. Taking this 
idea further, Adam Phillips gives a bird’s eye view of the social importance of 
attentional control: 
 
[t]he bringing-up and educating of children, whatever their culture or class, 
initiates them into regimes of attention; it tells them, in no uncertain terms, 
what is worthy of their attention, and how it should be paid, as well as what 
kind of attention they should be wanting, and how they should go about 
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getting it (neither distraction nor showing off is taught in schools). All religions, 
moralities, arts, sciences, politics and therapies organise and promote certain 
kinds of attention; in their different ways they tell us where to look and who to 
listen to; they tell us what about ourselves we should value and be valued for: 
what about ourselves we should take an interest in, and what we should take 
rather less interest in than we do (Phillips 2019 Chapter 1 Section 1). 
 
Demonstrating the far reaching regime and discipline of attention, Phillips shows how 
we become compliantly attentive subjects, whether inside the museum, school, place 
of worship or elsewhere. Specifying the crucial role of upbringing and education, 
Phillips recalls Bourdieu’s notion of ‘habitus’. According to Bourdieu, class and 
culture inscribe certain ideas and responses, allowing us to decode and operate well 
in certain situations, and not so well in others. The elusive notion of ‘taste’ is also 
developed through habitus. So the act of looking in the museum is far from neutral – 
it is ‘classed’, and, in Bourdieu’s words, ‘classifies the classifier’ (1984 p.6). These 
ideas effected a shift in thinking about how well audiences orientate themselves, or 
not, in museums.  
 
Claire Bishop (2018) re-reads the notion of subject production in the museum 
through the lens of attention.75 Tracing the rise and impact of the dance exhibition, 
she argues that museum and gallery attention practices are both interrupted and 
augmented by digital technologies. For Bishop, these exhibitions almost exclusively 
present choreographic practices that incorporate a digital logic into their looping 
performances. Whereas dance performances are traditionally set within a static 
theatre space at a fixed time (usually evening) with entrance permitted only with a 
ticket, performances in a dance exhibition are expanded to take place throughout the 
working day or weekend. Unlike ticketed performances, they do not ask to be looked 
at 100% of the time, and may be entered and left at any point (Bishop 2018 p.29). 
One of her main arguments is that this new form of exhibitionary practice is at odds 
with how the classic white cube gallery and black box theatre, as ‘purportedly neutral 
 
75 Indeed, it is a popular turn for contemporary art theorists and curators alike: Attention was the title 
and theme of the city-wide exhibition and public programme for Glasgow International (2020). 
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frames’, have absorbed and focussed our attention to ‘construct’ us as ‘viewing 
subjects’: 
 
[b]oth are founded on long-established, unspoken behavioural conventions: 
[…] disruptions tend to be auditory rather than optical – coughing, rustling, 
eating, talking too loud. Both discipline and shape a bourgeois model of the 
subject that monitors his/her neighbors for indications of nonconformist 
behaviour (Bishop 2018 pp.30–31). 
 
Whilst our attention is shaped by structural conventions of the white cube or black 
box, we are also involved in policing and maintaining the attention of those around 
us. As Bishop notes, such policing is deeply invested in ‘bourgeois’ subject 
production, and I would add, maintaining the ideal form of attention that these 
spaces construct. Awareness of our surroundings, vigilance for distractions and 
interruptions are therefore part of the embodied experience of attending.  
 
The exhibiting practice Bishop describes interrupts how certain spaces of cultural 
production have traditionally manipulated our attention, but it also reflects the shift in 
contemporary attentional practices taking place within them through an increasing 
engagement with digital technology. Contemporary cultural experiences are always 
already mediated by digital devices, whether these are physically present or not. Yet, 
rather than demonising technology for its role in a pervasive attentional drift, Bishop 
suggests we might embrace the opportunities new practices of attending offer to 
critique and rework the traditional spaces of ‘hierarchized attention’ and bourgeois 
subject production that museums and other cultural spaces construct (pp.36–39). 
 
Both the ideal and the digitally inflected modes of attending Bishop describes are 
common to the moments of public programming I unpack in this chapter. The public 
programme is a further technology of attention in the museum, picking out specific 
objects, practices and ideas that should be paid particular attention, and creating 
time-bound events for communal focus. The event spaces routinely used by the 
public programme are generally hybridised: neither white cube, black box, 
classroom, studio, nor theatre but borrowing, to a greater or lesser degree, from 
each. These are set within or alongside more traditionally defined spaces for the 
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contemplation of art objects. Additionally, new institutionalism’s critique of the 
structural organisation of public art institutions, including, though not limited to, how 
they orchestrate attention, creates a kind of attentional anxiety at the heart of the 
institution. It now needs to pay, and draw, attention to its operating structures as 
much as what it ‘shows’. The public programme is frequently the site of this kind of 
reflexive practice, creating space in the museum to reflect on it.76 
 
If the pervasive power of the attention economy sees attention as our most valuable 
commodity, the public programme’s emphasis on presence and experience provides 
a unique space for capitalising on this. Indeed, to survive in an increasingly noisy 
cultural and precarious fiscal landscape, innovative forms of live exhibitionary and 
public programming are key to securing our attention: now more than ever, the 
museum needs publics to attend. Yves Citton has even predicted that soon ‘we will 
be able to request payment for giving our attention to a cultural good instead of 
having to pay for the right to access it’ (2017 p.8). Museums were once happy with a 
mono-directional, didactic dynamic with almost empty galleries catering to an elite 
public of art professionals and connoisseurs. Now, as discussed in the Literature 
Review and Chapter One, the pressure to commercialise this relationship, increase 
and diversify publics to secure funding streams, has produced an undeniable 
awkwardness (Möntmann 2008). As previously reflected on, one response is the rise 
of museum ‘lates’ – evening events, combining informative and entertaining 
content.77 In contrast to more linear formats, festival-style concurrent programming 
entices younger, more ‘diverse’ audiences, experimenting with and exploiting the 
potential of plural attentions to open new revenue streams (Stockman 2016). 
 
We are not meant to pay attention to any of the ways in which museums seek to 
grab it, from the macro to the micro; certainly not the technologies and actors that 
shape our attention on the public programme: presentation equipment, institutional 
staff guiding and directing the ‘content’. The collective labour that goes into 
 
76 Such as Tate Modern’s long-running series of courses Towards Tomorrow’s Museum (2012–18), 
Inside Today’s Museum (2012–17) and The Museum, Past, Present, Future (2018–20) developed in 
collaboration with Kings College London. 
77 These events began in the early 2000s at London museums like Victoria and Albert and Tate 
Britain, and have become almost globally ubiquitous. Nuit Blanche, a yearly night-long arts festival 
happening in many cities across Europe, and Art Night in London are other iterations of this concept. 
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producing this publicness is predicated on making sure the right kind of attention is 
‘paid’ (Phillips 2019). But what if public programming actually pays attention to the 
mechanisms by which payment is ordered and collected? What if understanding this 
became the task of the public programme? 
 
Seeking Attention – A Literature Review 
 
Before outlining my observations of these mechanisms, I briefly map the diverse 
literature on this growing area of interest. Since attention manages the sensations 
we experience to tune into only what we need to focus on and ‘make sense of the 
world around us’, cognitive science treats attention as a neurological function 
determining ‘how we actively process specific information in our environment’ 
(Cherry 2020). Studies from psychology focus on attention as a neurological and 
social phenomenon of ‘joint attention’, discussed in more detail below (Citton 2017). 
For around twenty years, the ‘attention economy’ has found application and analysis 
in business and management studies (Davenport and Beck 2001). In popular culture 
and healthcare, attention to wellbeing is reframed as ‘mindfulness’, a widely taught 
practice honing our ability to focus on the present moment for the sake of mental and 
emotional health, but also ‘attentional control’ (Andridge et al. 2020).  
 
To challenge the rather individuated senses – looking, listening – and singular 
functions – information gain, self-mastery – in which attention is normatively and 
overwhelmingly described, I turn to literature stemming from theatre and 
performance studies and philosophy. George Home-Cook presents an opportunity to 
think both ‘inter-sensorially’ and ‘inter-subjectively’ (Home-Cook 2015 pp.1–6). 
Writing about instances of aural disruption in the theatre, he also introduces the 
kinds of interactions at play during an ‘act’ of attention (p.1), that privileges corporeal 
presence. Citton uses intersubjectivity to explain how ‘joint attention’ is developed 
when a baby follows the attention of its primary caregivers, opening the possibility of 
collective attendance in all kinds of spaces, from the classroom to the theatre and 
sports arena (2017 pp.18–19). I would add the museum to this list, as well as the 
different kinds of spaces created by the public programme. Citton introduces the 
ethical considerations of a ‘quality of attention rooted in care – which is to say the 
attentive consideration of the vulnerability of the other, of our solidarity and our 
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responsibility towards them’ (2017 p.18, original emphasis). This becomes especially 
important in my later discussion of a very particular kind of public programme: the 
reading group. But for now, it leads us towards the primacy of Emmanuel Levinas’ 
ethical relation to the other, where ‘[t]he approach to the face is the most basic mode 
of responsibility’. The inherent vulnerability of the other’s face reminds us that ‘the 
self cannot survive by itself alone’ (Levinas in Butler 2015 p.78). For Levinas this 
encounter is a visual one, whereas in this chapter I consider acts of attending in an 
expanded, more corporeal sense. The discussion of attention as a relation between 
subjects – we cannot respond to something or someone unless we have paid 
attention – leads to an exploration of responsibility in the following chapter.  
 
This chapter also deals with scenarios of joint attention in moments of public 
programming and their attendant problems and opportunities. These are, of course, 
considered against the backdrop of the ‘attention economy’. Though not my primary 
focus, it is important to touch on this phenomenon, not least because this widely 
used phrase draws on the transactional and monetary logic of ‘paying attention’ 
referred to in this chapter’s title. Business analysts Thomas Davenport and John 
Beck predicted how valuable attention was likely to become: ‘[i]n the future, many 
goods and services will be given away for free in exchange for a few seconds or 
minutes of the user’s attention’ (2001 p.213). Matthew Crawford warns that 
‘[a]ttention is a resource – a person has only so much of it’ (2015 p.11); however, the 
attention economy shows no sign of slowing down. Though we might think of it as a 
condition of contemporary neoliberal capitalism, Citton reminds us that the exchange 
of attention for information that can turn a profit is actually an ancient practice (2017 
p.12).78 The attention economy also refers to the fact that attention has become one 
of our most precious commodities – something that advertisers, brands, all scales of 
media outlets, cultural producers and venues all want a piece of. Though we also 
stand to gain, as mentioned above, the museum needs our physical and virtual 
attendance. The latter produces value in the form of clicks, likes, comments, posts 
and reposts. Such transactions, however mundane, fuel the attention economy and 
further the museum’s reach by expanding its (potential) attendees. 
 
78 At the risk of making a hackneyed a connection, the infamous first line of Marc Antony’s speech 
‘Friends, Romans, Countrymen, lend me your ears’ (Shakespeare Julius Caesar 3.2. 73), testifies that 




Guy Debord (1967) anticipated today’s attention economy. Decrying the way 
capitalism is structured and maintained through ‘spectacle’ – an endless proliferation 
of images mediating all social relations – Debord was deeply sceptical of what the 
capitalist spectacle sets up: ‘what appears is good, what is good appears’ (Debord 
1967 p.4). Though foundational to the attention economy, I go beyond Debord’s 
emphasis on the spectacle’s visuality and our complicit passivity. Later, Laura 
Mulvey’s account (1989) of a Women’s Liberation protest provides an opportunity to 
rethink spectacle in terms of vulnerability, allowing an understanding of the public 
programme in terms of both spectacle and vulnerability. 
 
Most of the literature tends to conceptualise attention in terms of looking or listening. 
Sound and aurality are ever growing fields, yet the politics, pleasures and affects of 
‘the gaze’ is the largely dominant form of understanding our interaction with ‘visual’ 
culture, as Debord demonstrated. This is why, alongside Citton’s analysis (2017) of 
where we direct our ‘looks’, and who with, Home-Cook and Jean-Luc Nancy’s 
attendance to the aural dimensions of attention are an important addition to the 
literature drawn together in this chapter. Both consider the act of listening in 
kinaesthetic terms: a ‘stretching’ of the ear, an effort or straining towards something 
(Nancy 2007 p.4, Home-Cook 2015 pp.2–4). In addition, as an ‘inter-sensorial’ 
phenomenon (Home-Cook 2015) attention is a synthesis of sensory information and, 
from the psychology and cognitive science literature, both a clarification and 
intensification of sensory information (Pashler 1998 p.2). At the same time, 
‘unattended stimuli’ are still perceived and registered by the body’s nervous system, 
however small the reaction (p. 4).  
 
It could be said that attention is promiscuous: as a phenomenon and a topic, it 
touches many different areas. Moving between subjects, senses and objects, 
attention connects them without any expectation of lasting commitment. Cruising (for 
sex) as a promiscuous reading of one’s surroundings, a queer form of paying 
attention to minor gestures, has been suggested by José Esteban Muñoz (2009) and 
others. Roland Barthes connects cruising as ‘erotic quest’ to reading as ‘the quest 
[for] texts’ (1985 p.231). Noticing what is ‘at tension’ (O’Neill 2018), where intention 
lies, when my attention is tuning in, where it is tending towards and what it is turned 
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on by has been particularly important to this research. And, as Carl Stumpf notes, 
there is a ‘pleasure in noticing’ all of this (paraphrased in Citton 2017 p.93). Indeed, 
as Phillips’ shows, attempts to control our attention will always ultimately fail, 
because: ‘[w]e never quite know what people will make of what they are given; or 
how their minds will drift while they are paying attention’ (2019 Chapter 1 Section 1). 
This will be demonstrated by the examples of public programming discussed below. 
As discussed in Chapter One, inattention in a public situation can become 
uncomfortable. But Phillips and these more promiscuous readings lead me to dwell a 
little longer on what happens when we get distracted or look away. 
 
Irit Rogoff (2005) considers ‘looking away’ as an alternative mode of participation in 
spaces of art and culture, other than those already proscribed by institutions, 
suggesting how we how might employ it as a strategy. For Rogoff ‘we’ is not a 
singular identity-based belonging, but signifies ‘momentary shared mutualities’ that 
come ‘fleetingly’ into being whenever ‘we negotiate a problem, a mood, a textual or 
cultural encounter, a moment of recognition’ (2005 p.123). Elsewhere, Kathleen 
Stewart suggests a ‘weirdly floating “we”’ comes into being through different 
perspectives on a specific event (2007 p.27). Describing responses to the 
announcement of a road accident at a diner in a small American town, she observes 
a fragile unity coming into being and ‘charging the social with lines of potential’ 
(p.11). Stewart describes a series of shimmering vignettes like this one, to elaborate 
her theory of ‘ordinary affects’ as ‘varied, surging capacities to affect and to be 
affected that give everyday life the quality of a continual motion of relations, scenes, 
contingencies, and emergences’ (2007 p.1). Though different in character, Stewart’s 
‘we’ is also temporarily produced by a collective shift in attention. I return to thinking 
through experience as a series of ‘ordinary affects’, and the temporal collectivity 
produced in Chapter Four. 
 
The readings mentioned above sharpened focus on my methodological approach 
clarifying why I am drawn to investigating moments of disruption, awkwardness or 
unexpected happenings that interrupt the ‘smooth’ running of public programme 
events. Secondly, how, in paying particular attention to them, these moments help us 
understand the process of ‘becoming public’ as an embodied one. This is vital to 
grasp, if a more nuanced and situational understanding of publics is to be wrested 
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from an outmoded universalising notion of the public as absent bodies to be 
‘engaged’ by the museum. I find affinity between this practice and the seductive, 
resonant way Stewart describes ‘ordinary affects’. Their ‘surging capacities to affect 
and to be affected’ and their ability to ‘catch people up in something that feels like 
something’ appeals to my way of gathering and opening up specific moments of 
public programming (2007 pp.1–2). The things I am looking for are, for the most part, 
not hugely ‘out of the ordinary’ situations or experiences, but are what Stewart calls:  
 
things that happen […] in impulses, sensations, expectations, daydreams, 
encounters and habits of relating, in strategies and their failures, in forms of 
persuasion, contagion, and compulsion, in modes of attention, attachment, 
and agency, and in publics and social worlds of all kinds (Stewart 2007 pp.1–
2).  
 
What I attempt to capture are precisely the ordinary, but sometimes intense feelings 
of becoming public(s). Partly because in these moments we feel ourselves 
inescapably connected to others. Stewart highlights how forms of attending, 
attaching and acting are not only multiple, but are intricately linked to the experience 
of being ‘caught up’ in ‘something that feels like something’ with others. Forms of 
attending are in fact forms of relating. 
 
Acts of Attention 
 
The interconnection of attention and agency links to the long-standing debate about 
active participation versus passive spectatorship in philosophy, theatre and 
performance studies (Bishop 2006, Debord 1967, Harvie 2013, Rancière 2009). This 
is not a binary I wish to uphold, but it could be said that attention plays a starring role 
in it. Laura Mulvey’s short account (1989) of her participation in the Women’s 
Liberation protest during the Miss World (1970) beauty pageant draws on the 
active/passive binary to emphasise the power of their action against the spectacle. 
Described as ‘a blow against passivity, not only […] of the girls on the stage but the 
passivity that we all felt in ourselves’, she also acknowledges the violence of their 
protest (Mulvey 1989 p.3). The spectre of unwanted but inevitable ‘attention’ it will 
accrue is also introduced: ‘interrupting a carefully ordered spectacle, [and] drawing 
111 
 
attention to ourselves, [we were] inviting the hostility of thousands of people’. In an 
effort to minimise it, she recognises that her fear of becoming the object of the gaze 
and vitriol of others is part of ‘our conditioning as women, and our acceptance of 
bourgeois norms of correct behaviour’ (Mulvey 1989 pp.3–4). There follows a vivid 
account of her and accomplice Sally’s attempts to fit in immediately before the 
protest, concealing last-minute planning with dramatised reactions:  
 
Sally’s and my conversation fluctuated wildly between frantically whispered 
consultations and mutual encouragement, and overly-loud comments about 
the show, the judges, the girls, anything ‘ordinary’ and unsuspicious. We tried 
our best to laugh at Bob Hope’s jokes, in a pathetic attempt to feel one with 
the audience at last (Mulvey 1989 p.4).  
 
Later, when the agreed moment for action came, Mulvey realised ‘how ludicrously 
accessible the stage was’ (p.4) and that ‘a handful of people can disrupt it and cause 
chaos in a seemingly impenetrable organisation’ (p.5). With these detailed glimpses 
moments before their protest erupted, Mulvey demonstrates that what constructs a 
spectacle is also what makes it ‘vulnerable’. Describing her overly theatrical attempts 
to fit in, Mulvey demonstrates the subtle but important labour an audience performs 
to hold a spectacle: their efforts at quiet concentration, gasping, laughing, clapping, 
and judging all of these moments accordingly, all play their part. This labour might be 
summed up as giving and showing attention, which is what constitutes ‘paying 
attention’. Perhaps not quite what Mulvey intended, but we learn from this vignette 
that attention, and its active demonstration, undergirds the public situation. For is 
there even a spectacle if no one pays attention?  
 
Naturally the Miss World audience are not all paying attention in the same way, and 
the individual nature of attentional practices is discussed in more detail later. 
However, this short and evocative account highlights a charged dynamic between 
the fear of ‘drawing attention’ and the necessary performativity of ‘paying attention’ in 
a public situation. Mulvey’s observations and reflections seem to suggest something 
more active is happening, yet she sides with the traditional critique of spectatorship, 
saying that the spectacle: ‘isn’t prepared for anything other than passive spectators’ 
to bolster her prior statement about its vulnerability (p.5). What actually becomes 
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apparent is that spectatorship and activism are not binary opposites, but different 
modes of attention. 
 
Mulvey also demonstrates what constitutes ‘ideal’ attention in the theatre space: a 
collective focus on, and a demonstrative, performed engagement with, what is 
happening on stage. Home-Cook’s analysis (2015) suggests that our ‘attendance’ in 
the theatre is more than simply being present: ‘[T]heatregoing, necessarily entails 
action, enaction, and, most of all, movement’ that carries with it ‘a collective, as well 
as an individual, sense of commitment, discipline and responsibility’ (2015 p.1, 
original emphasis). With a lengthy analysis of an audience’s declarative sounds, 
Home-Cook focuses on ‘acts of attending’ that Mulvey also noted, but dismissed her 
as ‘pathetic’.79 Does she mean that her attempts to act ‘attentive’ and ‘engaged’ were 
pathetic? Or is she referring to those around her as pathetic because they were 
taken in by, and uncritical of, the Miss World spectacle? Importantly, these ‘pathetic 
attempts’ imply that there is something about feeling ‘at one with the audience’ that 
creates, or sustains, the spectacle. However, Mulvey’s derision of passive viewing is 
still a popular critique: André Lepecki makes a moralising distinction between ‘[the] 
spectator to the more political and ethical figure of the witness, an actor-storyteller 
who takes responsibility for the work by transmitting […] it to future audiences’ 
(Lepecki in Bishop 2018 p.36). For Lepecki at least, watching without critically 
engaging is tantamount to shirking one’s social responsibility, an idea returned to in 
Chapter Three.  
 
What holds the theatrical spectacle may be similar to what holds spaces of public 
programming that follow in this analysis, though they are not the same experience. 
An auditorium-based public programme event and a theatrical production in a 
standard black-box theatre both demand co-presence and attention policing, though 
this is more vehement in the theatre. There are specific technologies producing 
attention: stage, lighting, screen, microphones and amplification. In an auditorium-
based public programme event these can have a lighter touch – particularly as there 
is often more light, especially during question-and-answer sessions. People come 
 
79 An audience of theatregoers engages in all manner of coded behaviours, making certain noises 
(pre-show chatter, rustling programmes, laughter, applause) that ‘publicly declare their presence’ and 
‘intersubjective act of attending’ (Home-Cook 2015 p.1). 
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and go more readily during a public programme event too, whereas movement is 
more strictly controlled in the theatre. It might seem strange therefore to preface my 
examples from a lecture theatre and a reading group with a story about a theatrical 
spectacle and its disruption. Yet, each situation is underpinned by an ideal form of 
attention; as such, vulnerability to fluctuating concentration or whole-sale distraction, 
is integral to their publicness.  
 
Relations of Care 
 
Before moving to my examples, both Mulvey and Home-Cook acknowledge, in 
different ways, the intersubjective nature of attending and its demonstration. Citton 
elaborates on why joint attention matters: when it is directed and focused 
collaboratively, empathetic responses allow subtle shifts and changes in direction to 
occur, highlighting the ethical and socially engaged dimensions of attention, because 
ultimately joint attention carries a quality of care (2017 pp.18–19, pp.85–6 and 
pp.104–13).80 Though not the most popular frame of reference, we can also think of 
the museum in terms of care. As previously cited, the word ‘curator’ comes from the 
Latin root curare, denoting the primary function of museum curators: to care for 
artwork in the collection (Schubert 2009). At Tate this work is carried out by the 
Collection Care department, allowing curators to concern themselves with exhibition- 
and display-making. If the museum is a technology of attention then, it is also a 
technology of care: guiding and shaping what its publics should and should not care 
about, and deciding which objects should and should not be cared for. Practices and 
relations of care in the museum have another genealogy. Felicity Allen (2008) 
describes the prominent role feminist art practices played in developing museum and 
gallery education, since the 1970s, and the integral work women as activists, 
mothers and caregivers did to carve out space for children and adults to play and 
experiment with meaning and materials (p.5).  
 
Drawing on this genealogy, John Byrne describes a move from the museum as 
cultural edifice full of objects, to a network of relations and practices that centres the 
 
80 Also resonant in the etymological relation of attention to tendance: ‘watchful care’ (Merriam-




visitor as ‘a member of the constituent body’ rather than a ‘passive’ recipient of 
knowledge (Byrne et al. 2018 p.11). Passive reception versus an engaged 
constituency is still at issue in this model, but the links made between attending, 
relating and caring are perhaps of more interest here. These are evident in Alberto 
Altés Arlandis’ contribution: ‘[i]nhabiting this constituent museum requires attention 
and care [...] It is a practice of exposure, vulnerability, fragility’ (2018 p.71). Though 
not as prominent as notions of ritual (Duncan 1995) or surveillance (Bennett 1995), 
Byrne et al. show how important such practices of relating and caring are (we might 
think of structured play and experimentation) to shaping today’s museum and 
gallery, recalling Chapter One’s discussion of the ‘good enough mother’ (Winnicott 
1984). Education and public programmes – live practices that privilege presence and 
collective engagement – are often the conduit for these relations of care, yet 
conversely constitute some of the least visible practices of the museum. 
 
Billed as a ‘space for everyone to make, play, talk, and reflect and to discover new 
perspectives on life, through art’ (Tate 2016), Tate Exchange is a large open space 
and programme aimed at addressing this problem around visibility.81 It is just one 
example of the recent proliferation of programmes and art practices presented at 
contemporary art institutions revolving around, devoted to and/or structured by 
relations of care, and their review in discourse (Archey 2017). As Curator, Public 
Programmes in Tate Exchange’s inaugural year, I worked with Guerrilla Girls to 
develop Complaints Department Operated by Guerrilla Girls (2016). Though not 
explicitly about care, this week-long project drew on institutional models of complaint 
handling, a wry comment perhaps on the pretence of caring about what users, 
customers or visitors think, that such practices perform for the institution. Instead of 
anonymous collection, bureaucratic processing and response, however, they offered 
‘encouragement’ and a variety of materials with which visitors could write or draw a 
complaint, addressed to anyone or any institution, and post it on one of the 
moveable screens. The Guerrilla Girls also operated several ‘office hours’ where 
visitors could ‘share thoughts and complaints with them face to face’, and invited 
 
81 It was initially conceived to provide Learning and Research (the umbrella department that covers 
Early Years and Families, Schools and Teachers, Young People’s Programmes, and Public 
Programmes at Tate) with a permanent, visible and physical space in Tate Modern. Programming was 
initially shared with a network of ‘Associates’ external to Tate, who now enjoy the lion’s share. 
115 
 
collaborators to host thematic discussions. Their simple invitation to ‘post complaints 
about art, culture, politics, the environment, or any other issue they care about’, is 
indicative of their practice of drawing attention to what they care about: the 
disproportional representation of women artists and artists of colour in museum 
collections compared with their white, male counterparts.82 Guerrilla Girls’ 
provocative approach zeros in on the gaps and omissions in the artistic canon that, 
as museum and gallery publics, we are not meant to pay attention to, and the ways 




Returning to the quotation opening this chapter, Arlandis reminds us that we are not 
always in control of how our attention is directed: it is emergent (2018 p.71), not 
unlike the process of becoming public(s) I describe in this thesis. Moving from the art 
museum to the art school, I introduce a small moment during a lecture by the curator 
and theorist Paul O’Neill that was part of week-long curatorial summer school 
focusing on social art practices at a European art school I attended in 2018.83 The 
‘summer school’ or ‘curriculum’ format, inviting practitioners to speak about their 
practice to other professionals, is frequently adopted and adapted by museums, 
contemporary art institutions and itinerant organisations such as biennales and 
festivals.84 Producing reflexive attention on practice, the practitioner presents their 
examples within a canon of professional practice. Moving beyond the academic 
conference, this model has become a dominant form of paying attention to a variety 
of art, curatorial, knowledge production and institutional practices, though it still 
belongs largely to the academy and art institution. Publications accompanying these 
 
82 As a collective of anonymous artists who only appear in public wearing their statement gorilla 
masks, Guerrilla Girls came to more public attention via a series of posters distributed around New 
York in the late 1980s. Perhaps their most famous poster bears the question, ‘Do women have to be 
naked to get into the Met. Museum?’ alongside a naked reclining figure of a woman wearing a gorilla 
mask. 
83 In the following analysis the school remains anonymous. 
84 Examples include CAMPUS at Nottingham Contemporary (a nine-month independent study 
programme, 2019–20), Syllabus (a six-month independent study programme collaboratively produced 
by Wysing Arts Centre, Eastside Projects, Iniva, Spike Island and Studio Voltaire taking place since 
2014), Anthropocene Curriculum (a series of week-long educational events exploring knowledge co-
production taking place since 2013), and Tate Intensive (a week-long programme exploring 
contemporary museum practice for global practitioners). In addition, The Whitney Independent Study 
Program could be said to have developed this intimate relationship between the seminar/course, the 
art institution and the development of curatorial and critical discourse around the institution. 
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programmes, or critiquing them, lend further clout to such ‘schooling’ within and 
around the regular structures of exhibition and display. All of these approaches are 
ostensibly about using a rather traditional educative format to open art spaces to a 
broader public, though this isn’t always the result. With no formal entry requirements, 
the summer school I attended was ostensibly open to anyone, and formed part of the 
art academy’s public programme. However, it naturally attracted a specialist 
audience: a mix of curators, artists and students of both disciplines, as well as a few 
more unusual routes in. 
 
In recent years, O’Neill’s discursive and publishing practice has played a major role 
in bringing the curatorial and its attendant structures into focus.85 He began his 
lecture by stating a desire to try something different from the standard presentation 
of curatorial practice. Explaining that looking, the most regulated form of attention in 
the museum, sometimes ‘gets in the way’, he invited us, during a section of more 
personal prose, to close our eyes and make ourselves comfortable. Finding this a 
more restful way to engage with a more lyrical tone in the lecture, listening with my 
eyes closed proved fairly pleasurable at first. As O’Neill began to describe the 
breakdown of a love relationship, it felt more comfortable not to be looking directly 
towards him. But after a while, I started to wonder when I should open my eyes 
again. Eventually, sensing the text moving back into theoretical territory, I blinked 
and sat up straighter in my chair, returning to my usual listening posture. When I 
later asked O’Neill about his strategy, explaining my enjoyment of this more relaxed 
mode of paying attention but omitting my worry about when I should start looking 
again, O’Neill responded: ‘where there is attention, things are also “at tension”’. I 
found this rang true with my slight discomfort with the two kinds of theorising going 
on in his presentation: the curatorial and the personal. O’Neill then suggested that 
attention is sometimes about comfort and sometimes about discomfort. It may also 
be about surprise: when something or someone ‘grabs’ or ‘catches’ our attention, 
diverting it from what we were engaged with.  
 
 
85 Not least through the public programme at Bard College, where he was previously Director of the 
Graduate Program, Center for Curatorial Studies (2013–17), and now as co-director of PUBLICS, 




The wider acknowledgment that ‘looking gets in the way’, is part of the move to 
overcome of the primacy of the visual in cultural and educational spaces. This has 
been problematised from feminist and post-colonial and neo-Marxist perspectives 
(Pollock 1988), and challenged by more ‘radical’ forms of public programming 
foregrounding other modes of engagement. We might also characterise these 
tensions as the interplay between attention and what is commonly considered its 
other: distraction. However, as Matt Bevis has noted, ‘attention is not the opposite of 
distraction. We have to sublimate our distraction to our attention’ (2017). Phillips 
similarly suggests that attention ‘is [in fact] made possible by inattention’. In addition, 
‘if acculturation is among other things the organising of attention, or the organising of 
desire as the organising of attention, then there is a tension [...] between what we 
are supposed to attend to, and what we find ourselves wanting to attend to’ (2017). 
The public programming moments described below also demonstrate that institutions 
may direct attention, but cannot control it. Frequently the idealised, moralised mode 
of full, undivided attention is ‘at tension’ with the reality that people pay attention 
through technological devices, doodling, daydreaming or chatting to a friend. 
 
The problem of the museum’s multiple, inattentive publics has been explored by 
Andrew Dewdney, David Dibosa and Victoria Walsh (2013), with the public 
programme often tasked with identifying and addressing publics that are ‘missing’. 
However, as their research shows, not only can attention not be directed, but the 
problem of ‘missing’ audiences is not always a lack of attention, but an attentiveness 
elsewhere. The resources and work museums put into ‘targeting’ and developing 
new audiences assumes that if only the right messaging is created, the ‘missing’ can 
be made to pay attention to the museum’s offer. However, this assumes that they do 
not already have objects of attention, or will find something worthy of attending to in 
the museum – which, in the case of colonial collections, may be a very problematic 




As so many scholars writing on attention have pointed out, it is overwhelmingly 





‘we are likely and prone in a culture of money, to liken attention to money, and so to 
be thinking of investments and returns, profits and loss, gains and draw-backs. And 
by the same token [...] to wonder what attention might be like, if it was not like 
paying’ (Phillips 2017).  
 
We know that, as an experience and as a payment, attention is not only a studious 
kind of listening or watching. In the shift from liberal to neoliberal institution, the 
museum has moved from centralising this idealised ‘quiet contemplation’ and 
castigating inattention as a moral lack, to understanding the public’s attention as a 
distributed resource to be captured for financial gain and statistical survival. These 
models understand attention as something possessed and given, rather than created 
in each and every attentive encounter. But, as suggested above, paying attention to 
something or someone can also be performing a special kind of interest, beyond the 
familiar transactions of the informational, familial, professional or ‘Platonic’ social 
exchanges. With Phillips’s suggestion of attention as an ‘organising of desire’, and 
Butt’s encouragement to take a flirtatious sideways glance at a ‘serious’ object of 
study (2006), I suggest that if attention is not a transaction, it could be a form of 
attraction.  
 
What happens when a normative technology of attention such as the museum needs 
to attract the attention of particular non-normative, non-dominant publics? The 
commodification of attention within the art economy is of course part of a wider 
marketisation of culture, where audiences are segmented into particular groups and 
marketed towards. Since the neoliberal art institution is bound to the attention 
economy, it needs more people to attend outside of a general public; exhibition and 
public programming focusing on, or representing non-white and/or queer bodies and 
experiences often sees its publics in terms of identitarian groups whose attention can 
be captured and monetised. This might be even more profitable than attracting the 
attention of a general public, especially when we think of ‘the pink pound’.86 Like 
 
86 This familiar phrase used to define ‘the spending power of gay men and lesbians, or as an 
increasingly lucrative target market’ may have been coined in the 1980s, but as queer scholar Justin 
Bengry notes, queer consumers have been targeted by mainstream markets ‘from at least the late 
19th century’ (2018). 
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many museums during 2017, Tate Britain celebrated fifty years since the partial de-
criminalisation of homosexuality with the exhibition Queer British Art 1861–1967, and 
a substantial public programme, including the one-day festival Queer and Now (Tate 
Britain 2017), presented in conjunction with, and opening, the two-week Pride in 
London festival. Such festival-style, spectacular programming, aimed at particular 
non-normative or non-dominant identities, is also pulled off through their 
spectacularisation, befitting the attention-grabbing tactics museums must now 
engage in. The way in which voguing – a stylised dance form created by black and 
Latino LGBTQ communities (Wolde-Michael n.d.) – has been brought into the 
museum (a non-traditional space for dance per se, particularly this style) via specific 
public programming moments provides just one example.87  
 
Given that we are acculturated to pay attention in specific ways, to the ‘right’ things 
(Phillips 2017), such programming can demonstrate that a museum cares about 
parts of society it has previously overlooked and under-represented (and in spite of 
such programming, continues to do so). I do not suggest that Queer and Now was 
cynical or inauthentic. From my experience as the event’s producer, the 
programming team was in part representative of the publics it aimed to attract and 
serve, and worked with colleagues across the museum to instil queer values more 
permanently.88 However, the many and tense conversations with artists, collectives 
and community organisations throughout the process attested to the suspicion with 
which approaches from major institutions that don’t ordinarily pay them attention are 
often received. Since national museums play a powerful role in reproducing social 
norms, such programming cannot be divorced entirely from the wider context of 
increased ‘pink washing’ of banks and consumer brands large and small, especially 
prominent during Pride in London in recent years (Vasques 2019). 
 
Shifting attention from queer publics per se, how might a sideways focus on the 
technologies the museum employs also constitute a queering of attention? For Butt 
to ‘flirt’ with the serious can be ‘queer form of commitment, and of being serious’ 
 
87 Indeed, during Queer and Now (2017) a voguing workshop with Jay Jay Revlon, host, DJ and 
voguer playing a key role in London’s scene, within the largest historic gallery at Tate Britain, was a 
highlight. 
88 Through, for example, gender-inclusive language training for all public-facing staff, provided by the 
organisation Gendered Intelligence. 
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(Butt 2007 p.94). Aaron Williamson’s mode of attending to art school lectures might 
also be evoked in rather more queer and flirtatious terms, too. After all, it led to a 
particularly anarchic cultural expression, the Collapsing Lecture, that could not really 
be described as a lecture or performance, success or failure. If we take queer to be 
‘a positionality vis à vis the normative’ (Halperin 1995 p.62) that resists 
categorisation, then the outcome was decidedly so. There are several ways to 
analyse what Williamson was doing when he was noticing and gathering these 
minor-failures of ‘performing-knowing’ as material for Collapsing Lecture. Following 
Butt, one could say he was ‘queerly’ attending. One could also say he was distracted 
by the peripheral information happening around, and intersecting with, the main 
event. Or that he was distracting himself from boredom in art school lectures by 
finding a new occupation for his attention. 
 
Joshua Cohen (2018) demonstrates how a traditional understanding of distraction in 
its ‘strictest sense’ is quite at odds with our contemporary notion: ‘[T]o be distracted 
means to be perplexed, confused, bewildered; a distracted person is out of touch 
with the person they used to be; a person “beside themselves.”’ Following traditional 
usages of the word that saw Puritans ‘denouncing the women at Salem as having 
been “Distract’d” into witchcraft [and] George III [...] censuring “the distracted 
colonies” on the brink of independence’, Cohen proposes how the word itself 
‘suggest[s] some degree of deviation from a communal standard – some loss of a 
fundamental collective traction, which must immediately be regained.’ To be labelled 
‘distracted’ suggested not only losing control of your attention, but also your moral 
compass. Cohen compares these rather serious, moralistic understandings of 
distraction with today’s digital evolution: ‘[w]e click away, but then we return, but then 
we click away again. We toggle perpetually between our guilt and guilty pleasures’ 
(Cohen 2018 Section 1).  
 
In both traditional and contemporary usages, then, distraction carries a sense of 
deviation from the path we ought to be following. It hardly needs pointing out, but the 
associations between queerness and deviance have been inscribed in the term 
‘queer’ since the nineteenth-century, when the word was both a painful slur used to 
abuse and defame and a term LGBT people used to refer to themselves (Tate 2017). 
If distraction is what pulls us off the straight and narrow path of attention, then we 
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might also think of it as a problem of orientation, or dis-orientation. Sara Ahmed 
(2006) provides the opportunity to think queerness as spatialised, through the dual 
notions of orientation and deviation. ‘In the case of sexual orientation, it is not simply 
that we have it’, in fact, Ahmed says, we ‘become straight’ by following particular 
paths, turning away from ‘objects’ (or distractions) that might ‘take us off this line’. In 
turning away from the paths and objects given by heterosexual culture ‘[t]he queer 
subject [...] is made socially present as a deviant’ (Ahmed 2006 p.21). However, she 
also notes how the term ‘desire lines’ is used by landscape architects and urban 
planners ‘to describe unofficial paths [...] that show everyday comings and goings, 
where people deviate from the paths they are supposed to follow’ (pp.19–20). If 
deviations leave impressions that create another path, once we focus on the 
technologies of attention that direct our looks and spatialise desire, and notice when 




I return to Williamson’s distracted, deviant and queer methodology to recall the 
different modes of attention at play during another morning lecture at the summer 
school mentioned above, by the director of a small UK arts organisation. My 
extended discussion of the following example employs Arlandis’ proposition that we 
do not, in fact, direct our attention, but neither is it entirely directed by external 
forces. Rather, it is contingent and directional, depending on ‘what happens’ 
(Arlandis 2018 p.71). I anonymise all the actors in this particular example, using the 
designations ‘speaker’, ‘director’ and ‘technician’ instead of given names, in order to 
speak about it more fully.89  
 
The lecture followed a very standard format: an introduction by the art school’s 
director, the speaker’s presentation from the lectern illustrated with a PowerPoint 
presentation, and a question-and-answer session at the end. While expressing his 
intention to present some exemplary social practices that worked curatorially, the 
 
89 Indeed, this is also a way of drawing attention to the functional positions in the construction of 
attention. Like Foucault's idea of the author function, where the author is designated a function of 
discourse, rather than its creator (1969). We might also recall here that Leo Steinberg designated the 
public as a function, rather than a real group of people per se, as introduced in my Literature Review 
(Burton, Jackson and Willsdon 2016). 
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speaker largely focused on artist collective WochenKlausur.90 Not immediately 
engaged by his presentation, my eyes wandered around the lecture theatre, noticing 
the different ways others appeared to be engaging (or not). All around me people 
were variously writing notes, browsing the Internet, sending messages, doing their 
hair or whispering to the person next to them. Our bodies were largely facing the 
same way, but attention was certainly not collectively and continuously focused 
towards the front of the room. Rather, it was diffused and dispersed around it. In 
addition to these minor distractions, a technical fault meant the projection screen 
behind the speaker was flickering from the start. He agreed with the director not to 
advance beyond his first slide until it had been fixed. The attempts of institutional 
staff to remedy this problem now provided the main source of distraction, but also 
presented me with a parallel ‘desire line’ to follow.  
 
Tuning into different modes of attending, I pulled out my phone and tried to record 
them surreptitiously through photography and filming. As I became more engaged in 
this side task, the attempts to fix the projector developed into a mini silent comedy. I 
began anticipating something interesting or significant happening as the director and 
technician were busying themselves with cables and connectors. Thus, engaged in 
both the lecture and the gathering of this extraneous data, I reflected on how fluid 
and flickering – even promiscuous – my and others’ attention seemed to be. As the 
hour wore on, the wavering interest and focus of my fellow audience members 
contrasted rather comically with the protracted attempts by the staff to tend to these 
technical needs. It seemed that once the flickering screen had been identified as a 
serious impediment, they could not rest until it had been resolved. Gradually it 
emerged that not only were their efforts fruitless, they were also excessive because 
the slides (like so many presentations) were not exactly essential to the narrative.  
 
The lecture theatre had doors to enter and exit on the right-hand side of the staging 
area. Another door on the left, behind the lectern, appeared to lead to an equipment 
cupboard. At some point during the charade, a new technician appeared from the 
cupboard, silently unplugged a cable, plugged it in again and exited the way he had 
entered. The inexplicable appearance of a new character from an unexpected place 
 
90 I name this group because it becomes important to discussing their work later. 
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had a very comic effect. Titters of laughter rippled through the audience, recognising 
the gentle slapstick unfolding beside the speaker’s rather serious appraisal of 
Wochenklausur’s work. Eventually, picking up a handheld microphone to close the 
lecture, the director began by apologising ‘for the technical faults’ – but he was 
interrupted by the microcphone cutting in and out. This time we laughed without 
restraint, and so did he, bashfully. The flickering audio now provided the distraction 
and a moment for tension release. Our collective laughter seemed to both 
acknowledge the institution’s failed attempt at a ‘curative intervention’ (Kafer 2013), 
and comically underline that they really needn’t have bothered. I had begun to see 
these attempts to fix the screen as ‘performing-attention’, recalling Williamson’s 
‘performing-knowing’ (2017). The laughter affirmed that I wasn’t the only one to 
notice the meta-performance of fixing the flickering screen had proved a greater 
distraction than the perceived problem. Like the applause at the end of Collapsing 
Lecture at Tate Britain (2011) it was also a demonstration of our collective 
attendance, despite all of the diffusion and distraction. 
 
These are, of course, common occurrences that might seem banal or overly 
dramatised when described at length. However, during this hour, I certainly felt 
‘caught up in something that felt like something’ (Stewart 2007). Interested, amused 
and alert, by tuning into the minor happenings surrounding the main event, I took 
greater than usual ‘pleasure in noticing’ (Stumpf in Citton 2017). Following these 
distractions felt enjoyably deviant too. It felt as if some people (the director and 
technicians) were over performing their attentive care, while others weren’t really 
present at all, revealing the different efforts required to maintain normative 
attentional situations. In fact, Stewart’s ‘weirdly floating “we”’ seems to capture the 
atmosphere in the theatre, a kind of togetherness that was not entirely fixed or 
focused. Sigmund Freud’s approach to listening to what his patient was saying 
during analysis as ‘evenly-suspended attention’ is also useful. Hugely influential in 
the development of psychoanalysis, the analyst must ‘withhold all conscious 
influences from his capacity to attend [...] simply listen, and not bother whether he is 
keeping anything in mind’ (Freud 1912 pp.111–12), letting new associations emerge, 
rather than selecting familiar patterns. For Citton, ‘free-floating attention’ (as it is also 
known) is not incongruous in situations of ‘joint attention’. In fact, it makes possible a 
kind of ‘detachment’ necessary to evolve from a ‘situation of associative vigilance, 
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[that] only brings about a transfer of information’, to a more liberated mode of co-
attending that can ‘discover forms, properties and potentialities […] not previously 
available to […] individuals in the group.’ Far from being derailed, joint attention is, in 
fact, liberated by free-floating attention or a distraction (Citton 2017 p.119), opening 
up the potential productivity of both. Deviation from ideal and idealised modes of 
attention – particularly digital distraction – has been, and still often is, coded as 
immoral (Phillips 2019, Cohen 2018, Bishop 2018). But, just as free-floating attention 
is part of joint attention, distraction is another facet of attention too. 
 
Towards an (In)attention Ecology 
 
Returning to the content of the lecture, what was given to my attention, the speaker 
introduced us to a series of projects by the group WochenKlausur. With a core of 
eight members, the group includes a revolving cast of around fifty other artist 
collaborators brought in to collaborate on specific projects. WochenKlausur may be 
translated in English as ‘weeks of enclosure’, and when working on a project, each 
member of the team dedicates themselves entirely to the task at hand, and ceases 
all other kinds of work. 91 Such a working structure provides a rather interesting 
analogy of the potential of joint attention and its quality of care (Citton 2017), 
because as we shall see, by looking away from other commitments, the group brings 
focus to social issues that are otherwise overlooked. In 1992 the group were invited 
by Vienna’s Secession to make an exhibition, and instead created their inaugural 
project Medical Care for Homeless People (1993). According to their website, rather 
than use the budget to create something inside the building, WochenKlausur decided 
to address an issue presenting itself on the public square immediately in front of it. 
Karlsplatz was a common meeting place for the city’s homeless population, whom 
the group learned were routinely refused healthcare by doctors’ surgeries ‘with the 
argument “go wash yourself first”’, despite being insured under Austria’s medical 
system. To address the issue, the group ‘set up a mobile clinic for providing basic 
medical treatment’ by purchasing a van with donations from numerous funders, and 
 
91 According to their website, the German word Klausur relates to English words ‘enclosure, 
seclusion, cloister’ (WochenKlausur n.d.) 
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securing further funding for medical professionals to operate the clinic from the city 
council (WochenKlausur n.d.).92  
 
Many of WochenKlausur’s projects have been discussed in terms of ‘conversation’ 
and the ‘dialogic’ (Kester 2004), but I’d like to suggest an expanded notion of 
attention as another lens through which to consider their work. An invitation from an 
art institution – gallery, museum or biennale – provokes research by the group into 
the local area. Such an approach was employed by the Centre for Possible Studies 
(2009–16), operating from the Serpentine Gallery’s Edgware Road Project. Run by 
Janna Graham and Amal Khalaf with others, the Centre hosted long-term 
residencies with international artists and groups working to produce knowledge 
about the area, its people, practices and histories through ‘encounters: between 
artists, local people, university researchers and workers, those moving to, from and 
along the Edgware Road’ (Centre for Possible Studies n.d.). Aligning with the 
curatorial as a ‘moment of encounter’ (Crone 2013 p.209) or ‘event of knowledge’ 
(Rogoff 2013 p.46), the process and output of the Centre’s work was primarily 
discussion- and event-based: closed meetings between residency artists and 
groups, and a public programme that shared the results of such collaborations.93 
Although issuing from different starting points, the Centre for Possible Studies (an 
independent branch of a contemporary art institution) and WochenKlausur (an artist 
group invited by contemporary art institutions), have both employed a forensic 
approach to noticing what is happening on the very doorstep of specific places as 
the impetus to begin work there.  
 
WochenKlausur in particular look for social issues not being addressed by local 
authorities, or worse, actively overlooked. An intervention that offers some form of 
‘solution’ is created by the group, often pulling in funding from many and various 
public and private sources. Some projects involve creating private spaces to house 
conversations and providing mediators between various actors to often leading to a 
 
92 Many of WochenKlausur’s projects, which exclusively respond to social issues in whatever location 
they are invited to, are sustained long after the project itself has finished. After several years of 
funding from Vienna’s city council, the mobile unit was taken over by relief organisation Caritas 
(WochenKlausur n.d.). 
93 Such as the Migrants Resource Centre, Implicated Theatre and a local group of ESOL (English for 
Speakers of Other Languages) teachers (Centre for Possible Studies n.d.). 
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collaborative resolution. Most, if not all, of these projects are not publicly accessible 
in the sense of a general public (and its attendant normative assumptions outlined in 
Chapter One), who are not invited to view or take part in them. Yet, the sites of these 
conversations are often rather provocatively made present. Through the placement 
of brightly coloured ‘attention seeking’ structures for these ‘conversation pieces’ 
(Kester 2004) in prominent places, WochenKlausur arouse public curiosity and 
awareness, without facilitating access to them. For example, a bright pink tourist 
boat on Lake Zurich, as in Shelter for Drug-Addicted Women, Shedhalle, Zurich 
(1994) or a purpose-built pink shed in the middle of a public square for 
Implementation of an Intermediate Social Work, as part of Documenta 13, Kassel 
(2012). The conversations staged may be private and generally inaccessible, but the 
structures in which they are held often have a striking public presence, around which 
gossip and speculation circulates. All of the issues WochenKlausur address are 
hiding in plain sight, but their method is to draw attention to what makes us feel 
uncomfortable: social issues dangerously unattended, such as healthcare provision 
for homeless people or housing for drug-addicted female sex workers. Challenging 
the museum’s traditional attentional model that draws attention within, 
WochenKlausur’s projects disperse it across several sealed, semi-private spaces. 
This parallels the shift mentioned above from liberal to the neoliberal institution: the 
move away from an idealised form of focused and committed attention, towards an 
understanding of the public’s attention as always already distracted and distributed 
across a wide field – the public realm.  
 
Maria Eichorn’s action 5 weeks, 25 days, 175 hours (2016) at Chisenhale Gallery 
provides an interesting and recent counterpoint to WochenKlausur’s drawing of 
attention away from the institution to the public space of the square and its 
‘problems’. Forcing the gallery to close for five weeks, yet keeping the staff on full 
pay and asking them not to work, Eichorn exposed how the institution ordinarily 
operates under a neoliberal capitalist logic of over-production, under which leisure 
time is understood as consumption time, since all time must be productive. 
Chisenhale Gallery’s then Director, Polly Staple described it as ‘both a gift and a 
burden’ that drew on a history of labour withdrawal to suggest the ‘possibility of 
suspending the capitalist logic of exchange by […] making a life without wage labour 
imaginable’ (Staple 2016 p.6). But by interrupting a largely working-class history of 
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waging financial precarity against oppressive labour conditions, Eichorn’s ‘work’ also 
highlights who can participate in it.94 It could be argued that ceasing the activity of 
cultural workers, who, are overwhelming from middle-class, traditionally more 
affluent backgrounds and can afford to embark on a career in the arts (McRobbie 
2016), draws attention in an unintended direction. 
 
One result of the inaccessibility of these projects is how they then exist. If they 
cannot be directly participated in, then they must be imagined. This is largely made 
possible through publications and public programming.95 As pointed out by the 
speaker describing WochenKlausur’s projects, these works often circulate as 
narrative: in various forms or writing and critique, spoken presentations and more 
informal forms of oral transmission such as art-world gossip, which I return to in 
Chapter Four. Indeed, this aspect became particularly problematic in the way 
Medical Care for Homeless People (1993) was evoked by the speaker himself. At 
the same time as lauding WochenKlausur’s project for providing healthcare to 
homeless people, the speaker admitted the same exclusionary views that routinely 
disallow their access to it, saying ‘they are dirty and smelly, and there are children 
present’. He added that the sterile environment of the doctor’s surgery was similar to 
the white cube gallery, necessitating the van operating outside these clinical spaces. 
Perhaps this comment simply proves that modernist spaces of publicity are civilising 
in quite particular ways (Duncan 2013), and reminds us of the centrality habitus 
(Bourdieu 1984). 
 
Nevertheless, his seeming acquiescence to the reasons homeless people are 
excluded from doctors’ surgeries and art galleries sat uneasily with me. Another of 
the summer school speakers during the question-and-answer session suggested 
that real problem might be better identified as how society deals with cleanliness and 
dirt. Mary Douglas states that ‘dirt’ is only recognisable as such through ‘a set of 
ordered relations and a contravention of that order. Dirt then, is never a unique, 
isolated event. Where there is dirt there is system’ (Douglas 1966 p.36).  The 
questioner suggested that in providing homeless people with access to state 
 
94 As a post-conceptual action, we cannot call it an ‘object’ nor an ‘exhibition’. 
95 For example, 5 weeks, 25 days, 175 hours was ‘launched’ with a one-day symposium on 23 April 
2016 opening up its themes before the gallery closed down. 
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healthcare out of sight – on an itinerant mobile unit with no fixed location – the 
project had, unwittingly or otherwise, reinforced the social exclusion of those without 
homes, jobs and access to washing facilities. The social majority who cannot 
countenance sharing space with a homeless person may thus continue ignoring their 
presence and needs. The reasons given for homeless people’s prevention from 
accessing public services marked them as excluded from the liberal notion of 
general public and reinforced the modernist purity of the art space and its need for 
protection.96 At the same time, Vienna’s homeless population became part of the 
neoliberal institution in so far as they were the particular public targeted by 
WochenKlausur’s work. I am not advocating for spectacularising them by offering 
healthcare within the gallery.97 However, I seek to draw attention to how the project, 
and its representation, might have reproduced the kinds of exclusions this group 
faced, and still face today. As previously introduced, Claire Bishop (2006) and Jen 
Harvie (2013) have suggested, social art practices can antagonise and even 
exacerbate the social inequalities they claim to critique. WochenKlausur’s 
redistribution of attention away from the contemporary art institution and its usual 
publics might even be read as a distraction from wider structural problems of 
inaccessibility. 
 
Shifting attention to the periphery, is what I suggest has been modelled by 
WochenKlausur’s approach to researching and performing their projects. Becoming 
distracted by the choreography of ‘performing-care’ going on around the lecture, I 
began to question how it is that we find out what we should and shouldn’t care about. 
The actions of the director and technicians seemed to suggest I should have cared 
about the presentation. But distracted by them, I drew a parallel to the way 
WochenKlausur work around the edges of what is given to attention, to seek out 
 
96 The misrecognition of the powerful systems of cleanliness and order that the doctor’s surgery and 
contemporary art gallery also echoed the fear of unruly and contaminating publics endangering the 
eighteenth-century Paris Salon. As mapped and described by Thomas Crow and featured in my 
introduction, the unruly public threatened to engulf this rarefied space with their body odour, uncouth 
manners, speech and facile opinions (1995). 
97 Santiago Sierra has similarly drawn attention to social issues that are hiding in plain sight by 
bringing certain people into the contemporary art gallery, and paying them to do, or consent to, certain 
actions. The film 160 cm Line Tattooed on 4 People (2000) in Tate’s collection documents an action at 
El Gallo Arte Contemporáneo in Salamanca, Spain in December 2000, where the artist hired four sex 
workers, working locally and addicted to heroin, for their consent to sit in a row and have their backs 
tattooed with a line, for the price of a shot (Manchester 2006). 
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what isn’t being attended to. Taking their joint attention to the periphery, without 
making the subject(s) of their focus fully accessible to a general public, 
WochenKlausur’s strategy is reminiscent of Édouard Glissant’s defence of opacity 
(1990).98 Campaigning for the right to not be fully understood or captured by Western 
thought, which, as Glissant writes, is based on the ‘requirement for transparency’ 
(1990 pp.189–90), he shows the violence inherent in reducing the Other to 
something understandable, and therefore acceptable. I suggest a similar move is 
being made by WochenKlausur, and yet, as pointed out by the questioner, the 
conspicuousness yet inaccessibility of their projects also risks making a double 
exclusion. In Chapter Four I examine the notion that any public is predicated on an 
outside, describing the workshop situations where peripheral phenomena became 
focus, without reducing them to total transparency.  
 
Yves Citton provides an insightful, experiential account of wandering the centre of 
Avignon, France during its yearly summertime theatre festival that may conclude my 
detour and extended focus on WochenKlausur. As part of a wider bid to reframe the 
‘attention economy’ as an ‘attention ecology’, he speaks to the looping negotiation 
and interrelation of attention and inattention that, naturally,  
 
intertwine all the time. If I am not attentive to the presence of the beggar, I will 
not give him a coin – this is a defence mechanism that most of us have 
developed to keep our guilt to a minimum. And likewise, artists do not live on 
attention alone [...] Cultural goods are also material goods, and [...] value 
creation strongly depends on the way in which we distribute our attention 
(Citton 2017 p.1). 
 
Moving away from abstraction towards embodiment, Citton encapsulates the 
complex ethics of ‘paying attention’ (which may or may not include an actual 
monetary transaction), drawing our attention to the intimate and rather awkward 
relations between giving and receiving it. Though it might seem a banal point, 
inequality is everywhere we look, and with this vignette Citton reminds us that 
 
98 This work has found much currency in contemporary art world discussion since it was drawn on by 
Okwui Enwezor’s edition of the Venice Biennale, 2015 and has also been frequently referenced by 
curator Hans Ulrich Obrist. 
130 
 
withholding attention is one way to fend off guilt about whatever privilege or 
intersecting privileges we may carry: disposable income, class, able-bodiedness, 
whiteness, cis-genderedness, and so on. Choosing not to attend to the differences 
between us – not meeting the eye of the homeless person asking you for money – 
keeps privilege(s) intact. If practising in-attention, decidedly looking away or 
sideways, minimises guilt and keeps spare change in your pocket, Citton suggests 
our attentive decisions are economic and emotional. In addition, value – cultural, 
fiscal, personal – is created by what we pay attention to, as much as what our 
attention is directed towards, or drawn by. Citton encourages us to think about 
attention in two ways: a ‘resource’ that neoliberal capitalism is simultaneously 
demanding and suggesting that we ‘manage’ better to gain a ‘competitive’ edge; a 
relation to others that could improve life (Citton 2017 p.x). Within the wider paradigm 
of socially engaged art practice, where the work of WochenKlausur certainly sits, is 
the moral imperative of giving attention to things that are worthy of it. Guerrilla Girls, 
and many others besides, demonstrate with their work what we should pay attention 
to, and care about. But WochenKlausur add another layer: how do we attend to the 
way in which our attention is drawn? One strategy might be to use opacity: the 
conspicuous structures set up in public spaces provide access to vital services, or 
the setting for publicised, yet closed conversations. Their strategy draws attention to 
what is hiding in plain sight: the exclusion of particular people from public welfare 
and health services. In WochenKlausur’s projects the ethical dimensions of attention 
are frequently ‘at tension’ with the embodied conflict of looking away to stave off 
guilt, or looking directly at, and engaging with social problems.  
 
Re-reading the Reading Group 
 
This chapter asks how the different threads of attention, inattention and distraction 
are all at work in moments of public becoming. Following these threads may highlight 
the tense relations between who is and isn't included within them, whom do we look 
towards and whom do we turn away from. Taking up Citton’s ‘attention ecology’, I 
turn to an ascendent form of public programming, the reading group, to think through 
who and what is being attended to in this more intimate setting with a very simple 
activity at its heart – reading and discussing a text. One that, unlike 




During the summer of 2018, I attended a session of the Feminist Duration Reading 
Group (FDRG) that has been meeting since 2015 to read, as the website explains, 
‘under-appreciated feminist texts from outside the Anglo-American feminist tradition’. 
The FDRG takes a format predicated on de-hierarchised, peer-to-peer learning, 
outside of the academy. 99 With roots in 1970s consciousness raising groups of the 
Women’s Liberation Movement, where listening was as much a priority as speaking 
(Farinati and Firth 2017 p.5), the reading group is most commonly practised in 
academic settings as a way for students to co-construct knowledge about a text, or 
other cultural object, rather than have it explained by a teacher. Within the public 
programme of a museum or gallery, the reading group is a high-quality and low-
resource format. It produces an intimate space where everyone is a participant, but 
all it really needs are photocopies of a text and a circle of chairs. The reading group 
is therefore readily used to plug gaps in the institution, highlighting once more the 
use of public programming to readdress the occlusions inherent in the institution’s 
liberal formation of a general public.100  
 
Moving itinerantly around spaces outside those of hierarchised institutions, FDRG 
extends the feminist critique of the gaze (Pollock 1988) by prioritising gathering, 
reading and discussing together as productive of knowledge. Eschewing the 
powerful connection between looking and knowing more common to the museum 
and the academy, it also challenges existing regimes of attention that we might find 
there. Within the canons of feminist and curatorial theory and practice, FDGR pulls 
collective focus on writing and theorising from non-Western perspectives that are not 
widely read. Asking what has been overlooked and under-attended to, FDGR draws 
attention to texts outside of the canon of white feminism and, in this way, it is not 
simply a reading group, but a curatorial intervention. Finally, the reading group 
 
99 Initiated by curator Helena Reckitt, the group has been hosted for a number of years by SPACE, a 
studio complex and gallery in Hackney, London as well as meeting in non-institutional spaces such as 
homes and community centres. It also travels to other UK-based organisations, including South 
London Gallery and De Le Warr Pavilion, Bexhill-on-Sea and is invited to run sessions internationally 
(FDGR n.d.). 
100 Examples include The Women of Colour Index Reading Group invited to explore the Panchayat 
Special Collection in Tate’s Library and Archive through a set of readings, openly discussed with the 
public (2018); the format was taken to the extreme by Das Kapital Oratorio, a daily dramatised 
reading of Karl Marx’s infamous text (1867) at Venice Biennale in 2015, directed by Isaac Julian who 
conceived it with Okwui Enwezor and Mark Nash (La Biennale Di Venezia 2015). 
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format itself draws on attentiveness as a lived, embodied experience: without 
collective focus or joint attention, it simply doesn’t work.  
 
Taking place at the same time as the England vs Colombia World Cup match in July 
2018, the session I attended was, at times, quite severely disrupted by a host of 
different sounds, articulations, needs, intentions and digital interventions. With so 
many competing demands, concentrating on the task at hand – the collective reading 
and discussion of a text – became difficult. Instead, I decided to take notes on what 
was distracting me, listening with an ‘evenly-suspended attention’ (Freud 1912) to 
what everything that was ‘exerting a pull’ (Stewart 2007) on my attentional 
resources. My focus here is not on the text we read, but my experience of trying and 
failing to attend to it. Recounting specific moments of this experience, I also map 
how FDRG pays attention to its own multiple forms of attentiveness alive in the 
moment of reading and discussing together. 
 
Upon walking in, I was offered a drink and some snacks that were laid out on a table 
in the foyer and made to feel welcome. I introduced myself to a few people, grabbed 
a handful of things to eat, one of the few printed copies of the text, and went into the 
adjacent gallery space to sit on a rather uncomfortable plastic folding chair. Feeling a 
little shy, but also fairly relaxed, I settled down and observed people as they came in. 
The group was around twenty or so. Each of us was asked to introduce ourselves 
and why we had come. A few people, like myself, had only visited once before, some 
had been recommended by friends, others were loyal contributors or organisers of 
the group. I noted that amongst our number were two men, a mother and her baby. 
Whereas the majority of the group was white European, English was not the first 
language of everyone in the room.  
 
The text for that session was White Women Listen! Black Feminisms and the 
Boundaries of Sisterhood by Hazel V. Carby (1982). In it, Carby calls on white 
feminists to listen to the intersecting oppressions of gender, race, and class that 
women of colour face. One of the tenets of this reading group is that texts are always 
read together, out loud and discussed ‘as we go along’. This means they are not 
always finished, but that no one feels at a disadvantage for not reading in advance. It 
also brings a certain focus to the room immediately. However, one of the first things I 
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noted was that although the text is made available via email or on the group’s 
website prior to meeting, only a few copies were available in the room. Some had 
diligently brought their own and rummaged in bags to find their copy, or moved 
closer to a neighbour to share theirs. But the beginning of the session was taken up 
with people logging into email accounts to download the file onto laptops or mobile 
phones, which later proved rather difficult to read aloud from. 
 
As we began to read and discuss, the second notable distraction to announce itself 
was the baby, whose constant chatter had several effects. It was harder to make 
yourself heard when reading or contributing, to hear others speak, or concentrate on 
the discussion. Very soon the baby proved near impossible to ignore because it was 
wide awake, mobile and disarmingly keen to join the conversation throughout the 
entire two hours. It was fed intermittently, and towards the end, passed around the 
circle to be bounced on laps, soothed, entertained and cooed over. At no point did it 
sleep or stop chattering. About forty-five minutes in, an older woman arrived and 
announced that she had forgotten her hearing aids. She requested everyone 
increase their volume, putting a further strain, in my opinion, on the group to make 
themselves heard.  
 
In what I have already described a few things appear to be ‘at tension’. Firstly, the 
difficulties of reading aloud with unequal access to the text, in competition with the 
voluble contributions from the youngest member of our group, a difficulty heightened 
by the demand to ‘speak up’. But these meta-events of the session culminated in an 
interruption from outside, a distraction which could not be ignored. This particular 
iteration of the reading group coincided with one of the most dramatic matches of the 
World Cup (2018), which, as I later learned, went to extra time and ended with a 
penalty shoot-out. As both match and reading group progressed, the football drama 
became harder to ignore with cheers and yells from local pubs, private homes and 
balconies penetrating the reading group whenever a goal was scored, missed or 
other pivotal moments occurred. It later transpired that several people had been 
following on their phones, including one of the two men present, just as the person 
next to me was making a point about what we’d been reading. As the conversation 
turned entirely to score updates, I sensed her frustration at waiting until some 




I couldn’t help noticing the paralleling and convergence of these two participatory 
activities, with very differently orientated publics. The traction of trying to listen and 
make oneself heard, of trying to concentrate and ignore several different distractions 
all clamouring for our attention was almost palpable. This sense of traction hints 
again at what happens when we reframe attention, and distraction, into competing 
and differing desire lines, and how the constant parsing of attention creates 
particular intricacies and intimacies. Perhaps the football match was the easiest and 
most voluble distraction for the group to acknowledge through collective laughter.101 
But this example also seems to parallel a constant concern of museums and other 
contemporary art spaces: what is the relationship between the programmed activity 
happening within, and the world outside? Should the space of the public programme 
be a sanctuary for specialised attention, or should it porously engage with the 
concerns of wider publics? How might two very differently oriented publics occupy 
adjacent, or the same, space and time?102 
 
Returning to the room and the reading group, from the outset, the relative 
inaccessibility of the text piqued my interest. Whether part of the structure or not, it 
forced the group to improvise, get together and share resources. It might seem an 
obvious point, but attending such a group one would assume that inclusivity is a top 
priority: that everyone there should have equal access to the text and be able to hear 
what is being said about it. This is backed up by the group’s principles that state ‘The 
FDGR welcomes feminists of all genders and generations’ (Antonioli 2019 p.14). But 
the tensions around hearing and making oneself heard prompted me to think about 
whose access is prioritised in spaces like these, because, as we read, I noticed 




101 It would be hard not to point out the irony that one of the only two men at this feminist reading 
group had been surreptitiously following the football match the whole time, though this was not 
acknowledged in the same manner. It struck me as comic, but also called into question: what do men 
do with the access that they have to feminist spaces?   
102 An example of the very real risk involved in actualising these concerns, was the march by the 
English Defence League that its organisers planned to pass by Tate Britain on the day of Queer and 
Now festival in 2017. Deciding that the march could threaten the integrity and even the safety of the 
event, stronger security measures were put in place by the gallery. 
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Voicing Vulnerability  
 
In a collectively authored text, various members reflect on what collective reading 
brings to the experience of FDGR (Reckitt et al. 2019). Attending to vulnerability 
emerges as one of the most distinctive and crucial facets of FDGR’s process, 
fleshed out in these three excerpts: 
 
it’s a privilege to feel part of something that [...] does not demand a high-
functioning normative set of behaviours, just being together, reading aloud, 
mostly listening, and contributing at times (Revell in Reckitt et al. 2019 p.144). 
 
I find it meaningful to read aloud while people listen. It seems like a little thing, 
but it is rare that women’s voices are heard so attentively and with care 
(Paiola in Reckitt et al. 2019 p.145). 
 
Not needing to prepare in advance means that this group feels accessible and 
open. It is such a pleasure to take the time to listen, to attend to a text with 
care, and a contrast to so much else in life that is fast and fleeting (Gibbs in 
Reckitt et al. 2019 p.146). 
 
For these group members at least, FDGR offers a haven for its own ideal form of 
attention. From the above excerpts, this could be defined as slowing down, taking 
time, care and attending to women’s voices in particular. As Revell elaborates, the 
simple format foregrounds practices of reading and listening, making possible a 
special kind of attunement to difference ‘that is not about explicit declaration’ (Revell 
in Reckitt et al. 2019 p.156). We might say that due to the various ways people read, 
their own struggles with the text, or refusal to read at all, reading aloud is, in 
essence, a practising of difference, or even a practice of differencing. Each variation 
makes its mark on those gathered:  
 
we hear immediately each other’s vulnerabilities, pleasures, dislikes and so 
on; who might struggle more with English as a second or third language, with 
reading itself, with being weary, excited, bored, confused, each body 




I would push this further: not only does each body produce the text differently, but 
the act of reading aloud produces each body as different, whether or not such 
variations are attended to by the rest of the group. Given that for some, tuning into 
these is an important part of the FDRG experience and set up, I wondered how the 
request to speak (or read) louder may have been registered by the rest of the group 
that night. Could it have felt like an imposition by shyer members of the group? 
Those who have quiet voices, dyslexia or insecurity about what they are reading. 
Those for whom English is not their first language. With these considerations, for 
whom are we making the space more accessible by speaking up? Must we speak up 
for the comfort of someone else, forgoing our own? In this moment, whose access is 
a priority? 
 
I will not answer all of these questions, but, at the risk of over-analysing something 
so fleeting, I argue that it is precisely in such moments of attunement that difference 
and sameness are ‘at tension’. I propose that tuning in to the needs and desires of 
others in this way is a kind of ‘listening in’ to the information a voice betrays about a 
body. I chose this term because of its illicit implications, for example, ‘listening in’ to 
a conversation in which you are not participating, even ‘eavesdropping’. Taking a 
standard dictionary definition, to ‘listen in’ is ‘1: to tune in to or monitor a broadcast; 
2: to listen to a conversation without participating in it especially: eavesdrop’ 
(Merriam-Webster 2020). I suggest that, through a conscious practice of ‘listening in’, 
we come to notice subtle differences in ability, need, weariness, emotion, 
enthusiasm, divided attention or disinterest that might be uncomfortable to speak 
about or acknowledge. On this occasion, because they distracted me from the text, 
the things I noticed were precisely a kind of listening or tuning in, while tuning out 
from the text we shared in common.  
 
This leads back to the most uncomfortable distraction to acknowledge as such in this 
context: the innocent chatter of the baby. It would seem to go without saying that any 
feminist group would welcome a mother and baby. And yet, since the baby talked at 
the same volume and pitch as everyone else, it proved extremely difficult to hear, or 
make oneself heard, above its contributions. At times I sensed a frustration at this, 
despite the best intentions of everyone gathered under a feminist spirit of equality of 
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access. Indeed, writing about these distractions has at times felt uncomfortable – 
especially because it is not my intention to denigrate the space created by the 
FDRG, which I found incredibly welcoming, rigorous and productive. Neither do I 
suggest that the group lacks awareness of what is produced in this durational, 
cumulative process of reading. A lot of time and energy is spent reflecting on it, 
leading to wider discursive programmes, presentations and individual and collective 
writing on the group by its members.103 However, in re-reading the reading group 
against the grain, paying particular attention to what seemed to be getting in the way 
of the task at hand, I found the kinds of tensions inherent in any purportedly public, 
accessible space. The thread running through this experience was not only the 
interplay between outside and inside, attention and distraction. Such a focus could 
also lead us to consider or question again: who has access to this space, whose 
access to this space is privileged, and whose is under prioritised or even left out? It 
might seem an ideal kind of access that works for everyone is generally wanted by 
such spaces – but is this ever possible?  
 
What I have been trying to describe thus far is a tension between the ideal form of 
the (feminist) reading group, and my experience of it. Here it makes sense to turn to 
Jacques Rancière’s retelling of the story of an eighteenth-century French school 
master (1987). As the story goes, Joseph Jacotot taught in Belgium without any 
knowledge of Flemish, simply by giving students a text to read in dual translation. 
Having spent time with the Telemachus, teaching themselves French through a 
word-for-word comparison with the Flemish translation, Jacotot asked them to 
explain their thoughts about it in French and was impressed with the sophistication of 
their response. According to Rancière, Jacotot’s ‘method’ positioned the text as an 
object around which everyone can gather with equality of intelligence, if they are only 
encouraged and given space to do so. This is an ideal that the reading group format 
promotes, particularly the FDRG. Here, both reading and discussing is part of the 
session, and participants are encouraged to read and respond in the moment, 
leaving prior knowledge outside of the circle as much as possible. Rancière’s 
retelling suggests that everyone can come to the same text with an equality of 
intelligence. He is also interested in how someone can teach themselves, and 
 
103 See, for example, the ‘Writings’ section of the FDRG website.  
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someone else, something about which they know nothing. As a form, then, the 
reading group enacts a de-hierarchised model of learning, where everyone reads the 
same text (and, in the case of FDGR, at the same time), arriving at it with an equality 
of intelligence and understanding. Ostensibly, the ideal that the reading group strives 
towards is Rancièrian: by gathering around something we share in common, we can 
share our own understanding of it, with equality of intelligence. While I applaud this 
ideal, in reality the Jacotot story reads like a fairy tale because it misses a vital 
ingredient: for everyone to share something in common with an equality of 
intelligence, they must first feel themselves to be equal.  
 
One of Rancière’s key messages is that equality cannot be claimed, but must be 
practised in order to be verified (Ross 1991 pp.xxi–xxii). The kinds of spaces under 
discussion in this thesis, often either implicitly or explicitly, claim to be open, safe and 
accessible, sometimes simply by virtue of being part of a public programme. If the 
organisation or institution creating the space sets the tone, it becomes the 
responsibility of anyone taking part to sustain it. An interesting parallel to the notion 
of practising of equality came via the intervention from the women who’d forgotten 
her hearing aids, also during this session of FDGR. Wherever Carvey had written 
‘they’ or referred to directly to white feminists in her text, this reader decided to say 
‘we’ or ‘us’. With the assumption that others would be in agreeance, perhaps she 
was trying to emphasise the urgency of all the white feminists present in the moment 
of reading to attend to the points Carvey was making, across the gap of almost forty 
years since publication. Changing the words of the text as she was reading clearly 
seemed appropriate to her. However, my interpretation of this intervention was that 
she assumed the role of speaking, or reading for everyone, taking our silent 
attentiveness for permission. Rather than feeling united by, or part of this ‘we’ (which 
ostensibly I was, being white, a woman, a feminist), I immediately wondered how 
everyone else felt about being included, or not. Did her ‘we’ include the men in the 
room? Did it include the minority of reading group participants there who were not 
white? Even if the intervention was intended to be unilaterally inclusive, did these 
individuals themselves feel included, excluded, or like me, a bit awkward about it? In 
addition, changing the pronouns in the portion of text she read was not always easy 
because sometimes she made mistakes. There even appeared to be the author’s 
own occasional slippage between ‘we’ and ‘I’, ‘us’ and ‘them’ when speaking of Black 
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feminists. This led to the reader, and by her implication many of ‘us’, making 
misidentifications with Black feminists, which I assume was not the intention at all.  
 
This particular moment of reading was fraught with a well-intentioned tension. As 
listener and reading group participant, I felt conflicted about her live editing, leading 
me to attend more closely to what I was being asked to identify with. The reader’s 
intervention could be read as a Rancièrian attempt to abolish distance between 
writer and readers, between text and bodies, to practice equality. But, did it achieve 
equality, or not? And how might this even be verified? Despite being well-
intentioned, I felt the ‘we’ and ‘they’ very much ‘at tension’. Are these moments of 
togetherness necessarily a practice of equality? Might they be better rethought as a 




This chapter extends Warner’s claim that publics are produced through ‘mere 
attention’ (2005), to think about the different but simultaneous modalities of attention 
that produce publics and moments of publicness. If the museum is a technology of 
attention, then the public programme, as part of that technology, focuses attention in 
a particular way: through time-bound, collective forms of engagement. As laid out in 
the Introduction and Chapter One, it also normatively serves the neoliberal 
institution, variously addressing a liberal general public or seeking to attract 
neoliberal publics (and sometimes both at once). If we are all part of segmented 
publics to be marketed to and extracted from, what does this say about our agency, 
as attentive subjects? Debord (1967) and Mulvey (1989) might suggest that such 
programming only leaves room for passive spectatorship, but I argue that this is not 
necessarily the case. The de-financialisation of attention, and its reframing as a field 
of multi-directional desiring moments, opens it up to being inhabited and practised, 
rather than directed and controlled.  
 
This is important because the ideal ‘regimes’ of attention (Phillips 2019) the museum 
and contemporary art institution are predicated on, say nothing about the complex 
embodied, emotional reality of both attending and looking away and even seek to 
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banish distraction and inattention. A lack of focused attention, or being prone to 
distraction, are still pathologised and medicated,104 approaches reaffirmed in spaces 
of education and cultural engagement where ‘distraction is often presented as a 
weakness of character […] attention, by contrast, connotes agency and self-
determination’ (Bishop 2018 p.38). For, if we are not attending, then what are we 
doing? According to a normative definition, we are being derailed, pulled off course, 
deviating from what we ought to attend to (Cohen 2018, Phillips 2019). Bishop’s 
focus on dance exhibitions and choreographic practices that incorporate a digital 
logic within their structure, demonstrates that today more than ever, when we are 
present we are also distracted.105 But rather than being a negative development of 
technological advancement, she positions flickering engagement as innate to the 
structure of attending anything suggesting the ‘mental drift’ we experience makes 
space for creative and critical thinking (Bishop 2018 p.39).  
 
In many ways, my detailed accounts of mental drift and derailment in the lecture 
theatre and reading group are conventional, banal even. However, my action of 
filming, photographing and note taking to capture the diffusion of attention made me 
alive to the different ways in which attention underpins public situations. Fleshing out 
multiple, embodied forms of attention, and attending to their economic and ethical 
dimensions led me from studious concentration to joint attention, to promiscuous, 
diffuse and queer forms of attention, to relations of care, distraction and looking 
away. Ultimately, I found that all forms of attentive comportment are present in the 
various formats deployed within the public programme. These are inhabited, parsed 
out and moved between moment to moment. I assert, therefore, that we need to pay 
attention to attention; in doing so we find that it is produced by and in difference, 
through changing modes of desire and distraction. 
 
 
104 For example, children with behavioural symptoms of ‘inattentiveness, hyperactivity and 
impulsiveness’ diagnosed with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder have such behaviour 
‘managed’ with prescription drugs (NHS 2020). So, too, over-attending can be diagnosed as anxiety 
or depression, and similarly medicated. 
105 We might also see this in the constant checking of phones during public programme events. 
Rather than policing this, however, many institutions put dispersed attention to work by encouraging 
attendees to comment online about what they are experiencing during the event itself. 
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Kathleen Stewart’s shimmering vignettes (2007) suggested the promiscuous 
potential of attention, and its capacity to connect us to others in rather uncertain 
ways. This disrupts the normative function of informational exchange and brings 
attention into view as a more complex field of desiring moments, evoked as a 
hovering erotics of attention. The turning and tending of the ear (Home-Cook 2015 
Nancy 2007), allows for a consideration of the orientating function of attention for the 
whole body, linking to Ahmed’s queer phenomenology of orientation (2006). The 
promiscuity of queerly attending, demonstrated by Williamson’s Collapsing Lecture, 
not fully committing, like my fellow lecture attendees, or flirting with the pleasure in 
noticing, are all part of this desiring field. Indeed, as Phillips has asked: ‘what would 
attention be like if it were not like paying?’ (2019). It could be like desiring, or, as 
exampled by Feminist Duration Reading Group experience, it could be a kind of 
‘listening in’, a tuning into and practising of difference, rather than a claim for 
equality. We might then think about the public programme as a space to rethink 
attention rather than direct and control it, and by extension, publicness. I also 
suggest that the queering of attention might be a way to find some agency within the 
neoliberal institution. Either through the distraction discussed above, or paying 
attention to that which is not directly given to our attention. 
 
Guerrilla Girls, WochenKlausur and Maria Eichorn further demonstrate the 
fruitfulness of re-thinking what is given to attention by the museum and 
contemporary art institution, and re-distributing our attention, thereby suggesting 
what we could and maybe should care about. Indeed, the formation of activist group 
Liberate Tate during an art and activism workshop as part of Tate Modern’s public 
programme is just one example of what happens when the public programme 
becomes the space to attend to the museum’s attentional management. When art 
activist group The Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination was invited to run a 
workshop on art, civil disobedience and the museum’s role in climate change in 
2010, according to the Liberate Tate’s website: ‘they were told by curators that they 
could not take any action against Tate and its sponsors’, a mandate ‘policed by the 
curators’ (Liberate Tate n.d.). In what is now an infamous story, workshop 
participants created a performative action against British Petroleum (BP) 
sponsorship in the museum. Several participants subsequently banded together to 
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create the new activist network Liberate Tate. Their stated aim was ending Tate’s 
reliance on oil sponsorship by 2012 through a series of targeted performance actions 
in and around the museum. In 2015, BP announced the end of its twenty-six-year 
sponsorship agreement with Tate. In an article for Art Monthly narrating the events of 
the workshop, John Jordan of The Laboratory of Insurrectionary Imagination 
describes it as ‘pedagogic success beyond anything we could ever have imagined’ 
(Jordan 2010). With the above example, and indeed all the examples in the chapter, 
the passive spectator/active participant binary is shown to represent only the notion 
of ideal attention, and the moralistic lens with which distraction is also treated. The 
genesis of Liberate Tate out of a workshop on Tate Modern’s public programme only 
reiterates Phillips’ point that, ultimately, all regimes of attention fail to control the 
publics they are directed at (2019). Attentional agency is possible within the 
neoliberal institution, despite its careful management. 
 
Focusing on an intimate, yet dominant form of public programming practice – the 
reading group – gave me a different experience of attentional management, failure 
and potential. As a form it may aim to create a community of readers and explicators 
operating on an equal plane. However, my FDRG experience showed this to be an 
ideal, since capacities to either attend or participate are never evenly divided. 
Though we might have an equality of intelligence, we are far from coming to a text 
with an equality of access. We are not disembodied heads coming together around a 
text, but bodies with different abilities, needs and desires. In any group coming 
together there may be hungry babies to feed, football scores to follow, shyness to 
overcome, different capabilities of reading out loud, hearing and listening. All of 
these claims pull us away from, or intersect with, the text. Rancière’s ideal of equality 
of intelligence (1987/1991), therefore, is shown to rely on the liberal notion of a 
general public. As discussed in Chapter One, this liberal notion does not 
acknowledge the differing abilities, capacities and lived experiences of individual 
bodies. Neither can it account for account unearned privilege, and the differences in 
how people perceive themselves or are perceived by others. The Habermasian 
public sphere has equally been heavily critiqued as an ideal, unreal model where ‘all 
subjects are presumed to be equal and equally able to participate in rational-critical 
debate without being prejudiced by self-interest’ (Kwon 2002). Nevertheless, the idea 
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that someone who knows nothing can teach something to someone else, purely by 
virtue of coming around a cultural object shared ‘in common’, is a cornerstone of 
gallery education and public programming, reframed as ‘co-constructed’ and peer 
learning (Pringle 2009). However laudable this ideal is, it still obscures actual 
experiences of attending or gathering around that object. But, if a broad 
understanding of attention is integral to the forms of publicness the public 
programme generates, how might it be drawn to create or discern moments of 
commonality? If attention is a collective act of intersubjective engagement, when we 
are attending together, are we in accord or discord? In the next chapter, I consider 
how attending with difference allows us to come together as ideal communities, or 
not, and how fraught these moments of becoming public(s) can be. Finally, how 
fraughtness itself might be meaningfully attended to through an exploration of how 





Chapter Three – Performing Responsibility: Temporary Communities and 
Performance Art 
 
Community is almost always invoked as an unequivocal good, an indicator of 
a high quality of life, a life of human understanding, caring, selflessness, 
belonging. One does one’s volunteer work in and for “the community.” 
Communities are frequently said to emerge in times of crisis or tragedy, when 
people imagine themselves bound together by a common grief or joined 
through some extraordinary effort. Among leftists and feminists, community 
has connoted cherished ideals of cooperation, equality, and communion 
(Joseph 2002 p.vii). 
 
The ideal underpinning the reading group – that we may come together as equals 
around something shared in common – leaves us with a desirable, but rather difficult 
notion of community in relation to the public programme. If we all attend differently, 
then these differences need attending to – not in order to overcome them, but rather 
to sustain them in relation to one another. There is a possibility that understanding 
our inability to attend in the same way, and come to something as equals, might 
allow us to come together as a community – of difference. However, as the epigraph 
from Miranda Joseph suggests, the ideal community is often imagined to emerge 
through a common experience, or plight, suggesting that there is something 
inherently good about this coming together. As such, community is often invoked as 
a hopeful signifier of togetherness, belonging and collaboration, by all kinds of 
governing and public institutions, including the museum. The public programme 
becomes the place to construct, mediate and sustain these relationships to the 
museum’s communities. Practice has shifted somewhat from talking about 
‘communities’ towards ‘publics’, as the aforementioned rebrand of Checkpoint 
Helsinki to PUBLICS in 2017, under the directorship of Paul O’Neill, demonstrates. 
However, community still puts the friendliness into public, and is widely used to 
frame and imagine positive relations between museums, art institutions and their 
localities. To challenge these notions, I draw on my experiences of two rather 
unfriendly participatory performances by Jamal Harewood and Ann Liv Young. 
These performances invoked the notion of a ‘temporary community’, but unsettled its 




As summarised in my Literature Review, today’s institutionalised community 
practices draw on Owen Kelly’s notion of cultural democracy (Kelly 1984), and the 
community arts scene of the late 1960s that developed ‘empowerment through 
participation in a creative process’ (Pringle 2011 p.1). Practices of community within 
the museum and contemporary art institution also stand in relation to Nicolas 
Bourriaud’s coinage ‘relational aesthetics’ (2002) naming practices that materialise 
social interactions, rather than objects, as art, and Claire Bishop’s contestation of 
their assumed conviviality (2004, 2012). Bishop’s counterargument of social 
practices that antagonise social relations, draws on Jacques Rancière’s diagnosis of 
the problem of spectatorship in theatre as an unresolved anxiety over the gap 
between passive viewing and active participation (2009). What all this suggests is 
that the museum’s incorporation and use of social practices to engage their local 
communities reveals an anxiousness over their active participation; for if we are not 
actively engaged (paying attention to what the museum wants us to attend to), what 
are we doing?  
 
Marijke Steedman (ed. 2012) reviews the social and political role of the gallery to 
consider reasons for the proliferation of programming in relation to immediate social 
contexts. Community is now used across the arts as a short-hand for benevolent 
engagement with marginalised publics: people designated as either local and 
socially disadvantaged, or lacking the cultural capital to attend a public museum or 
gallery of their own accord, as discussed in more detail below. During my time 
working on Tate’s Public Programme, the Community Programme came under the 
same umbrella.106 Adult groups identified as needing extra support to use the 
museum’s collections or exhibitions, are offered workshops with a specialist artist 
educator, and sometimes longer-term projects producing a showcase or one-off 
event for wider audiences. The World is Flooding (2014) with artist Oreet Ashery is 
one example where participants from Write to Life, UK Lesbian and Gay Immigration 
 
106 The Community Curators worked separately to (but sometimes in collaboration with) another Tate 
department called Community and Regeneration Partnerships, who run the programme Tate Local. 
While also interested in locality, the Community strand of the Public Programme (that I was most in 
contact with, being in the same team) focused on groups brought together through common interest 
or experiences, as Joseph suggests above. These included various mental health service user groups 
and art groups working with learning disabled adults such as Intoart and Corali, and Write to Life, a 
group of creative writers supported by refugee charity Freedom from Torture. 
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Group (UKLGIG) and Portugal Prints collaborated with Ashery over several months 
to create a public performance in Tate Modern’s Turbine Hall (Ashery 2014).  
 
Despite the laudable aims, processes and outcomes of these kinds of partnerships 
between cultural organisations, artists and specific community groups, in her book 
Against a Romance of Community (2002) Joseph argues that community and 
communal production is already ‘imbricated in capitalism’ (p.ix), causing a rethink of 
its appearance in the museum. Such programmes might be free to participate in, but 
they are also used to leverage significant funds from government, trusts and 
foundations, and corporate sponsors by diversifying the museum’s audience. In the 
UK, community became a key funding mechanism for museums and arts 
organisations since New Labour, a period of Labour Party government under Tony 
Blair and Gordon Brown from 1997 until 2010 (Belfiore 2020). This might seem 
beneficial, but also relates to the way it has been both instrumentalised, and used to 
‘other’ and set apart certain groups of people from the liberal notion of a general 
public. Thus members and non-members alike may speak of the Black community, 
the D/deaf community, the queer community and so on. While acknowledged as an 
important part of identity formation, such naming allows non-members to call 
‘community leaders’ and whole communities themselves to take responsibility for the 
actions of individual members, a power routinely wielded at the level of government 
and in the media.107  
 
To challenge these multiple meanings and uses of community, especially in relation 
to the public programme, in this chapter I turn my attention to the uneasy feelings 
about participating in Jamal Harewood’s solo performance The Privileged (2014) at 
SPILL Festival of Performance (SPILL) in Ipswich, 2014. On his website Harewood 
describes himself as a ‘live artist who creates temporary communities’ and The 
Privileged is advertised as ‘an audience-led participatory performance that uses the 
excitement of a polar bear encounter to explore race, identity and the community’ 
(Harewood n.d.). I interweave a contrasting encounter with Sherry, a character of the 
 
107 Reni Eddo-Lodge summarises the furore surrounding MP Diane Abbott’s comments on Twitter 
about the British media’s ‘laziness’ in speaking of the Black ‘community’ after the trial, conviction and 
sentencing of Gary Dobson and David Norris for the murder of Stephen Lawrence in 2012 (Eddo-
Lodge 2017/18 pp.93–4). 
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performance artist Ann Liv Young, delivering her trademark Sherapy (since 2009) 
during a panel discussion at the Performance Studies International 18 (Psi #18) 
conference, Leeds in 2012. Though content and method are different, both Young 
and Harewood make similar claims for temporary group or community formation 
within their audiences. During and after taking part in both performances, I wrestled 
with what becoming part of a ‘temporary community’ might mean.  
 
Turning to theory and philosophy, community has been broken down under 
‘Foucauldian theories of the subject as an unstable effect of discourse rather than an 
authentic origin of identity’ (Joseph 2002 p.xxv). If there is no unity in the subject, 
how can there be unity in community? Jean-Luc Nancy has greatly influenced our 
understanding of community in art and curatorial discourses: Grant Kester draws on 
Nancy to discuss social art practices that show community ‘compromised’ by 
‘twentieth-century totalitarianism’ and its fictitious ‘mass identity’, and rendered 
unthinkable by the poststructuralist denial of a coherent self (Kester 2004 p.154). 
Dispensing with belonging to predetermined geographically or identity-based groups, 
Giorgio Agamben also calls for a ‘whatever’ community always in the process of 
becoming (1993). Considering these perspectives on the near impossibility of 
community, I test Harewood’s claim through a detailed account of my conflicting 
feelings about belonging during his performance. But if, like Agamben suggests, we 
focus on community’s emergence, rather than pre-existence, we might see how the 
responsibilities it connotes are key to describing publicness as a process of 
becoming.  
 
This chapter expands the kinds of disruptive moments analysed in this thesis in 
several ways. Firstly, the discomfort I experienced happened by design, aligning with 
the practices Bishop outlines, where antagonism and agonism are privileged over 
conviviality. Nevertheless, I didn’t know how I was going to respond (or not). With 
these examples I explore how an audience’s responsibility is engaged through 
setting them up to participate in, uphold or react against what makes them extremely 
uncomfortable. As indicated, I set these claims for temporary community formation 
against the dominant, positive reading of community that Joseph explores (2002). I 
do this because, as outlined above, the public programme, particularly discursive 
events and those explicitly labelled as part of the Community Programme, draws on 
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this positivity to suggest a particular kind of collectivity that demands certain 
responses. Furthermore, what is often claimed for the public programme in the 
contemporary art institution, is the creation of ‘safe’ spaces for a ‘community’ to 
come together, be present and engage in issues of social import or justice. An 
example issuing from Tate is the collaboration between the Community Programme, 
Community and Regeneration department and external partner Delfina Foundation 
on artist Ahmet Ögüt’s year-long residency. This residency generated Silent 
University (2012): a ‘knowledge exchange platform [...] with group participants that 
have had a variety of asylum, migrant, and refugee experiences’ (Tate 2012) that 
has been extended and hosted internationally.108 The aforementioned Centre for 
Possible Studies used similar models of longer-term engagement in collaborative 
and creative processes between different local groups and communities.109 Within 
such practices the notion of public is doubled back on itself, as specific communities 
or groups are identified, worked with intensively, ostensibly in private, and then 
something, often performance-based, is made public.  
 
These longer-term projects provide some context for the participatory performances 
under discussion in this chapter, and the claims Harewood and Young make for 
forming temporary communities. The other side of this is how participatory 
performance has become an important part of the contemporary art institution’s 
public programme, as a way of extending the range of experiences on offer beyond 
more traditional discursive formats, but also feedback into them.110 The inclusion of 
live art and social practices within discursive frameworks has become fairly standard 
 
108 Including at The Showroom, London (2012); Tensta konsthall and ABF Stockholm (2013), 
Stadtkuratorin Hamburg in partnership with W3 – Werkstatt für internationale Kultur und Politik e.V., 
Hamburg (2014); Impulse Theater Festival in co-production with Ringlokschuppen Ruhr and Urbane 
Künste Ruhr, Mülheim (2015); Spring Sessions, Amman, Jordan and Athens (2015); and a new 
branch was set to open in Copenhagen, 2019 (Silent University n.d.). 
109 During 2015–16, the Centre’s ongoing work with the group Implicated Theatre engaged English 
and Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) teachers and their students from migrant communities 
through a combination of language development and ideas from Brazilian theatre practitioner Augusto 
Boal’s Theatre of the Oppressed, a form of community-based theatre practised for social change, 
developed during the 1950s and 60s (Centre for Possible Studies 2016).  
110 At Tate, this practice has developed through series like Late at Tate Britain (since 2000), festival 
formats like Queer and Now (since 2017) also at Tate Britain, and through the performative symposia 
that framed The Tanks: Fifteen Weeks of Art in Action (2012) at Tate Modern. The latter three 
gatherings Inside/Outside: Materialising the Social, Performance Year Zero: A Living History and 
Playing in the Shadows lasted one or two days and included paper presentations, screenings and 
participatory performances, both announced and unannounced (Tate 2012). 
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public programming practice.111 As previously mentioned, I encountered Ann Liv 
Young’s work during a conference, where one classic paper presentation and two 
performances were followed by a discussion at the end. The Privileged was also 
staged as part of Vivid Project’s Black Hole Club in 2017.112 I argue that the 
uncomfortable nature of the participatory performances under discussion in this 
chapter are crucial to our understanding of the development of the public programme 
as a specific curatorial practice; not only because they readily appear as an 
extended or experimental mode of engagement and learning in a variety of 
contemporary art institutions, but because they model many of the potential issues 
facing it. How do we come together around something, as equals, or not? How are 
our different abilities of attending and responding accounted for, or not? What kinds 
of attachments and desires do we bring to the institution (of whatever size), and how 
are these modulated through the experience of participating? What does my capacity 
to attend and respond say about my individual role and responsibility in such 
moments of fraught, collective public becoming? 
 
As exemplified by Harewood and Young’s participatory performances that are 
designed to unsettle and antagonise, moments of public becoming are never simple; 
they often entail an ambivalence about belonging to a group. I suggest this needs 
attending to if we are to fully understand the connotations of invoking, what Joseph 
calls community’s ‘cherished ideals of cooperation, equality, and communion’ 
(Joseph 2002 p.vii). I unpack in detail my feelings about belonging to, and acting as 
part of a temporary community in these performances. This makes way for 
considering less extreme, but nonetheless fraught moments of public becoming 
created by the public programme, where we are called to critically engage with, 
respond to, or react against injustice.  
 
Since we cannot respond to that which we have not first paid attention, this chapter 
develops out of my discussion of ideal and actual modes of attention, to discuss the 
 
111 As the more recent CAMPUS Fugitive: The Unexpected Beautiful Phrase (2019) at Nottingham 
Contemporary demonstrates. Curated by students from the Curating Contemporary Art MA, Royal 
College of Art, this day-long event took the format of a symposium with several live performances 
happening in and around the auditorium.  




kinds of public programming spaces that are desirable. The preceding chapter 
considered attention in the public programme as beyond an economic model of 
informational exchange, situating it within a fluid, multi-directional desiring field. Once 
we have begun paying attention to how it is produced and distributed by the 
technologies of the institution, difference within the attentional field can be 
considered outside of a normative model of widening accessibility. This allows for 
more subtlety when thinking about frustration, vulnerability, ability, distraction, how 
equal we feel ourselves to be, or not, and the kinds of responses that are permissible 
and possible.  
 
My analysis of The Privileged and Sherapy sheds light on the modulation between 
response-ability and responsibility in several particularly tense moments. The current 
political moment prompted me to analyse more thoroughly my own subjectivity in 
The Privileged, which I participated in six years prior to the final revisions of this 
thesis.113 My unpacking of a disturbing scene of white supremacy created during the 
latter includes some deep excavations of my own whiteness, privilege and fragility. I 
seek to understand how these shaped my orientation and (in)action in this 
performance, bound me to the other white people there in uncomfortable ways, and 
made me deeply ambivalent about being part of any community the performance 
created, temporary or otherwise. I bring this level of detail to draw particular attention 
to the interplay of privilege and responsibility in these performances and ask: given 
the limitations necessitated by the dramatic spectacle, what are the possibilities for a 
real or imagined temporary community to act? Is it really down to individual choice? 
And what is the possibility and potential of refusal? These questions are germane to 
the kinds of spaces created by the public programme but are also relevant to the 
way we live our lives, both privately and publicly. This is because neoliberal 
capitalism perpetuates both the fantasy of the individual and the community, in order 
to make us responsible for our own success or failure, and accountable for others. 
The disruptive moments explored in this chapter are where this impossible bind 
 
113 The 2020 Black Lives Matter protests prompted Harewood to make full documentation of The 
Privileged (2014) that I attended at SPILL 2014 available on his website, which he contextualised 
thus: ‘With all that’s going on in the world, Jamal has decided to release a full version of his first 
performance The Privileged (2014) – a piece that explores ideas of race, identity, and community [...] 
As conversation is important, especially now, a forum has been created for those that wish to discuss 
their thoughts and feelings on the work’ (Harewood 2020).  
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becomes visible, and I suggest that creating a space to reflect on this bind becomes 
another purpose of public programming. 
 
Community and the Museum 
 
Joseph draws on her work with Theatre Rhinoceros in 1980s San Francisco, a 
company that prided itself on representing the city’s ‘gay and lesbian community’, to 
explore the ‘persistence and pervasiveness’ of community. She shows how it is both 
used to speak about, and taken up by, various groups as a term of belonging. 
However, far from an ideal form of social relation, Joseph argues that ‘community – 
the Romanticized “other” of modernity – [...] is deployed to shore [...] up and facilitate 
the flow of capital’. Rather than taking place outside of market relations, ‘our cultural, 
our communal practices are generative for capitalism’ (pp.xxxii–xxxiii), and the 
fantasy of fellow feeling community conjures is really no more than the homogenising 
drive of a ‘disciplining and exclusionary’ logic (p.viii). If neoliberalism has reshaped 
notions of community, Joseph argues that it is impossible to have an idea of 
community beyond capitalism. A history of alternative models would suggest it might 
be possible to think about community beyond market relations, even if only 
temporarily.114 Rather than accepting that community is or isn’t possible beyond a 
capitalist logic of consumption and production, in this chapter I focus on what Joseph 
really calls my attention to: ‘the social processes in which they [communities] are 
constituted and that they help to constitute’ (p.viii). 
 
If community has a complex relation to neoliberal capitalism and government, it has 
an equally complicated relation to the museum and contemporary art institution. 
Community programmes are often set in motion before a new global art museum or 
contemporary art gallery opens, to garner the trust and buy-in of neighbouring 
residents and businesses, whose landscape and prosperity will often be irrevocably 
changed by the gentrification process following its opening (Miles 2015).115 Alison 
 
114 From the seventeenth-century Diggers, to the nineteenth-century Paris Commune and the twenty-
first-century Occupy Movement (Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica 2016 2020). 
115 An example already cited is the Regeneration and Community Partnerships team formed at Tate 
Modern’s inception as a bridge between the ‘local community’ and the mega-museum that 




Rooke (2013) reflects on many of the issues pertaining to this relationship, 
presenting her findings from a workshop bringing together different stakeholders in 
community practices across the arts.116 Rooke outlines the ‘mixed motivations’ of 
arts organisations and institutions working with communities at the outset, which 
include the ‘need to enhance the traditional demographics of gallery audiences 
through “education” “community” or “local” programming’ and ‘an agenda of social 
justice’. This work is broadly characterised by ‘artists working together with, or as 
part of, communities in critical and creative responses to the processes and effects 
of regeneration and gentrification’ (Rooke 2013 p.2). From this perspective, we can 
already see the instrumentalisation of the relationship between the museum, or 
contemporary art institution, and its communities. Sometimes they are sought out 
and engaged by the museum for different reasons. Tate’s Curatorial team has, at 
times, needed to recruit quite specific groups for participatory projects in the 
prominent Tanks or Turbine Hall spaces, at the behest of a high-profile artist.117 To 
Community Programme colleagues, these approaches have sometimes felt like the 
need to ‘source’ an authentic ‘community group’ to participate in a ‘proper’ artwork by 
a big-name artist, without an ongoing concern for the kinds of work regularly 
happening on these programmes. Yet, it has also been the start of some tense and 
fruitful interdepartmental conversations.  
 
Such intra-institutional tensions are richly reflected in Rooke’s report when 
participants ‘noted that institutions often position this [community] “pedagogical” work 
as external to the main work of curation’ (p.4). Such attitudes can result, perhaps 
unsurprisingly, in ‘[t]he work of gallery education and “local” departments of larger 
galleries and arts institutions aimed at increasing cultural “inclusivity” through “art 
education”, “community” or “local” programming’ being shown to be ‘socially and 
symbolically creat[ing] an impression of more diversity than actually exists while 
maintaining institutional status quo’ (p.4). Moreover, ‘such “diversity” work 
participates in and reproduces the hierarchies of institutions which allow racism and 
 
116 Rooke identifies these as ‘artists, commissioners, researchers, educationalists and practitioners 
from community development’ in her report on the workshop Curating Community? The Relational 
and Agonistic Value of Participatory Arts in Superdiverse Localities (Rooke 2013 p.2). 
117 For example, for Suzanne Lacy’s Silver Action (2013), groups of older women who had been 
involved in activism and protest in the UK between the 1950s and 1980s were wanted, leading to 
conversations reflecting on the nature and intention of such engagement with colleagues who worked 
more regularly with these groups. 
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inequalities to be overlooked’ (p.5). Interestingly, participants also commented that 
‘local community’ is often short-hand for ‘working class community’ (p.4). As Rooke’s 
workshop participants also found, the othering implications of community often used 
by art organisations and commissioning agencies are an equally powerful tool of 
oppression:  
 
working class, migrant and ethnic “others” [...] are frequently invoked when 
discussing “community arts” and “community engagement” but are rarely 
present in arts institutional conversations about the relationship between 
galleries and communities (Rooke 2013 p.5).  
 
I do not aim to discredit these programmes; I believe in their social justice agendas, 
and highly respect programmers whose work and skill-set is frequently overlooked 
by the institutions they work for, and by curatorial discourse. My aim is to draw 
attention, following Joseph, to the way in which community is invoked and drawn on 
by the museum and its extended spaces. I do this to set up a comparison with its 
deployment by the performances I discuss later, and ask how community might be 
rethought in relation to the demands of becoming public within and without 
institutional settings.  
 
An Encounter with ‘the Arctic’s whitest apex predator’  
 
At midday on Saturday 31 October 2014 a group of forty people gathered in the hub 
venue of SPILL 2014 – Ipswich’s old police station – were led downstairs to a dirty 
basement strewn with food packaging and chicken bones, where a circle of chairs 
had been arranged. We were the audience eagerly, somewhat nervously, awaiting 
Jamal Harewood’s The Privileged to begin. Inside the circle, a large figure dressed in 
a cheap and grubby polar bear costume appeared to be sleeping. On several chairs 
lay envelopes: I chose to sit on one with an envelope marked ‘5’, somewhat excited 
by what this might mean. When everyone was seated, the person with envelope ‘1’ 
opened it and began reading. She announced that we’d entered the Arctic polar 
bear’s enclosure and were ‘privileged to be spending time with this rare animal’. 
Would we like to know more about polar bears, or proceed with the performance? 
After a short deliberation, the group elected to know more, and were instructed to 
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read the contents of envelope ‘2’. Among other facts, we learned the polar bear’s 
name was Cuddles and he was ‘the Arctic’s whitest apex predator’, whose thick 
white fur covers black skin, allowing it to absorb warmth from the sun. The reader 
told us we must now nominate another ‘encounter member’ to wake him; someone 
duly volunteered and poked the bear tentatively. Cuddles began to stir – so far, so 
good. We then heard that he might be a little grumpy on being woken up, but not to 
worry, because he was really a friendly bear that would greet everyone in turn. 
Titters of nervous laughter broke out as Cuddles began nudging, pawing and sniffing 
his way around the circle, giving way to shock for some as he lurched onto their laps 
with a force shoving them back suddenly in their chairs.  
 
As the performance wore on the audience were asked to nominate further ‘encounter 
members’ to carry out tasks and were called on to make decisions as a group, 
volunteer individually or work in small teams of two or three. Each of these 
interactions allowed us to, ‘[b]e one of the privileged few to say they have pet, played 
with, and fed a polar bear as if you were one of the Arctic keepers’, in keeping with 
Harewood’s description of the work on his website. With this greeting ritual complete, 
we were invited to play Cuddles’ favourite game ‘Predator and Prey’ and advised 
that it was prudent to let him win at least twice. With some excitement we elected the 
leader of the game and began playing, which proved energising and fun. Next, the 
bear’s costume had to come off, which revealed the naked body of the performer: a 
tall and muscular Black man with long dreadlocks. The woman elected to perform 
this task was rather shy about touching his bare skin; when her attempts to peel the 
costume off, which he resisted, became too awkward to watch, others came to her 
assistance.  
 
Later came feeding time; two encounter members were asked to retrieve buckets of 
fried chicken and a bowl of water from the corridor. Cuddles must now be instructed 
to eat the food, and another woman volunteered to take this task – perhaps thinking 
(as I did) that it sounded relatively simple – surely, he would now be hungry? 
Standing in front of him though not meeting his height by several inches, she began 
calmly commanding: ‘Eat. Eat. Eat!’. As he stared back defiantly, her high, thin voice 
became increasingly desperate. Feeling rather uneasy by now, I felt a creeping 
sense of shame at her failure and contemplated offering her my help. However, not 
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knowing how this would be possible without amplifying and prolonging the disturbing 
racial dynamic of this scene, I stayed in my seat. After several excruciating minutes, 
Cuddles sat down solemnly and began tearing at the chicken hungrily. In a tight 
silence we watched a naked Black man crouching on a dirty floor eating greasy fried 
chicken from a bucket. The performance appeared to have lost any lightheartedness 
or humour with which it began, the racist stereotypes we all participated in creating 
having reached their culmination. But if this was painful to watch, Harewood had 
more in store: the next envelope told us that Cuddles’ food must be rationed. 
Advised to take care removing it in case he became aggressive, it eventually took 
three men to wrest the food from the snarling bear-man, one of them jumping on his 
back to bring him down. During this latest task, a woman in the audience had begun 
to cry quietly and suddenly embraced him. Whether this was in solidarity with his 
plight, or an additional attempt at control in aid of fellow encounter members was 
initially unclear. When she returned to her seat audibly sobbing, those immediately 
next to her offered comfort. Despite this puzzling outburst of emotion – that at first 
seemed too theatrical to be genuine – she did not leave the circle. Later I wondered: 
was she personally involved with the artist? Or so affected by the scene that she 
chose to make comforting physical contact? Was she a ‘plant’? 
 
Responsibility and Response-ability 
 
The Privileged is a complex work that asks audiences to examine their complicity in 
structural racism and white supremacy. With several tense climaxes that left me 
distinctly uncomfortable about what I had been part of, and had allowed to happen in 
front of me, I left the room feeling stunned and exhilarated by the experience. 
Despite understanding what the performance was about, what struck me the most 
was how it held space for so many different responses. Coming to write about it 
some years later, I read the performance through the notion of ‘response-ability’, a 
hyphenated word bringing emphasis to the ‘response’ and ‘ability’ of responsibility. It 
was first introduced to me during a performance lecture by the artist Daniel Oliver 
hosted by The Bad Vibes Club in 2016, who drew on the appearance of this new 
term in the work of theatre and performance scholars Hans-Thies Lehmann (2006) 
and Rachel Zerihan (2006). For Oliver, the notion of response-ability acknowledges 
that the capacity and possibility to respond in a participatory performance will vary 
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from person to person. In his experience, individual response-abilities sometimes 
exceed the implicit boundaries of participatory performance work and are not always 
accounted for by the curation, and critique, of participatory performance practices, or 
indeed the artists that create them. As I hope to remedy with my extended analysis, 
the formation of complex projects into critical case-studies often only alludes to the 
dynamics at play.118 Oliver explained that his own work leaves space for varied 
responses, which can result in a shared awkwardness and uncertainty as to what 
should happen next for everyone. This approach draws on Oliver’s experience of 
living with dyspraxia – a neurological condition affecting movement and coordination 
skills – where he has learned to deal with the social awkwardness that comes with 
not always responding appropriately or doing things in the right order. Another 
inspiration for this approach is the neurodiversity movement, that re-positions 
bipolar, autism, dyspraxia and other neurological conditions as variations on ‘normal’ 
brain function that are generative of diverse forms of self-expression, rather than 
casting them as pathologies or disorders in need of a cure. Oliver sees the 
awkwardness produced in his performances when not knowing which way to turn (in 
line with Kotsko’s analysis discussed in Chapter One) as a kind of productive third 
way between the convivial inclusion of Bourriaud (2002) and the antagonistic 
alienation of Bishop (2004). For Oliver, the awkwardness we experience in the 
situations he sets up can open up a space for something unexpected or off-script to 
happen.  
 
Oliver’s analysis and usage of response-ability is built on its brief appearances in 
theatre and performance studies, where it is still relatively under-theorised. However, 
the term readily crops up in other fields such as self-help, psychotherapy and 
business coaching. In my research I found a coaching company called Response 
Ability, with the strapline ‘Propelling People Potential’ (Response Ability 2020), and 
many definitions offered by business coaches and psychotherapists. For example, 
management consultant and business coach Fred Kofman defines response-ability 
as ‘your ability to respond to a situation’. Unlike Oliver, Kofman frames it as 
individual ‘choice’, because, he writes, ‘your responses are not determined by 
 
118 Examples where these are given more space include the evaluative research of Elaine Speight 
(2019) and Cara Courage (2017) around ‘place-making’ practices in urban environments, where art 
and creative processes are used by artists and local communities to create a sense of place. 
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external circumstances or instinct. They depend on external factors and inner drives, 
but you always have a choice. As a human being, you are an autonomous (from the 
Greek, “self-ruling”) being. And the more conscious you are of your autonomy, the 
more unconditioned your responses will be’ (Kofman n.d.). Though recognising that 
‘external circumstances’ play a role in our responses to situations, Kofman’s 
emphasis is very much on aligning response-ability with individual, conscious 
‘choice’ and ‘autonomy’. The implication is that such awareness builds our muscle to 
make more ‘unconditioned’, authentic and empowered responses.  
 
It’s interesting to note that when spoken out loud it can be difficult to differentiate 
between responsibility and its corollary ‘response-ability’. The power of the 
hyphenated mutation lies precisely in this slippage, bringing about a shift in sense 
that is catchy and appealing, yet anchored in familiar concepts of seriousness, 
maturity and morality. Psychotherapist Tina Tessina writes on her website:  
 
Often, people react to the idea of responsibility […] as though an angry parent 
were standing over you saying, “Who’s responsible for this mess?” […] Adult 
responsibility […] is really response-ability; that is, the ability to respond to life. 
Rather than placing blame, this way of thinking acknowledges personal 
power. Response-ability is the capacity to choose […] Response-ability is 
remembering to be in charge (Tessina n.d.). 
 
Like Kofman, Tessina shows that ‘response-ability’ brings a particular awareness to 
our capacity to respond in a given situation, recognising the choices we have. As the 
therapists, self-help and business gurus suggest, it is also about taking responsibility 
for our decisions and actions. Ultimately, it is about being ‘in charge’ and control, 
forming a more resilient, self-reliant and accountable subject. In this way, response-
ability forms a corollary with the attention economy: various situations and possible 
responses vie for our attention all the time. It is up to us to assume responsibility for 
our ability to both attend and respond, or not. 
 
The wider, social implications for these understandings of responsibility and 
response-ability take on a murkier quality in the age of neoliberal capitalism, or 
neoliberalism. Under this political and economic ideology, free markets and 
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privatisation are encouraged to flourish, government intervention in business is 
discouraged and public spending is reduced to free up the circulation of capital and 
maximise profit. Neoliberalism turns public services into private markets where it is 
claimed competition will attain higher quality provision for service users, or clients. 
Favouring the enterprising individual – the entrepreneur – the accretion of vast 
individual wealth under neoliberalism is possible only for a small few, and crucially, 
impossible for the vast majority. George Monbiot calls neoliberalism the economic 
policy that dare not speak its name, because not only is the term now 
overwhelmingly used pejoratively, but its pervasive power lies in it being a nameless 
force (Monbiot 2016).  
 
Judith Butler shows how under neoliberalism responsibility loses its nuance between 
self and other, becoming a paradox forcing marginal peoples to live in ‘induced forms 
of precarity’ (Butler 2015 p.11): 
 
each of us is only responsible for ourselves, and not for others, and that 
responsibility is first and foremost a responsibility to become economically 
self-sufficient under conditions where self-sufficiency is structurally 
undermined. Those who cannot afford to pay for health care constitute but 
one version of a population deemed disposable (Butler 2015 p.25).  
 
If individuals are ultimately responsible for themselves, those that fail are not only 
beyond the help of wider society, but can be blamed for their helplessness. 
Neoliberal capitalism’s strategic deployment of responsibility does not end with the 
individual; it also relies on, and instrumentalises, our hopeful belief in community. In 
the UK, Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron’s flagship policy of his first 
office (2010–15) was the ‘Big Society’, which proposed to empower local 
governments and communities by devolving state power and responsibility. A 
document issued by the Cabinet Office outlined a programme of policies in support 
of the Big Society, stating: 
 
[w]e want society – the families, networks, neighbourhoods and communities 
that form the fabric of so much of our everyday lives – to be […] given more 
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power and take more responsibility […] [so that] we achieve fairness and 
opportunity for all (Cabinet Office 2010).  
 
It was widely recognised as a thinly-veiled excuse for reducing government 
spending, rolling back state-funded public services and the distinctly unfair use of 
what Dave Prentis, General Secretary of Unison, called ‘volunteers as a cut-price 
alternative’ (2010). Cameron’s Big Society enjoyed little success and disappeared off 
the political agenda fairly soon, but the notion of devolved responsibility and 
collective culpability is still very much alive. More recently, the post-Brexit 
referendum rhetoric of 2016–18 that included the oft-repeated phrase ‘the people 
have spoken’ was an arguably more successful mantra. Designed by the political 
right and echoed by the left, the phrase instrumentalised a ‘general public’ of ‘the 
people’ to call a community of British voters into being. Whether or not they voted for 
Brexit, or even voted at all, this imagined community was made collectively 
responsible for the consequences of a referendum, which many favouring the 
‘remain’ campaign argue was based on falsehood and whipped up anti-immigrant 
sentiment.  
 
This harsh brand of collective responsibility-taking, which proliferated through the 
self-governing rhetoric explicit in self-help, business management and 
psychotherapeutic discourses around response-ability, puts us in charge of our 
responses, successes and failures meaning that individuals and communities may 
be blamed for their failure and, ultimately, their social exclusion. Of course, it is 
widely acknowledged that without failure, neoliberalism cannot flourish. Jen Harvie 
(2013) writes that the effect of neoliberal ideology is to ‘aggressively promote 
individualism and entrepreneurialism and pour scorn on anyone unfortunate enough 
to need to draw on the safety net of welfare support’ (p.2). Furthermore, in the 
essential relationship between neoliberalism and inequality, the latter is generated 
not as an ‘unfortunate by-product’ but as a necessary condition: ‘[f]or neoliberalism 
to thrive, competition must be cultivated, so social inequality must be too’ (Harvie 
2013 p.81). 
 
In these conditions Harvie is skeptical as to whether participatory art and 
performance can really produce the ‘fellow feeling’ that may sustain ‘people’s shared 
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exercise of power’ and keep neoliberalism’s ‘unreserved self-interest’ in ‘check’ (p.2). 
Instead she suggests that social practices ‘contribute to neoliberal governmentality’ 
by exacerbating ‘inequalities more than they diminish them [...] effectively limiting 
how much agency they actually divest to their audiences’ (pp.3–4). In addition, when 
audiences are expected to complete the work of art through their participation, this 
sets up a parallel with the precarity of the flexible labour market and the rise of the 
‘prosumer’, who, consciously or unconsciously, becomes involved in producing what 
she consumes. According to Harvie, the potential cost of such ‘audience-led’ (to use 
Harewood’s term) art and performance, is not only the displacement of skilled 
workers who might otherwise be employed, but also the fact that this low or unpaid 
work permeates the prosumer’s leisure time, emotional and social life (pp.52–53). 
Such a parallel also recognises that these audiences are not simply volunteering 




In contrast with the approaches from coaching and psychotherapy, Oliver’s use of 
response-ability acknowledges that different people have varying capacities of 
response, that aren't always under their control or choice. For Oliver, response-ability 
is only partly consciously directed, and he creates situations that make space and 
give permission for a diversity of responses, rather than asking, or empowering, 
audiences to take responsibility for their part in a situation. However, Harvie’s 
understanding of the relationship between responsibility and neoliberalism, read 
through participatory art and performance, questions whether any agency is actually 
divested in audiences at all. She also raises the spectre of the prosumer, who is not 
fully aware of the implications of her involvement in producing the culture she also 
consumes. So how do participatory performances make us feel like we do have a 
choice, or agency, within them? 
 
Moving from the macro to the micro, performance scholar Rachel Zerihan writes 
about response-ability in the intimate scene of Keira O’Reilly’s Untitled Action for 
Bomb Shelter (2003). In the iteration Zerihan participated in, the one-to-one 
performance took place in a room containing a large mirror and a television with live 
feed that looped the action of the room back on itself. Before entering the room, 
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Zerihan was handed a written invitation to make a small cut on the artist’s skin with a 
scalpel. When in the presence of O’Reilly, Zerihan was confused and nervous, but 
realised that she wanted neither to make a mark, nor cover up another’s with the 
plasters that are also provided. Instead she finds another mode of response than the 
options on offer, gently placing her hand on some of the fresh wounds. The artist 
responds in return with tender approval: ‘“What you’re doing is lovely” she said. I 
didn’t know what I was doing’ (Zerihan 2006 p.8). 
 
Responsible for placing herself in this risky predicament, when presented with the 
opportunity to play her part in the performance, Zerihan does something apparently 
off-script. At the same time as feeling impotent and not in full cognitive grasp of her 
response to the situation – ‘I didn’t know what I was doing’ – Zerihan instinctively 
does what feels appropriate, in accordance with an ethics of responsibility towards 
the artist as another person whom she wishes neither to physically harm, nor offend 
via a refusal to participate in their performance. Not burdened by the fear of having 
to perform the right action in front of other audience members, perhaps the 
possibilities of response are multiplied by the intimacy of the scene? From the 
description of her thought process, though, it’s clear Zerihan is still concerned with 
doing the right thing by the artist. But in this intimate exchange, the possibility of 
refusing the invitation to cut, or place a plaster on, O’Reilly’s skin seems just as 
viable as accepting it, or doing something else. What Zerihan reflects on is a tender 
moment between two people, without a fourth wall; and yet this is still a performance 
and not a real exchange. Or is it? For me, Zerihan rather uncritically elevates her 
sense of response-ability here, because although she appears to have found a 
unique response to the artist’s offer, in one-to-one performance often what feels 
intuitive and special might well be a common iteration. What is interesting to take 
forward is how the intimacy of the situation appears to magnify both the options and 
compulsion to do the right thing in line with the artist’s intentions. Despite Harvie’s 
critique of participatory performances as often more limiting than empowering, 
Zerihan feels there is room for another response, other than what is offered to, or 
expected of her, because it was met with tender approval by the artist. But what 
other responses might have been possible – what if Zerihan had refused to do 
anything at all? How does the uncomfortable reminder from Harvie that she has paid 
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for the privilege of volunteering her attentive and emotional labour affect what we are 
led to believe is an intimate, tender and authentic exchange?  
 
In it Together 
 
If what feels like response-ability could be a false assumption of conscious choice 
and troubles the agency in this scene, then it also affects how we might think about 
the actions of Harewood’s ‘temporary community’. Despite a mounting unease at the 
increasingly disturbing scenes created through the instructions we carried out, I was 
sure that each new task would be undertaken by someone. Could it be that The 
Privileged enabled (and relied on) individual response-abilities? Was there a shared 
sense of responsibility to carry out the work asked of us, no matter how difficult, 
because of some kind of communal solidarity? Or simply a common commitment to 
the institutional conventions of being a good audience that goes along with the 
demands of the performance, holding on to the knowledge that they are not acting in 
‘real’ life?  
 
Hans-Thies Lehmann writes about the disturbing disconnect between images that 
are produced by the media and their affective reception, and what theatre might offer 
to remedy this: 
 
[t]heatre can respond to this only with […] an aesthetic of responsibility (or 
response-ability). Instead of the deceptively comforting duality of here and 
there, inside and outside, it can move the mutual implication of actors and 
spectators in the theatrical production of images into the centre and thus 
make visible the broken thread between personal experience and perception 
(Lehmann 2006 pp.185–86).  
 
Suggesting the mutual implication and complicity of actors and spectators in the 
production of images, Lehmann disturbs the relative comfort and safety of sitting in 
the audience. His ‘aesthetic of responsibility (or response-ability)’ means that an 
audience is, in fact, making a scene as they watch it. Offering a new angle on the 
prohibitive dynamics of the ‘fourth wall’ in theatre, if what is being portrayed offends 
us or goes against our values, this suggests that we should do something to stop or 
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change it. If we don’t, then the sense of shame and guilt for doing nothing can really 
be felt, and not so easily dismissed.  
 
If, as posed earlier in this chapter, under neoliberal capitalism, the ultimate value of 
any community is that it is responsible for, and accountable to, itself, what kind of 
community creates scene after scene of racial stereotyping and white supremacy, 
while feeling deep unease with it? The root of my unease at watching my fellow 
encounter member, a clothed white woman, commanding Harewood, a naked Black 
man, to eat, was certainly a sense of shame and guilt. I felt that the disturbing, 
dehumanising racial dynamic set up between Harewood and the audience member, 
was perpetuated by her commitment to completing it. But it was also perpetuated by 
my (our?) inaction. Underlying my desire to put a stop to it, was something more 
disturbing and harder to admit even to myself: a sympathetic shame at her failure to 
make him eat. Realising that my sympathies ought to lie with Cuddles – or 
Harewood, as he now unmistakably was without his bear skin – I struggled with 
some shame about my shame. While I felt complicit in perpetuating an appalling 
scene of white supremacy by passively watching it unfold in front of me, the longer I 
watched, the more responsible I felt for prolonging her public humiliation at failing to 
make him eat through my inaction.  
 
Lyn Gardner (2014) has written about theatre and performance works, including The 
Privileged, where audiences are offered more responsibility than usual to make 
decisions that drive the action forward. She describes mixed feelings about being 
placed in situations that test her moral compass, and that can result in audiences 
enduring in public what they might condemn in private, for the sake of the 
performance and the performers. Participating in National Theatre Wales’s 
Bordergame (2014), in which she and other audience members were cast as 
refugees travelling from Bristol to Newport, who are refused entry to the 
‘Autonomous Republic of Cymru for having false identity papers’, Gardner writes: 
 
The possibility of trying to organise a rebellion, rise up against the border 
guards and break free crossed my mind. There was very little to stop us. But I 
also worried that, in doing so, we’d be disrupting the performance. How would 
164 
 
the actors respond? Was the show fluid and flexible enough to embrace such 
an audience response? (Gardner 2014). 
 
The ethics of response-ability here turns on whether or not the work is structured to 
withstand an unforeseen reaction from its audience, which plays no small part in the 
action. Later on, however, Gardner reveals that her concern for how the actors might 
handle an ‘uprising’ is actually concealing her fear of making a spectacle out of her 
over-identification with the issues at stake in the performance:  
 
in a public situation the urge to do the right thing, conform and not make a 
spectacle of ourselves remains strong. If that weren’t the case… traditional 
theatre would be plagued by continuous walkouts. Instead, people slip away 
quietly at the interval – from a desire not to draw attention to themselves as 
much as respect for the actors (Gardner 2012). 
 
In this excerpt from Gardner, there is a tension between understanding the theatre 
space to be a microcosm of our private/public worlds, in which we should act in 
accordance with our ethical position, and an understanding of ourselves as part of an 
audience who are responsible for helping realise the potential of the theatrical piece, 
which is outside of the usual terrain of public life. This bind is part of the meta-rules 
of temporary community participation that Gardner is already very aware of, yet it still 
presents a dilemma. On this particular occasion, Gardner’s desire to conform with 
what’s expected of her, in front of her fellow audience members and the actors in the 
play, overrode her discomfort with the ‘image’ she was jointly responsible for making. 
What she highlights is that conforming to the rules of the theatre space in general, 
and of particular participatory performances that extend or create new rules, is often 
portrayed as wanting to ‘do the right thing’; but it is also about preserving your public 
image. Not ‘showing yourself up’ as the uneducated person who doesn’t realise that 
this is only ‘pretend’, or the overly emotional person, who puts their feelings in a 
situation above their rational assessment. Or both, like the person who fled 
Collapsing Lecture visibly upset. And yet, the limitations that Gardner describes, 
which I also felt in The Privileged, were not so for everyone else, particularly the 
woman who cried and embraced Harewood in what appeared to be a show of 
solidarity with him. The feeling of having the cultural/social capital to act in 
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accordance with your own desires, seemingly ‘off-script’ within these situations, 
might be compared to those who feel themselves equal enough to participate in the 
reading group discussed in the previous chapter. 
 
Like Gardner, my desire to do the right thing was partly what curtailed my ‘response-
ability’ and kept me silently watching: I was part of a dramatic spectacle and my 
primary responsibility was towards Harewood as an artist, to go along with the 
instructions that furthered the narrative of his performance, however uncomfortable 
they might be. Not only that, I had a responsibility to comply with the rules of 
theatrical performance, not to ruin it for my fellow audience members. Following 
Lehmann, though, my discomfort suggested I should have intervened to bring this 
scene somehow to a close. But what would that have revealed: an over-identification 
with the deplorable racial dynamic that I take to be real, rather than constructed? Is 
not wanting to show yourself up in front of the majority, and wishing to act in 
accordance with its rules, what makes the audiences to The Privileged a temporary 
community? Or, is it that the difficulty of the tasks that produces the crisis out of 
which, Joseph suggests, community is widely thought to emerge: ‘when people 
imagine themselves bound together [...] through some extraordinary effort’ (Joseph 
2002 p.vii)? Perhaps our sense of being in it together, in a disturbing, difficult 
situation, made us want to help each other out and feel part of something greater 
than ourselves. The question that is hardest to answer: What was it that bound me to 
the woman commanding Harewood to eat, that made me want to help her? Was it 





It could be that all of these aspects of communal audiencing created an 
uncomfortable sense of community for me. Like Harewood, the artist Ann Liv Young 
has also theorised how people respond to her performance work, as individuals and 
collectives. Young’s work also works her audience, manipulating them and 
deliberately creating an uncomfortable space, which left me with similarly mixed 
feelings about what I had participated in. Coming to performance and theatre 
through a dance training, where she was ‘taught to ignore the audience’ (Young in 
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Earnest 2014), Young now takes a forensic approach, noticing and involving them in 
her work, most notably as her character Sherry. In her Sherapy performances (since 
2009), Young appears as the trashy Southern-belle alter-ego Sherry, dishing out 
questions and analysis to her audience as a radical and aggressive form of therapy – 
hence the play on words in the work’s title. Not knowing anything about Young’s 
work, I witnessed a rampant Sherapy session when I attended the panel discussion 
Self-gratifiers: feminist appropriations in the performances of Narcissister and Ann 
Liv Young during PSi #18 in Leeds, 2012. After a performance by Narcissister and a 
more traditional paper presentation, Sherry appeared dressed in a blonde wig, heels 
and a tight pink dress. Before addressing her audience, she took the mic and 
ensured that it was turned up full volume. What followed was, without doubt, my 
most traumatic and hated performance art experience yet, not least because I felt ill-
informed about the nature of encounter the audience would be subjected to. The 
conference programme described the panel discussion that included two 
performances as ‘combining live performance with critical presentations’ (PSi #18 
2012), without mentioning the discomfort that might ensue.119 Searching for 
promotional material about Young’s work online, I similarly found no informative copy 
about the content of her performances, but did come across frequent references in 
interviews with Young herself about shocked venue curators and upset audiences. 
 
Sherry began introducing us to her tacky, brash persona by singing a pop song and 
telling anecdotes from her childhood growing up in North Carolina and I was lulled 
into a false sense of security that this might be a funny performance. It wasn’t long, 
however, before she began targeting individuals in the audience, starting with a 
woman in the front row whom she asked a series of probing questions around her 
masturbation habits. Later to a man seated in the middle next to the aisle she 
enquired: ‘Are you gay? You seem gay. Have ever you had sex with a man?’ I was 
already shocked at the intimacy of what seemed (at best) irresponsible questioning, 
at worst bullying, when she ended this particular interaction with, ‘Have you ever 
 
119 The full copy read: ‘Narcissister and Ann Liv Young juxtapose the degraded object (tacked-on 
merkins, ill-fitting ball gowns) with strategic nudity and bodily abjection (faeces, perspiration, urine) in 
performances of self-pleasure. Joined by Narcissister and Ann Liv Young themselves, and combining 
live performance with critical presentations, this panel asks, what are the politics of a feminist 
economy of self-gratification?’ (Performance Studies International 18 2012) 
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been abused?’ Sitting in stunned silence, feeling appalled and ashamed for those 
who’d already been subjected to Sherapy, I was genuinely afraid of becoming the 
next target and aware that I was blushing visibly. It seemed almost inevitable then 
that her analysis eventually came my way. ‘You! The blonde in the back row. Who 
are you?’ She left a short pause, in which I failed to respond. Next she fired, ‘What 
do you want to be?’ and with my cheeks burning hot, I managed to mumble 
something indistinct about being a curator or writer, admitting pathetically that I don’t 
really know yet. ‘You don’t even know who you are! What’s wrong with you? How do 
you expect to get anywhere?’  
 
Perhaps I should have been grateful at being arbitrarily spared the humiliation of 
disclosing my sexual preferences and experiences. But I couldn’t feel anything 
except acute shame and hurt at having my lack of self-knowledge and confidence so 
ruthlessly exposed. Internally raging, I wanted desperately to walk out in protest, but 
I was too afraid to make any kind of movement that would attract her attention and 
bile again. When the performance was over, Sherry took off her wig and Ann Liv 
Young joined the other panelists for a discussion. In response to questions about 
what happened during Sherapy, I felt Young answered as aggressively as Sherry 
might have done: revved up by her performance she didn't seem in the mood to 
discuss it critically. Locked into my own seething state of heightened emotion I 
assumed everyone hated Sherapy as much as I did. A friend sitting next to me also 
seemed uneasy, but she had managed to utter that if Sherry were to share 
something about herself, it might help others open up too. Considering my abject 
failure to protest at what was happening, I felt the bravery of her offering. But I don’t 
think Sherry heard, or else didn’t want to acknowledge it. Later we discussed our 
mutual unease at the ‘performance’ we were subjected to, and I felt a little comforted 
that others must have disliked it as much as I had.  
 
However, much to my surprise, during a seminar the following day a different friend 
publicly praised Young for her performance. ‘You silenced everyone!’ he said, ‘that 
never happens. It was brilliant!’ The realisation that he had enjoyed Sherapy and 
found something redemptive or useful about it was, at first, too painful to 
comprehend. Not wanting to credit the performance with any proper consideration or 
scholarly attention before now, initially I even struggled to write about it in this thesis. 
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I approach it now, firstly to unpick how reaching the limits of my response-ability in 
Sherapy – of being ‘silenced’ – was linked to my assumption that everyone felt the 
same fear and anger as me. Sara Ahmed (2004) uses a similar mistaken assumption 
of there being a ‘shared feeling in the room’ to discuss the complex ways in which 
emotions circulate. Against theories of affective contagion, Ahmed says that 
emotions may move between subjects, but are not passed from one to another like 
property where the emotion has the same quality for each owner. She writes that 
during tense experiences of togetherness:  
 
[s]hared feelings are at stake, and seem to surround us, like a thickness in the 
air […] But these feelings not only heighten tension, they are also in tension 
[…] we don’t necessarily have the same relationship to the feeling […] shared 
feelings are not about feeling the same feeling (Ahmed 2004 pp.10–11).  
 
Could it have been that my friend felt fear of Sherry and was rather thrilled by it, 
whereas my relationship to fear that afternoon had a deeply shameful quality? 
Coming to terms with my mistaken assumption of a shared feeling in the audience, I 
realise my uncritical rejection of Sherapy was also a way to invalidate and dismiss a 
rather traumatic experience, painting it as her desire to bully others in the guise of 
‘performance art’. Attempting a more nuanced exploration of my emotional reaction 
some years later prompted me to find out more about the differing ways other 
audiences and individuals have responded to Sherapy. In a co-authored paper about 
her performance at the World Psychiatric Association Congress in 2014, I found an 
intriguing analysis by Young herself on the formation of temporary groups and 
alliances within her audiences: 
 
One coping tool for the audience is to band together as a group […] [and] 
treat Sherry as a threat. Individuals within the group will challenge Sherry and 
try to minimise her by highlighting her otherness – for example […] You don't 
have formal training, so you are not qualified to talk about therapy, etc. These 
bold individuals try to use specifics of the group to discredit Sherry, and in 
doing so, offer Sherry a platform to build her status […] Then new groups form 
in the room – those supporting and engaged with Sherry, and a small group of 
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holdouts from the original anti-outsider group (Spiess, Strecker and Young 
2015). 
 
These astute observations show a certain fluidity between individual and collective 
responses in her audiences: groups form in opposition to Sherry and support of one 
another, crucially, led by certain ‘bold individuals’ who decide to challenge, or 
support her. Young’s own descriptions of the fraught exchanges between Sherry and 
the other artists booked to perform before her, members of the audience, ill-informed 
organisers shocked by what happens, frequently refer to their authenticity: ‘The 
curator just kept saying afterward “I didn’t expect it to be real”’ (Young in Earnest 
2014). In an interview with Young, Jarrett Earnest (2014) alludes to the slippery 
boundary between Sherry and Young, performance and reality: ‘People just think 
that Sherry is you. How do you see the differences between Sherry as a character 
and you as a person?’ Though Young describes Sherry as ‘loosely based on my 
mother’ who mandated a culture of silence about what happened at home, she 
insists on being very different. In fact, Young wishes she was more like Sherry, who 
asks and says the things she cannot: ‘[w]hen I’m Sherry I can undo [my politeness]’ 
(Young in Earnest 2014).  
 
Young describes a variety of responses to her work, that include verbal attacks and 
even physical violence. But despite their extremity, she explains why she always 
wins the battle: ‘“Sherry is indestructible. Her show cannot be ruined. There’s this 
idea in theatre that… people have to like the performance. And Sherry’s just like, 
“Fuck all of you. This is my show”’ (Young in Katz 2011). Young’s reference to 
‘theatre’ is pertinent because her practice hovers between theatre, performance art, 
dance (Young's original training) and by her definition, therapy. However, theatre 
being one of the more conventional disciplines she is involved with, she notes that 
people bring certain expectations to it, one of them being to be entertained – ‘people 
like to have a performance’. But Young’s work does not adhere to disciplinary 
boundaries: she is invited by dance, theatre and performance venues and festivals, 
as well as contemporary art institutions such as MoMA PS1 (2010). She is equally 
unconcerned with playing by the rules of any of these spaces. In her flouting of the 
rules, her relinquishing of structure and control, I argue that she exercises an even 
greater hold over what happens. The sense that the show cannot be broken – 
170 
 
indeed that it might not even be a show – might be enabling of more varied 
responses than The Privileged, which, though unpredictable, was structured to 
progress through certain scenes towards an end designed by the artist. However, 
through informal conversations with peers, reviews and Harewood’s own accounts I 
also learned of all manner of heated discussions, flat refusals to participate, 
accusations of racism and even physical fights breaking out.  
 
However different their approach, both Harewood and Young demonstrate their 
privilege as artists: to work their audiences and, certainly in the performances under 
discussion, make their audiences work for them. Andrew Haydon’s review tells how 
‘things got interesting’ when ‘our discussion *became* the content’ (Haydon 2015). 
Alice Saville underlines this, writing that ‘[e]very performance of The Privileged is 
totally different: with full audience compliance, it could be done in half an hour, but 
most dissolve into heated group discussions or stand-offs or walk-outs’ (Saville 
2017). Indeed, the way that audiences are put to work, to volunteer for tasks, stand 
up for themselves or support one another, troubles the line between performance 
and reality in these works that surprises even the artists themselves. In one 
interview, Harewood remembers a performance where his audience were ‘following 
the instructions quite blindly’ until ‘one woman kind of jumped in front of me, arms 
out, and shouted “just stop, guys”. She stopped it all and said “it’s a human, and it’s 
always been a human. We shouldn’t be doing this.” [...] And that action still sticks 
with me’ (Harewood in Grace 2017). In another interview, Saville references a 
striking moment she witnessed when an audience member, who was also a 
performance maker, refused to comply, which led to a fruitful collaboration with 
Harewood on his next performance Word (Saville 2017). Like Young’s assessment 
of her own work, Haydon writes of The Privileged that these occurrences prove that 
‘the piece itself doesn’t get broken by people suddenly refusing the instructions [...] 
The way that the audience is situated by the title as *the privileged* [...] ensures that 








The Responsibility of Privilege, The Privilege of Response-ability  
 
The Privileged asks audiences to consider their role in perpetuating racist 
stereotypes, violence and social structures: will they blindly do what is asked of them 
and dehumanise Harewood by removing his polar bear costume, forcing him to eat 
fried chicken and then taking this food away? Or will they refuse, walk out, discuss it 
or do something else? In other words, how will they use their privilege?  
 
In the interview with Earnest, Young insists that, however they use it, they must do 
something. Recounting a story of attending a performance by Rebecca Patek during 
a stint at the American Realness festival, Young says that, since she was in between 
her own Sherapy performances, she went in costume. Patek’s piece was a 
contemporary dance performance about rape and HIV, which began with one of the 
performers handing out slips of paper asking for audience feedback. Presumably this 
feedback was meant to come in written form at the end of the show, but unable to 
contain her contempt for the work, Young as Sherry stood up and yelled hers out 
loud during the performance:  
 
I […] walked across the stage […] and said, “This is crazy. This show sucks. I 
have a question for you: Have you actually been raped?” […] finally [she] said, 
“You clearly have rape issues.” I just said, “Yes I do. I hope everyone here 
has rape issues.” […] Everyone was just silent. Then Sherry looked at the 
audience and said, “Look at you guys, you’re white, you’re young, you’re 
Williamsburg hipsters, you’re probably all her friends and you are perpetuating 
bad art – this is a waste of time. You don’t need to make this: you need 
Sherapy and I’ll be at my table all night,” and I left (Young in Earnest 2014). 
 
Exemplifying Lehmann’s ‘aesthetic of responsibility (or response-ability)’, Young 
insists that audiences are duty bound to react authentically to theatre and 
performance: ‘it is a privilege and a responsibility to be an audience member and I 
will not be […] complacent […] Deep in my heart I felt what she was doing was 
wrong, and when you feel that you have to speak up’ (Young in Earnest 2014). 
However the slippage between ‘I’ and ‘Sherry’ all over this passage appears to be 
the crucial factor in enabling Young to respond as bravely and ferociously as she did 
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to something she felt ‘deep in [her] heart’ was ‘wrong’. As Young previously stated, 
she doesn’t play by the rules of any of these spaces, but she does acknowledge that 
‘it takes [for some audiences] a minute to adjust [to Sherry] and figure out how to 
feel’ (Young in Earnest 2014). Does her ‘indestructible show’ leave room for more, or 
less capacities for response? As audience members in the theatre, we usually 
inhabit a role that permits silent ‘enjoyment’ (or endurance) of a performance until 
points where collective laughter, clapping, and other noises are collectively judged 
permissible (either when the performance elicits them, or at moments such as the 
interval or end of the performance). As discussed in Chapter Two, making coded 
noises in the right places are essential to signalling to other audience members and 
the performers that we are paying attention (Home-Cook 2015). Such coded noises, 
referring back to Bourdieu's notion of habitus (1984), also signal that we have the 
cultural capital to understand and adhere to the rules of this cultural venue in the first 
place. Dialogue with performers ‘on stage’ when you are in the audience rarely 
happens, unless specifically solicited. As such, ‘speaking up’ when you feel 
something is wrong isn’t perhaps as easy as Young professes, and as Gardner 
highlighted above, can easily backfire. Public programmes, like the panel discussion 
I attended where Young was performing, have similar rules to the theatre, though 
these are ostensibly more relaxed. Dialogue between those ‘on stage’ and those in 
the audience is usually permitted during a discrete question-and-answer session. 
Given the lighted room of the lecture theatre that I encountered Sherry in, and the 
fact that she was roaming around directly engaging with individuals, her performance 
as part of a panel discussion, at first glance, invited a more active dialogue 
throughout. Calling for audiences to recognise their privilege, Young demonstrates 
that it comes with responsibility. What she doesn’t seem to reflect on is that her 
rather extreme response-ability in Patek’s performance might not be an example of 
using audience privilege responsibly.  
 
Emboldened by wearing the mask of her character Sherry infamous for her 
outrageous and offensive outbursts, undoubtedly one performance acts on another. 
Though she claimed to be ‘in between shows’, Young also leaves with the parting 
invitation to the audience to join her at her ‘table’ where she would be ‘all night’. One 
definition of privilege is having ‘special rights or advantages that most people do not 
have’ and ‘the opportunity to do something that makes you feel proud’ (Hornby 2005 
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p.1200). Rather than her privilege as an audience member, could it in fact be 
Young’s privilege as an artist that emboldens her to speak out? Privileged 
information is also that which is ‘known only to few people and legally protected so 
that it does not have to be made public’ (pp.1200–01). Sharing the Latin root ‘priv-’ 
with many other adjectives and nouns, privilege is very close to ‘privy’, incidentally, 
an old English word for toilet, and of course ‘private’. To be ‘privy to’ something is to 
be ‘allowed to know something secret’ with the example of the Privy Council being 
the ‘group of people who advise the king on political affairs’ (p.1201), who were 
originally those special individuals admissible to the king’s ‘toilet’, or private quarters. 
These additional nuances show how privilege connotes favourable intimacy, 
bordering on privacy, and exclusive access for a ‘privileged few’. Given the Patek 
incident is not the only example of Young publicly critiquing another artist’s work as 
her character Sherry (Squibb 2010), is she, in fact, demonstrating her powerful 
entitlement, and favourable intimacy, as an artist? 
 
Harewood’s conferral of special status on his audiences, and how they chose to use 
it, highlights a different nuance of privilege. When taken full advantage of, privilege 
might have remarkable and terrifying consequences, as discussed in the story 
above, yet its acquisition is often unremarkable: In The Privileged, it is conferred 
through the simple act of purchasing a ticket to a performance. Discussions on white 
and male privilege since the 1980s have sought to uncover the workings of what 
Peggy McIntosh called ‘unearned advantage’ and ‘conferred dominance’ (1988). 
McIntosh detailed her observations of male privilege in academia, and her own daily 
experiences of white privilege as a middle-class American woman. The list sheds 
light on the oppressive systems of privilege and disadvantage in operation that 
remain influential to discussions around race and class today.  
 
Despite these ongoing discussions, it is still hard for many white people to 
acknowledge what McIntosh calls their ‘unearned advantage’. McIntosh 
acknowledges how the idea of privilege can be ‘misleading’ since ‘[w]e usually think 
of privilege as being a favored state, whether earned, or conferred by birth or luck. 
[...] [It] carries the connotation of being something everyone must want.’ Anger and 
indignation commonly springs from the fact that, as mentioned above, privilege 
refers to ‘special rights or advantages’ or the ‘opportunity to do something that 
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makes you feel proud.’ How can something that brings advantage and pride belong, 
for example, to a white working-class person who feels themselves to be at a 
disadvantage, economically and socially? Looking at the negative effects of 
unearned privilege makes it less desirable. As McIntosh writes, ‘privilege simply 
confers dominance, gives permission to control, because of one’s race or sex. The 
kind of privilege that gives license to some people to be, at best, thoughtless and, at 
worst, murderous should not continue to be referred to as a desirable attribute’ (p.6). 
Negative and unwanted emotional states such as guilt and shame are also likely to 
come when reflecting on the fact that Black and Brown people might have worked 
harder in their education or career than a white person. But the ultimate privilege of 
white privilege is the ability to shrug off these emotions and continue without 
addressing or changing anything.  
 
Tracing my own relationship to white privilege brings up a childhood experience with 
similar feelings of shame and complicity, which I faced watching Harwood being 
commanded to eat. Called to the front of the classroom in my primary school 
alongside my cousin, who is of mixed white British and Iranian heritage, our teacher 
first asked me, then my cousin, to count to twenty. When I succeeded and he failed, 
the teacher asked why his younger cousin could count all the way to twenty and he 
could not? I felt angry and hurt that my ability was used to discredit and shame 
someone I loved. Without being able to name it as racism, I remember the 
unfairness of this negative treatment. It aligned with the many other ways we, as 
children, were made to feel that his mixed heritage and darker skin colour counted 
against him, both at school and in the home we shared. I also recall feeling acute 
shame at my acquiescence to counting in front of an audience of our classmates; my 
pride at succeeding, which was subsequently used to mark his inability; my standing 
still and silent while the teacher praised me and shamed him. In this moment, white 
privilege made me feel anything but proud, and yet it was also an originary 
experience of my specialness. 
 
McIntosh famously described white privilege as ‘an invisible package of unearned 
assets that I can count on cashing in each day, but about which I was “meant” to 
remain oblivious’ (p.1). Despite my early awareness of racism at home and at 
school, my white privilege is not something I have reflected much on until more 
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recently. Tracing its operation in Harewood’s performance, then, begins before the 
moment I walked into The Privileged. My membership of a performance-literate 
cultural elite initially gained me access to the polar bear’s enclosure. Familiarity with 
this art form and the capacity to confidently decode it afforded me the confidence 
and curiosity to buy that ticket in the first place. Going further back, my white, middle-
class background, though not financially rich, gave me access to cultural and 
educational experiences on which I built my career in the arts, where my whiteness 
and non-descript English accent has certainly opened doors for me. In addition, I 
have no physical or learning disability that prevents me from participating fully in this 
particular performance, if I want to. Tracing the operation of my privilege and other 
forms of skin differencing that bound me to other members of my ‘community’ within 




Skin is a loaded metaphor in The Privileged. Before we have entered the work, the 
promotional shots of Harewood stripped to the waist with just the polar bear head 
covering his face reveal his Blackness. The content of the second envelope read 
aloud informs us that we are to meet the Arctic’s apex predator, whose dazzling 
white fur covers black skin. As Cuddles greets us, we glimpse a patch of Harewood’s 
naked skin peeking through a large hole at the seat of the cheap polar bear costume. 
The audience member who volunteered to remove his white fur did so extremely 
tentatively, shying away from touching Harewood’s skin as far as possible. In casting 
himself as an animal crawling on all fours, tasking the audience with taking away his 
clothing, feeding him, denying his food and not speaking throughout, Harewood 
plays with many dehumanising anti-Black stereotypes through the objectifying lens of 
primitivism. This now unfashionable term allowed white artists, critics and cultural 
consumers to appraise, and desire, Black artists and their work from the early 
twentieth-century onwards. As an art historical term, it was used to ‘describe the 
fascination of early modern European artists with what was then called primitive art – 
including tribal art from Africa, the South Pacific and Indonesia, as well as prehistoric 
and very early European art, and European folk art’ (Tate n.d.). But it had much 
further reaching implications for the white enjoyment of Black music, performance 
and social life than the mere ‘fascination’ with art objects. Drawing on Hal Foster’s 
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explanation of ‘the underlying dynamics of primitivism’, art historian James Smalls 
has written that: 
 
[o]n the one hand, there is an explicit desire to break down the cultural 
oppositions of European and “primitive” culture and nature, as well as the 
psychic oppositions held to underlie them: active and passive, masculine and 
feminine, heterosexual and homosexual. On the other hand, there is an 
insistence on maintaining these oppositions. These conflicts of desire occur 
because the primitivist seeks both to be “opened up to difference” (i.e., racial, 
sexual, social, cultural) and to be “fixed in opposition” to the other so as to 
have mastery over it’ (Smalls 1998 p.88). 
 
Through this prism, Harewood plays most potently with the Black male body as 
image, and a very loaded one at that. An abiding image of The Privileged for me is a 
tall, muscular and naked Black man standing squarely in front of the much shorter 
and slimmer, clothed white woman, defying her instruction to ‘eat!’ Identifying with 
the white woman standing in front of Harewood, I felt intimidated by his imposing, 
defiant presence as if I was her. Despite the disturbing scene unfolding, I imagined 
struggling with my fear of him, coupled with the desire to look at his unclothed body. 
While the four reviewers of The Privileged I reference here (all white, three of them 
women) talk about structural racism in the work, none refer to how white supremacy 
has constructed the Black male body through the binary lens of primitivism, as both 
desirable and threatening, to white womanhood in particular. It may be painful to 
admit, but watching them standing so close, I felt both unnerved and excited by their 
proximity. Perhaps most shamefully, I felt angry with Harewood for putting her – me 
– in that position. Because that would mean I was subjecting him to something the 
other reviewers do not mention: my white gaze. 
 
Psychiatrist and political philosopher Frantz Fanon seminally theorised his 
experiences of skin difference in Europe, where his encounters with white people 
and their imagination ‘sealed’ him ‘into that crushing objecthood’ of being the Black 
other (Fanon 1986 p.109). Fanon’s writing on the white gaze, through which he 
began to see himself, has been highly influential for articulating and generating 
discourse around a phenomenon that constructs Blackness in relation to a white 
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standard, with far reaching implications for racialised bodies and their production. 
Malik Pitchford (2020) demonstrates how it demands what Black artists (of all 
genres) produce be consumable, understandable and relatable to white people. This 
is routinely exemplified when white audiences feel entitled to sing the lyrics of their 
favourite Black artists at concerts, refusing to omit any of the racial slurs. But as 
suggested by Smalls’ reading of primitivism, the white gaze has other desires. 
Investigating the sexual objectification of Black bodies, Afua Hirsch’s explorative 
critique of swingers’ clubs and events centred around white hetero-sexual couples 
that want to have sex with Black men, shows the white gaze is bound to a primitivism 
that constructs the Black male body, in particular, as hypersexual and supremely 
physically endowed (Hirsch 2018). Rebecca Edwards has chronicled how such 
hyper-sexualisation was used by white southern politicians in early twentieth-century 
America to construct white women as ‘angels’ vulnerable to Black men’s aggressive 
sexuality, justifying white supremacist agendas (1997 p.140).  
 
That white women learned to use the power conferred on them is perhaps not 
surprising. White women’s fragility has, in 2020, come under the spotlight through 
several mobile phone recordings of its weaponisation circulating the internet. These 
include Christian Cooper’s video of Amy Cooper (no relation) threatening to call the 
police and tell them there was an ‘African-American man threatening my life’ after he 
requested she keep her dog on a leash in the bird-watching area of New York’s 
Central Park. Such examples of white woman fragility have been critiqued and 
chronicled by journalists, writers, and rapidly circulating memes such as the ‘Karen’ 
archetype that satirises a middle-aged, middle-class white American woman who 
exercises her power to ‘call the cops’ (Lewis 2020). While humour has played a part 
in this critique, Charles M. Blow writes of his rage at ‘white women weaponizing 
racial anxiety’ (Blow 2020). 
 
While semi-aware and uncomfortable about my white gaze during The Privileged, I 
didn’t fully understand its connection to white woman fragility. Nevertheless, the 
intricate histories of how Black bodies must be differently orientated to, and towards, 
white bodies as a matter of survival (Nielsen 2011 Section 2) was very much alive in 
the moment I perceived Harewood ‘squaring up’ to the white woman as both 
intimidating and exciting. Harewood’s stance in this scene is also unusual. As trauma 
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specialist Resmaa Menakem has outlined, in most social situations ‘[Black bodies] 
genuflect to white comfort, because we know, when white people get nervous, 
people lose their jobs, […] people get hung from trees’ (2020). Perhaps the feeling I 
could not admit at the time was, in fact, anger towards Harewood, for putting this 
white woman in a humiliating, highly racially charged and threatening scenario. I 
could not have understood, much less written this at the time, but I was even angry 
at Harewood for forcing an awareness of my white gaze that constructed him as both 
dangerous and desirable. I also didn’t want to feel my whiteness binding me to 
others in uncomfortable ways. If it was the fact of our white woman fragility held in 
common, more than our common audience membership that made me want to come 
to her aid then maybe this was the temporary community I was really part of. And 
what if it was named as such? Would individual members of the white community, as 
suggested in my introduction, become accountable for the words and actions of 
other community members? 
 
Of course The Privileged does not play to exclusively white audiences, and this is 
part of its power. However, Harewood does find their responses more predictable, 
whereas, ‘“[w]ith a black person, there’s very mixed reactions. At SPILL festival, one 
guy just like sat back and said “I get what you’re trying to do, you don’t need to do it 
anymore.” Then another black person the same day saw that, but decided it wasn’t 
enough to sit back, he wanted to make me stop the performance”’ (Harewood in 
Saville 2017). Haydon (2017) and Grace (2017) both note that the greatest privilege 
of all might be to refuse to participate, to leave the room and avoid implication in 
what is going on. But, as the artist himself states, you won’t be stopping anything, 
unless you can convince thirty-nine other people to follow you (Harewood in Grace 
2017). Could carrying out the tasks, and feeling conflicted about it, be where the 
learning is? Could understanding oneself to be part of a community, while feeling 
deeply ambivalent about it, be where agency actually lies?  
 
Theatre as Ideal Community  
 
As well as drawing on the various discourses circulating around community, 
Harewood’s work revisits an ongoing criticism of theatre. It is either reproducing the 
gap between action and passive spectatorship, or producing the ideal community. 
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However, Rancière (2009) explains that this perceived problem with spectatorship in 
the theatre is, in fact, constitutive of it. Lehmann’s call for spectators and actors to be 
mutually accountable for the production of images in the theatre has concerned 
philosophers, critics and playwrights since Plato wishing to activate or find some 
intentional agency in the distance between actors and spectators (p.3). But theatre 
relies on the presence of passive spectators, who wait to be shown things. 
Therefore, ‘to be a spectator is to be separated from both the capacity to know and 
the power to act’ (p.2). Rancière references Bertolt Brecht and Antonin Artaud’s 
attempts to reduce the distance between action and passive spectatorship, to 
activate, implicate and involve spectators in the spectacle (p.8). However, he 
fundamentally questions the assumptions about spectatorship and theatre that these 
moves are predicated on. There is a ‘network of presuppositions… equivalences 
between theatrical audience and community, gaze and passivity, exteriority and 
separation, mediation and simulacrum; oppositions between the collective and the 
individual, the image and the living reality, activity and passivity, self-ownership and 
alienation’ (p.7). Implied by this network is the idea that by abolishing the distance 
between passivity and activity – through active participation of the audience in the 
spectacle – theatre can become a kind of ideal community. One that is responsive 
and, by implication perhaps, responsible. Rancière even finds this idea inscribed in 
an invitation for a speaking engagement:  
 
the Sommerakademie that welcomed me put it like this: “theatre remains the 
only place where the audience confronts itself as a collective” […] It signifies 
that “theatre” is an exemplary community form. It involves an idea of 
community as self-presence, in contrast to the distance of representation 
(Rancière 2009 p.6). 
 
What allows the community to recognise itself is ‘self-presence’, a kind of publicity 
where gathered individuals see themselves as coming together for a common 
purpose or shared experience. The community is present to itself in that it can see 
itself, recognising that a different kind of communing happens in the theatre than 
other spaces of entertainment such as the cinema. Here, too, attempts have been 
made to rethink the experience of watching films in the cinema as a mutable 
experience of collectivity. Julian Hanich (2010) describes an oscillation between an 
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individual and collective experience marked by noises such as coughs or 
incongruent laughing. At such moments, we are made aware that we are watching 
with others, who either share our affective responses, or remind us that they are 
experiencing the film differently from us. In this sense, you become an individual 
through being in public. But when we knit ‘self-presence’ to attempts to overcome 
distance through participation, what we have is a drive towards finding collective 
agency in spectacular situations, that, at the same time, ‘emancipates’ the individual. 
Rancière writes that ‘[s]ince German Romanticism, thinking about theatre has been 
associated with this idea of the living community… the community as a way of 
occupying a place and a time, as the body in action as opposed to a mere apparatus 
of laws’ (Rancière 2009 p.6). According to this logic, then, theatre as ideal 
community is also the path to individual emancipation. We might call this self-
sovereignty: the responsible and response-able subject. The exponential rise of 
participation in theatre and performance could be working towards this end, drawing 
on the set of equivalences and oppositions that Rancière describes.  
 
However, rather than trying to abolish the distance and passivity of spectatorship in 
theatre Rancière argues that spectating is, in fact, an activity, and the gap it 
produces is a necessary one of equality. Rather than seeing a need for breaking 
down distance and difference, the theatre allows us to be, paradoxically, ‘apart’ and 
‘together’ in a ‘community of sense’ (Rancière 2009 pp.57–59). This chimes 
with Nancy’s reading of community as ‘being-in-common’ a ‘strange being-the-one-
with-the-other’ (Nancy 1991 p.xxxix) without a pre-existing set of definitions and 
exclusions. As Rancière shows, the gap is as necessary to theatre as the traditional 
pedagogical model where the teacher is always one step ahead of the pupil: ‘he can 
only reduce the distance [between ignorance and knowledge] on condition that he 
constantly re-creates it’ (Rancière 2009 p.8). More than this, any attempt to 
emancipate the spectator such as forms of pedagogy that eradicate distance only to 
recreate it through the exercise of the inequality, do not empower the spectator with 
any more agency than if they’d been left in their seats. For Rancière, such a distance 
between actors and spectators in theatre holds: ‘the third thing that is owned by no 
one, whose meaning is owned by no one, but which subsists between them, 
excluding any uniform transmission, any identity of cause and effect’ (p.15). In this 
gap that is equally shared, not created in hierarchy of the one who knows and the 
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one who is yet to know, Rancière finds the potential for something not designed or 
designated by either artist/actor or spectator to occur. It is also where spectators are 
actively working on their understanding of the relationship between fiction and reality, 
as both individuals and a collective, and learning from it. 
 
Myriad ways to participate now proliferate across all forms of spectacular 
entertainment – from TV talent shows inviting viewers to decide the fate of 
contestants, to immersive theatre companies such as Punchdrunk casting audiences 
as authors of their own unique experience. What might the proliferation of 
participation in these spectacular structures signify? In her introduction to the 
anthology Participation (2006), Claire Bishop revisits Rancière to argue that ‘the 
binary of active/passive always ends up dividing a population into those with capacity 
on one side, and those with incapacity on the other. As such, it is an allegory of 
inequality’ (Bishop 2006 p.16). As already drawn on, Harvie has also asked whether 
participatory art practices offer anything more than ‘a dangerous “distraction” from 
the social inequalities they claim to critique’ (Harvie 2013 p.3). There is also a wider 
sense that participation, belonging to and contributing to a community, might 
ameliorate our sense of disempowerment within political structures, but without 
actually doing anything about it. I would argue that Rancière, Bishop and Harvie’s 
critical awareness of the anxiety surrounding the ‘passive optical relationship’ 
(Rancière 2009 p.3) has to do with the neoliberal imperative towards constant, 
visible productivity: ‘the idea that art has to provide us with more than a spectacle, 
more than something devoted to the delight of passive spectators, because it has to 
work for a society where everybody should be active’ (Rancière 2009 p.63). 
 
Conclusion – The Ambivalence and Intimacy of Belonging 
 
Community finds its way into every corner of our social lives as a placeholder for an 
ideal kind of social belonging. The special place it holds in our hearts (because deep 
down, most of us want to belong somewhere), means that community may be 
invoked and instrumentalised by institutions such as the museum, school, places of 
worship, and overarching all of these, the state, leading Joseph to suggest that 
community cannot be disentangled from capitalism (2002). Because being part of 
The Privileged and Sherapy felt anything but good, I used my uneasy feelings about 
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participating in these performances to challenge the dominant positivity of 
community and show how the claims made by artists and contemporary art 
institutions of different scales, converge individualism and personal accountability 
together with powerful notions of belonging and collective responsibility. Looking in 
detail at these ‘response-ability’ activating forms of participatory performance, 
refusing participation and implication in unpleasant, oppressive or violent social 
structures is shown to be the ultimate privilege.  
 
I have also undertaken an excavation of my own whiteness in relation to my 
experience of The Privileged, and its role in creating community where I didn’t want 
to see it. As Robin DiAngelo has suggested, the myth of individualism that upholds 
white supremacy (2018), also prevents the imagination of a white community that 
may be held accountable for the racism it perpetrates and perpetuates. If neoliberal 
capitalism relies on the strategic deployment of individuality, it also counts on our 
belief in community and social belonging, not only so that it can profit from its 
production, but because communities, like individuals, can be made responsible for 
their own social inclusion or exclusion. Powerful systems of oppression – white 
supremacy, structural racism, hetero-normativity, ableism, neoliberal capitalism – are 
not only interconnected, but rely on the implementation of individualism, community 
and responsibility to create a fantasy of safety and equal opportunity for some, that, 
in fact, relies on the inequality and oppression of others. If the recent ascendance of 
the Black Lives Matter movement has called on white people to realise their 
complicity in white supremacy and work towards dismantling it through being actively 
anti-racist, this chapter speaks to the need for unpicking how particularly fraught 
moments of publicness are navigated in order to support this work.  
 
It was not my intention to appraise The Privilged or Sherapy in this chapter, rather to 
examine what both experiences afford. My mistaken assumption around shared 
feelings in Sherapy speaks to the oscillation between individual ego and the 
collective intentionality invoked by being part of the ‘we’ of Young’s audience. Any 
such invocation of community in these performances, therefore, turns away from a 
celebratory model, towards a togetherness that acknowledges complexity and 
potential ambivalence about belonging. Such ambivalence may or may not be 
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voiced, but it doesn’t mean you are not participating. In fact, Joseph describes her 
position as researcher at Rhinoceros Theatre with a similar ambiguousness:  
 
[m]y position [...] allowed me to remain silent in moments of conflict and to 
remain present even when I was uncomfortable with the choices made by the 
staff and board. However, my notes often reveal my unvoiced feelings, trailing 
off during heated discussions in which, though silent, I was deeply involved 
(Joseph 2002 p.x).  
 
The pervasive sense of discomfort and unease I felt in Harewood and Young’s 
performances, though punctuated by some notable surges of negative feelings like 
fear, anger and shame, belongs to what Sianne Ngai terms ‘minor negative feelings’ 
like ‘envy, anxiety, paranoia, irritation’ in the book Ugly Feelings (2005 p.2). Ngai’s 
practice of mining ‘ambivalent situations of suspended agency’ (p.1), is helpful to 
think alongside the experiences in this chapter. Describing such negative feelings as 
‘explicitly amoral and noncathartic’ Ngai highlights their persistence saying they are 
‘defined by a flatness or ongoingness… [and have] a remarkable capacity for 
duration’ (pp.6–7). The nagging persistence of uncomfortable feelings indicates our 
critical ego at work, and their layering produces a critical awareness of their 
appearance as we feel them. My double sense of shame during The Privileged 
certainly chimes with what Ngai writes about the production of an ‘unpleasurable 
feeling about the feeling’ and their capacity for ‘ironic distance’ (pp.9–10). I suggest 
that the ironising capacity of ugly feelings might be thought of as a non-normative, 
but equally productive mode of operating in the gap between spectating and 
participating that Rancière and others have critiqued. This is because, when 
encountering violence in the theatre – whether we understand it as actual or fictional 
– we are experiencing these ugly feelings in the presence of others. Julian Hanich 
suggests that through certain ruptures in the experience of public viewing we 
become aware that our thoughts and feelings might be different from those around 
us (2010 p.12).120 Like my shame about shame, or my assumption of shared feelings 
 
120 Hanich quotes the philosopher Hans Bernhard Schmid: ‘“[i]t seems that in everyday life, we 
experience only very few of our conscious states as our personal conscious states. In fact, it seems 
that we take our conscious states to be our own only where we have reason to think that our 
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in Sherapy that showed themselves to be false, these experiences are jarring 
because they are happening in public, but also because they unsettle any easy 
assumption about our place within a public. 
 
I have suggested that Young’s forceful use of her privilege as an audience member 
to speak against and discredit Patek, might actually have been the favourable 
intimacy of one artist speaking to another, however acrimonious. In a postscript to 
his interview with Young, Earnest writes about her public humiliation of Patek at 
American Realness festival, insisting that Young ‘is forcing a certain type of 
accountability, which I believe in, even though it is done through tactics I abhor [...] 
What is shocking is that no one stood up to defend Patek; blaming [the curator] Pryor 
is an empty accusation that only aims to dismiss the audience members’ individual 
obligations as human beings. It reveals a deeply internalized desire for the ultimate 
safety of an institution while purporting to “admire” transgression’ (Earnest 2015). 
The latter insight recalls the public’s attachments to care, safety and the ‘curative 
intervention’ of the paternal, liberal institution explored in Chapter One. Earnest 
suggests that the safety often demanded of institutions is, in fact, masking our own 
individual agency and accountability for creating and maintaining the kinds of spaces 
we want to be part of. However, as Alexander and Margarete Mitscherlich identified, 
belonging to a community is an inherently ambivalent experience that calls for the 
individual to ‘[adapt] to the “objective realities” of his society’, for the avoidance of the 
‘unpleasure’ that speaking out against them will bring (1975 pp.245–46). If, like 
Gardner who regretted passively watching Young reduce a fellow audience member 
to tears (2012), these performances create communities we might feel ambivalent 
about taking part in, they also raise important questions about the desire for 
institutions to provide safe spaces in which to discuss the issues they raise.  
 
Sarah Schulman (2017) writes that safe spaces often come at ‘the expense of other 
people’. She cautions that ‘[t]he concept of “safe space” can also be a projection in 
the present based on dangers that occurred in the past [...] It is used by the 
dominant to defend against the discomfort of hearing other people’s realities, to 
 




repress nuance, ignore multiple experiences, and reject the inherent human right to 
be heard’ (p.154). This circles us back around to the fallacy of comfort and 
accessibility of spaces for everyone that has been proliferated by the museum and 
its extended spaces until rather recently. Indeed, one of the most urgent questions 
around public programming to have emerged in the four years since I began this 
research is around whether or not a ‘safe space’ is ever possible, or even desired. 
Practice has shifted from claiming ‘this is a safe space’ at the beginning of some 
discussions, to stating clearly that it is not, towards the aim of creating ‘brave 
spaces’, influenced by developments in educational discourse and practice (Palfrey 
2017, Arao and Clemens 2013). As Arao and Clemens have argued through a 
review of their pedagogical work on social justice, the term ‘safe space’ often serves 
to conflate safety and comfort, which ‘may arise in part from the defensive tendency 
to discount, deflect, or retreat from a challenge’ (2013 p.135). Indeed, what feels like 
safety for one person, might feel risky or dangerous for another, especially in 
conversations around race. One reason for this is that the oppressions and 
inequalities that exist in any mixed group of people coming together for a 
conversation will not simply be erased by a claim for ‘safety’. Moreover, as Resmaa 
Menakem has said, most spaces are organised and orientated around ‘white 
comfort’ (Menakem in Tippet 2020), and we may add to this able-bodied, cis-
gendered and heteronormative comfort. The creation of truly safe and accountable 
spaces, then, might in fact begin by feeling like an unsafe or uncomfortable space for 
the white, able-bodied, cis-gendered, heterosexual people in the room. Might they be 
better articulated as ‘brave’? And how might we perform responsibility and response-
ability in the creation of ‘brave’ spaces to counter and deconstruct white supremacy 
and other oppressive systems? Might this necessarily involve de-privileging those 
who usually have the most ability to respond, and reorientating responsibility in the 
institution towards accountability? I return to these questions in the following chapter, 
and my thesis conclusion. 
 
In this chapter I have unpacked my experiences of two performances that felt 
radically unsafe, highlighting my privilege and responsibility as an audience member, 
and a white woman. I do this to test their claim for temporary community formation 
and extrapolate the implications for brave spaces within public programming. I argue 
that in these participatory performances our intimate thoughts, feelings and attitudes 
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about what it really means to live collectively are made, sometimes shamefully, 
present to us. If we can reflect on these, they can inform how we become 
accountable for the spaces we create elsewhere. If, as Harewood and Young seem 
to suggest, audiencing is a community membership bestowing an intimate privilege 
that comes with certain responsibilities, what is at stake in these performances are 
the conventions and intimacies of a critical public life. When and how does individual 
critical thought become articulated as a public speech act of disgust that calls others 
to witness and form ‘a community of the disgusted’? (Ahmed 2004 pp.82–101). 
When does it slide into passive tolerance, and how can we be watchful of this? With 
this chapter, I suggest that the wrangling of individual and collective critical agency is 
at its most agonising and most useful, perhaps, when understood as part of what it 
means to become public. This, I would argue, is precisely the value of these 




Chapter Four – Practice Makes Public 
 
My research emerges from how the museum and contemporary art institution have 
been tied to publicness in uncomfortable ways, to address the problem of an 
abstract, ideal or ‘missing’ public emerging from the literature, and worried about in 
practice. In addition, this public is not a singular, monolithic entity, but rather plural 
publics, despite being addressed as one through the public programme. These 
publics are in many ways exactly what the public programme – a specific kind of 
curatorial, museum and educational practice – has emerged to address, manifest 
and serve. There are other related reasons for its emergence; namely, to address 
problems of attention, gaps and failures of the institution. And yet, as indicated, the 
public programme will ultimately fail to adequately address or overcome these 
problems. This is because these abstract, ideal and missing publics themselves 
emerge from a certain set of assumptions issuing from how the museum and 
contemporary art institutions have historically been tied to publicness. I am not trying 
to find out who this public really is, and offer ways to materialise it, rather to 
understand the exclusionary assumptions this ideal, abstract public is built upon. 
 
As outlined in my Introduction, the liberal notion of the museum as public good has 
always been intricately tied to private interest, which complicates a notion of public 
service. This begs the question: Does the neoliberal museum serve the public, or do 
the public provide a service, or function, for the museum? Unfolding from Chapter 
One, liberal assumptions around openness, accessibility and inclusivity of ‘everyone’ 
sometimes obscure the misaligned expectations of care and attention between 
institutions and their publics, producing some of the awkwardness Möntmann 
described (2008 p.19) and Aaron Williamson’s Collapsing Lecture at Tate Britain 
revealed (2011). Liberal assumptions of a general public must now be rethought 
alongside the variations in attending opened by the neoliberal attention economy. I 
described attention as a multi-directional desiring field encompassing inattention and 
distraction in Chapter Two, which, in turn, expands capacities for response and 
response-ability to something held in common, as discussed in Chapter Three. This 
opens the possibility to imagine a community that emerges and operates in 
difference, rather than sameness, through specific moments of public programming. 
In all of these chapters, I describe the emergence of these issues: misaligned 
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expectations, attention and responsibility to support my argument that the public is 
not always already there and publicness is not a given, but a process we may 
observe in becoming through the disruptive moments I choose to focus on. I do this 
to establish the public programme as a valuable space to observe this process of 
becoming public(s) in the contemporary art institution, and, in turn, to consider what 
reframing publicness as a process of becoming could do to our future use of it.  
 
The series That Awkward Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–
19) extends a central proposition of this thesis: the public programme as a ‘stage’ 
across which the ‘awkward relations’ between the art institution and its public(s) are 
played out. In this chapter, I discuss my experiments with naming the public 
programme as an awkward stage, and putting into practice a shift: specifically, 
making the event’s peripheral occurrences – the manifestations of awkwardness, 
discomfort, uncertainty – central to discussions with other public programmers. I also 
test a key question of Chapter Two: what happens when we pay attention 
differently? Rather than focusing only on end products through traditional evaluative 
models, or professionalism through case-study sharing that models best practice, 
employing a more promiscuous, multi-directional attention to that which is ordinarily 
in-attended, could shift dominant ideas of what the public programme produces, 
how, and what its very purpose is. I do this because, as my research highlights, the 
public programme is a field and curatorial practice under-served both theoretically 
and professionally; it needs more space and time dedicated to it. The emphasis of 
this para-professional space, then, was on exploring, rather than improving practice, 
and finding out what happens when those elements ordinarily parsed out of it are put 
back in and made central to the practice itself.  
 
In this chapter I consider what it means to put those elements back into practice 
through the creation of a dedicated space for anecdotal sharing. For example, 
participants in to my workshops and conversations were able to trace the impact of 
disruptive moments to reflect on normative demarcations like programmer, 
participant, public and institution, and so on. We also reflected on what is tacitly 
known: that through the practice of producing public(s), the boundaries and 
demarcations of public space(s) and publicness become more tangible. Through the 
re-telling and unpacking of moments that have disrupted the smoothness of our 
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events, we began to see, or rather feel, ‘public’ as a process of becoming rather than 
a given space, or static state that we step in and out of. It is worth noting here that 
the ubiquity of spatial metaphor in social research has been reviewed (Silber 1995 
pp.323–355), and it is no less popular in the arts and humanities. Though I have 
been trying to underline the relevance of moving from architectural, static notions of 
‘public space’ towards a more fluid notion of ‘public time’ (Allen 2015, O’Neill 2018, 
Kwon 2002), I inevitably fall back on a spatial vocabulary when describing these 
stories and their implications. Through doing the workshops I learned that becoming 
public(s) has to do with spatial and temporal processes that cannot really be 
separated. The questions driving these workshops and conversations were: What do 
we notice about the moments when the smoothness of the event is disrupted? What 
does our pleasurable or painful consideration of these moments tell us about what is 
at stake in this process of becoming public(s)? The question driving this chapter, and 
the entire thesis, then becomes: When we make the periphery the main event, what 
happens to the practice of public programming? I will share some of the stories that 
arose and reflect on what was produced through the process of discussing them 
later on. Before delving into what happened, I introduce where these workshops 




Sara Ahmed’s simple proposition that for certain things to come into the foreground, 
other things must be relegated to the background is instructional for thinking through 
the peripheral, overlooked parts of practice. She examples the white male 
philosopher, whose masculinity frequently disappears ‘under the sign of the 
universal’ doesn’t need to do a whole lot of ‘backgrounding’ in order to begin his 
work (Ahmed 2006 p.34). By contrast the female philosopher must set a whole host 
of assumptions, objects, people and their needs aside in order to begin writing.121 
Even then she is frequently ‘pulled away by the background to engage with it’ 
(Ahmed 2006 pp.30–31). I draw a parallel with, as described in Chapter One, the 
 
121 Ahmed references Edmund Husserl, whose phenomenological exploration, may begin with a 
consideration of what is directly in front of him: the desk that supports his writing. She also asks us to 
consider how certain roles are raced and classed too, which requires other kinds of back-grounding. 
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public programmer’s work, a great deal of which happens behind the scenes – in 
‘private’ – to make the ‘public’ moment happen.  
 
Though I am not gendering the role of the public programmer in this research, from 
my working knowledge it is an overwhelmingly female profession, especially where it 
interacts with families, communities and those with specific access needs. The 
particularities of exactly who does the work of holding spaces is not covered by this 
research, but what is important to draw from Ahmed is how the background work of 
public programming remains largely invisible, since it is done before, during and after 
the event takes place. However, it is frequently during an event that one is pulled 
away to engage with background activities – guest-list management, speakers’ 
PowerPoints, agitated ticket-holders – in order to make the foreground, the public 
part of the event, appear as smooth as possible. Bringing our focus to the periphery, 
the workshops and conversations allowed an exploration of what is usually relegated 
to the background. As one workshop attendee wrote to me afterwards: ‘I actually 
think more work needs to be done around the private side, to make the public side 
really valuable’ (Helena 2019). I return to this in more detail later, as it marks how 
infrequently personal feelings and intersubjective relations are allowed into 
professional spaces. Indeed, as Ahmed also asks: ‘Why call the personal a 
digression? Why is it that the personal so often enters writing as if we are being led 
astray from a proper course?’ (Ahmed 2006 p.22). My invitation to programmers to 
discuss their work experiences foregrounded ‘the personal’, not as an improper 
deviation, but as a useful place to begin theorising the practice of public 
programming.  
 
What Ahmed calls to attention is how personal stories and anecdotes frequently 
cross boundaries of appropriateness that separate us in more public situations. But 
the empathic and public-forming capacity of a personal story shared and retold is 
one of its most intriguing aspects. Consciousness raising practices have long relied 
on storytelling and listening to share experiences, connect and organise (Farinati 
and Firth 2017 p.5). The anecdote’s currency and relevance to public life is 
demonstrated in the mainstream media by the popularity of the TV chat-show and 
branded formats such as TED Talks. Perhaps even more relevant to the practice 
under discussion in this chapter is the proliferation of viral story sharing through 
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hashtags such as #MeToo. Put simply, one story leads to another and soon multiple 
threads accumulate allowing larger themes and patterns emerge, and an infinite 
nuancing of experience.  
 
Both online and in spaces of physical presence, the proliferation of anecdotal story 
sharing blurs the boundaries between public and private, somewhat anticipated by 
Lauren Berlant (1998), who, like Michael Warner (2005), warned against strictly 
distinguishing between public and private life. Berlant saw such a distinction as a 
fantasy perpetuated, and at the same time revealed, by our varied attachments to 
intimacy (pp.282–3). Drawing on the Habermasian bourgeois public sphere as a 
‘development of critical publicness [that] depended on the expansion of class-mixed 
semiformal institutions like the salon and the cafe, circulating print media, and 
industrial capitalism’, Berlant writes that ‘collective intimacy’ became a ‘social ideal’. 
Emphasising the triangulation between publicness, intimacy and criticality Berlant 
shows how ‘[p]ersons were to be prepared for their critical social function in [...] the 
intimate spheres of domesticity, where they would learn (say, from novels and 
newspapers) to experience their internal lives theatrically, as though oriented 
towards an audience’ (Berlant 1998 p.284). Without the bourgeois public sphere 
being developed in this way, ‘the public’s role as critic could not be established’ 
(p.283). These observations about the interlinkage of intimacy with critical public life 
came at the end of the 1990s, but are extremely relevant to this thesis, in particular, 
what the workshops and conversations generated. Since many of us curate the story 
of our lives as if ‘oriented towards an audience’, we may be too wrapped up in the 
effects and possibilities of digital publicity to remember how print media, the salon, 
café (and I would add, the theatre) set the stage for the radical public intimacy often 
claimed for the present.  
 
Against this background, my proposal for what became The Awkward Stage: Private 
Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19) detailed a hypothetical invitation to 
public programmers from different organisations to share memories of moments 
where ‘things went wrong’ during public programme events they had either 
organised or been audience to. Presented during a supervision in 2017, the idea 
initiated a lively discussion, roaming around several singular moments my 
supervisors had experienced as programmers themselves, as well as more general 
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occupational hazards and common occurrences.122 As we considered both ordinary 
and extraordinary professional experiences of public programming, I observed a kind 
of camaraderie building, as well as enjoyment. Sharing the cringy pain of these 
stories with others who could relate, both professionally and personally, was oddly 
pleasurable, and important insights were also gleaned from the process. Despite our 
relative comfort with radical public intimacy online, mentioned above, the anecdotes 
shared in this initial discussion underlined normative fears, anxieties and 
assumptions around what is thought to be private or internal erupting in spaces of 
physical proximity and publicness. Despite a mutual interest in what the invitation 
opened up, there was a degree of anxiety over whether other professionals want to 
share moments of under-performing or failing at one’s role?123 It was decided that 
workshop participants could risk harming their public reputation, especially if their 
contributions were written up and were attributable, and I agreed to rethink my 
proposal. 
 
However, the urgency of this first foray into awkward moments of public 
programming persisted. Half a year later, in October 2018, I gave my first research 
presentation to Tate’s Public Programme team during their Away Day and invited 
them to discuss moments that had disrupted the smoothness of an event they had 
either programmed or attended. The immediate buzz of chatter in the room 
generated by the partner conversations signalled that, despite some of the stories 
being complex, difficult, even embarrassing to recount, sharing them was strangely 
enjoyable and productive. Reflecting that both the supervisory and first workshop 
discussions had a momentum that felt productive to pursue, I formalised the process 






122 Recurrent moments such as when a member of the audience takes the handheld microphone 
during the question-and-answer session and asks, ‘is this on?’ while tapping and waving it around, 
looking for the ‘on’ button. Or refuses the microphone entirely, insisting ‘my voice is loud enough’.  
123 This was also suggested by Alexia and Williamson in Chapter One. Though of course the context 
was different, being a series of staged failures, there was always the potential of Collapsing Lecture 
being taken for real. 
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Approaches in Practice  
 
This practice began by unpicking my own awkward or disruptive moments with 
theoretical sources that explore minor, periphery, anecdotal and performative modes 
of speech and their productivity. The move to practice and action research in this 
chapter develops in response to the more ‘conventional’ critical analysis of the 
previous chapters. It also responds to issues emerging from them, putting into 
practice a shift in attention and testing the potential of a well-worn public 
programming format – the workshop – for producing a community of difference. The 
practice developed through doing the workshops and conversations themselves, and 
this section interweaves approaches to practice and writing about them, since the 
method itself was set up in my Introduction. As also referenced there, Erin Manning’s 
writing on the value of the ‘minor gesture’ that ‘exceeds the limits of the event’ and 
makes the event’s limits felt, and thereby ‘punctually reorients experience’ (2016 p.2) 
has been instructional in developing this practice. In the workshops and 
conversations, we unpacked the eventfulness of events, paying particular attention 
to their fullness: the excess usually overlooked. Outside of the normative 
categorisations of success or failure, our peripheral focus allowed another 
understanding of the ‘limits’ of the event to emerge – what it can and cannot hold. 
We were then able to consider how their exorbitant details might delineate the edges 
of publics themselves. Lastly our peripheral focus allowed a ‘reorientation’ of our 
position as programmers, as professionals, inter-institutional colleagues, and 
audiences to our own programmes.  
 
Though never explicitly asked to, most participants retold the stories discussed in 
pairs in the group discussion and several recurring themes emerged, which are 
discussed below. At times the process of story sharing, begun in pairs and opened 
out to a small group, bordered on what might otherwise be called ‘professional 
gossiping’. Indeed, as previously introduced, Gavin Butt’s writing on gossip’s role as 
a performative informational practice that produces a different, but equally important 
kind of art historical knowledge (2005), has been instructive in developing this 
methodology of practice and writing. As the workshops developed, the way in which 
these stories allowed a collective reflection on practice became as important as their 
content. A feeling of connectedness was perhaps made more possible without the 
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foregrounding of a recording device. Recording would have produced verifiable 
research material, but it was a shift in practice I wanted to capture through an 
embodied and observed experience. That said, I did record some reflective 
conversations afterward, and others with some would-be workshop participants. I 
was therefore privy to extra stories that also form part of this analysis.  
 
The risk involved in re-telling someone else’s story requires a sensitivity to possible 
interpretations; this is why some stories are transcribed exactly as told or retold to 
me. I try to stay true to speech because I am interested in how someone told 
something: the difficulty of discussing delicate topics with a professional peer are 
reflected in faltering speech patterns that dance around a tricky topic, over-explain it, 
or where laughter punctuates the narrative. Some stories from the workshops I retell 
(again, with permission) from memory, assisted by my notes, and these do not follow 
a straight path. Tim Ingold (2007), describes story-telling as just one of the many 
line-making practices humans do: ‘walking, weaving, observing, singing, story-telling, 
drawing and writing [...] all proceed along lines of one kind or another’ (p.1). In many 
ways the stories told in the workshops and conversations, and written about here, 
were materialising the visible and invisible lines bounding the kinds of ‘public 
space(s)’ that were under discussion. These stories tended to revolve around 
breaches of these lines, or boundaries, which is of course what revealed them as 
such. Ingold’s observations on the assumptions about the shape of lines, or how 
they proceed, are also useful to consider here:  
 
I wondered what it means to go straight to the point. On the whole, this is not 
something we do, either in everyday life or in ordinary discourse. We are 
drawn to certain topics, and meander around them, but by the time we reach 
them they seem to have disappeared [...] How came it, then, that the line that 
is properly linear is assumed to be straight? (Ingold 2007 pp.3–4).  
 
Whereas my initial proposal was to bring public programmers together to discuss 
‘what went wrong’, this shifted towards the term ‘disruptive moment’ to encompass 
the unexpected, uncertain or awkward but equally the funny and joyful occurrences 
that exceeded what had been planned, or was expected to happen, as part of a 
public programme event. On the one hand these workshops and conversations 
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invited participants to interpret my invitation to discuss disruptive moments widely. 
On the other, to share experiences that were oddly specific. Naturally there were 
instances of participants asking if what they contributed was ‘what I wanted’? Others, 
where someone expressed relief at finding the right space to explore a strange 
experience they’d never known quite what to make of. However, rather than 
progressing to a point, or proving a theory, what I wanted was precisely to ‘meander’ 
around ‘certain topics’ that were difficult to talk about in other professional fora. To 
find out what would happen to our understandings of public(s) and public space(s) if 
we roamed around the edges of things that seemed unusual, unexpected or 
uncomfortable. 
 
As outlined in my Introduction, these meanderings on the periphery are written about 
through an auto-ethnographic lens. In carrying out this research I drew on 
professional and peer networks, though everyone in the second workshop at Open 
School East, Margate, and half of the final workshop at Tate Britain were people I did 
not know, invited through an existing network of public programmers organised by 
Historic England. As Carolyn Ellis, Tony E. Adams and Arthur P. Bochner point out, 
because auto-ethnographic practices work with participants that ‘begin as or become 
friends through the research process’ they are not simply ‘mined for data’ (2011 
p.281). In this way, the research method transgressed usual rules of distance that 
normally apply in social research projects. In line with an auto-ethnographic 
approach that takes into account relationships, I didn’t set this practice up as ‘field 
research’ or call the conversations ‘interviews’, but aimed for the workshops and 
conversations to be of mutual benefit. This approach opened further transgressions 
of conventional research practice, in addition to the transgressions in public 
programming practice we were exploring. Finally, bringing private recollections into a 
shared public, or semi-private space, might also be considered a transgression. The 
potential for anecdotes to connect speaker and listener meant a convivial and 
vulnerable space was generated quite quickly. As one participant reflected, ‘it felt like 
we had become a little team by the end’ (Miranda 2019), and I was often surprised 
how willing workshop participants were to share their stories candidly. This felt 
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particularly generous given how discussions often revolved around that 




My choice of the workshop format is tied to its deployment as a research 
methodology across many fields and popularity as a dominant form of public 
programming (discussed below). The term originates as a descriptor of ‘a small 
establishment where manufacturing or handicrafts are carried on’ (Merriam-Webster 
n.d.). The verb ‘to workshop’ takes this primary meaning to imply a process of 
working through something with others. However, the workshop has come to mean a 
‘brief’ and ‘intensive’ educational format ‘for a relatively small group of people’ 
focusing ‘on techniques and skills in a particular field’ (Merriam-Webster n.d.). In 
their article ‘Workshops as a Research Methodology’ (2017) Rikke Ørngreen and 
Karin Levinsen describe the discursive or performative workshop as ‘an arrangement 
whereby a group of people learn, acquire new knowledge, perform creative problem-
solving, or innovate in relation to a domain-specific issue’ (2017 p.71). Jen Tarr, 
Elena Gonzalez-Polledo and Flora Cornish (2017) review the efficacy of the arts 
workshop (largely theatre-based) as a research method in different fields, including 
health and pedagogy. Their examples found the workshop to be a ‘creative and 
inclusive space’ where participants feel ‘safe’ to ‘question authority’, build ‘a sense of 
solidarity’ and produce ‘new forms of relating and communicating’ (p.39).  
 
As a popular mode of public programming, the workshop is similarly used as a space 
to learn and try out new skills, be they practical or theoretical. But, like the reading 
group, it may also stand in for, or cover up, certain representational gaps in the 
contemporary art institution. Workshops, like those introduced in Chapter Three 
designed for specific ‘communities’, may be targeted at audiences not reached 
through the generality assumed in more broadcast models of exhibition and public 
programming. The workshop is presumed to be less elitist and more accessible than 
event models such as the academic conference, talk or panel discussion. Given the 
 
124 As outline in my Introduction, in order to represent contributions carefully and respectfully, every 
direct and indirect reference to what was said in a workshop or conversation is included with 
expressed permission. I use pseudonyms and do not give full job titles or the names of institutions. 
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workshop appears ubiquitously across a range of institutions, it is surprising that little 
published research explores the format with public programming.125 Since it is not 
only didactic, but premised on the notion of equal participation, the workshop is also 
a popular format of the curatorial in its shift towards ‘event of knowledge’ (Rogoff 
2013) and away from (re)presentational curating.126 Again, like the reading group, it 
is an opportunity for group learning or co-production that has collective resonance, 
and does not have an audience in any conventional sense. This affords privacy to 
discussions since if everyone participates (to a greater or lesser degree), each 
shows or shares something of themselves. This aspect is particularly relevant to the 
ongoing concerns over passive spectatorship previously mentioned (Bishop 2006, 
2012, Rancière 2009). It also means that though participants may be unknown at the 
outset, through the workshop’s ritualised processes – a round of introductions, pair 
and small group work, breaks for refreshments and plenary discussions – strangers 
have the possibility to become intimates. This was integral to the workshops I ran, as 
was the opportunity to discuss the mechanics of public programming with a group 
with specific knowledge, which also allowed for a more sophisticated conversation to 
emerge.  
 
Given the importance of group learning and co-production foregrounded by the 
workshop, a notion of ‘group dynamics’ might be said to hover around this form of 
practice as it appears on the public programme, if not underpinning it. Attributed to 
Kurt Lewin (1948), the scientific study group formation and behaviour is foundational 
for group therapy and other modes of collaborative working across different fields. In 
my experience, the group dynamic of a workshop is structured by a facilitator as well 
as by what is offered, whether that is an individual transformative experience, or 
coming together as a group to make something. Where the edges of the contained, 
but co-produced, space are, what is and isn’t possible for the group to hold, will be 
 
125 Recent examples include Contemporary Art Boot Camp at Whitechapel Gallery a series of 
workshops for young people (Whitechapel Gallery n.d.); Art:Work a series of ‘creative interdisciplinary 
lab’ workshops in Tate Exchange, Tate Modern (Tate 2017); Art Rebels Workshop at Turner 
Contemporary, a series of weekend activities for families (Turner Contemporary n.d.); Contemporary 
Drawing Workshop, a week-long course at Central Saint Martins, University of the Arts, London (UAL 
n.d.); Teacher workshops: ways into contemporary art – talking and making a series at the Royal 
Academy (Royal Academcy n.d.). These examples are perhaps indicative of how the workshop 
retains a formally educational purpose, despite its ubiquity. 
126 A good example of this is the perennial Bergen Assembly in Norway. 
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developed through the workshop itself. This relates back to issues stemming from 
my analysis of the attentional field at the Feminist Duration Reading Group and the 
group’s own reflections on its on-going practice (Reckitt et al. 2019), and was indeed 
something I noticed as developing through pair conversations and plenary 
discussions. 
 
Lastly, another way to describe what happened would be ‘talking shop’. This phrase 
can describe an inability to stop talking about work in a social situation, or it can be 
an invitation to break out of the social and talk about work for a while, perhaps to 
forge a new partnership. Public programmers might be forgiven for ‘talking shop’ 
because the role stages the self in a way many other jobs do not. But it also has a 
fluidity to it: a public programmer is sometimes organiser, sometimes host, 
sometimes audience. The space produced via the workshops and conversations 
provided public programmers with an opportunity to discuss all these roles, in the 
ways ‘talking shop’ implies: informally, socially and para-professionally. 
 
A Useful Space for Useful Stories 
 
In a recorded conversation with Emma, a public programme coordinator at a 
university, she remembered the difficulty of adequately reflecting on events she 
produced when working at an art museum:  
 
I think we shied away from critiquing ourselves individually because of the 
scrutiny we were under from the rest of the organisation [...] and we felt very 
vulnerable to really draw attention to ourselves [...] and the weirdness of 
programming (Emma 2019). 
 
Finding the space to talk openly about programming continues to be at issue in her 
current role, where evaluative discussions are explicitly objective. Reflecting on this, 
it struck me that the visibility of public programming makes it, as she later said, 
rather an ‘insecure’ practice. Despite the public programme rarely being the focus, or 
core of any institution, the language of vulnerability came up many times during 
these discussions in connection to the nature of live spaces, their contingency and 




The ‘weirdness of programming’ or the ‘you never really know what’s going to 
happen’ quality of the unpredictable public seemed to shadow each event for Emma, 
something I return to later. There was also a contradiction between the need to plan, 
advertise and promise that something will go a certain way, and the inevitable 
eventfulness of the event. For me this connected to what was different and valuable 
about the space created through my workshops and conversations. An email from 
Helena, a curator of public programmes for a national heritage organisation, 
reflected on the experience of sharing emotions that are intimately connected with a 
notion of being ‘public’, but are hard to talk about in other professional spaces. 
 
It was refreshing to know that other public programmers and curators feel 
embarrassed or stressed or uncomfortable sometimes, and it isn’t all plain 
sailing! I definitely went away thinking about process versus outcome – about 
all the times when, despite putting on a successful end result, the process by 
which I got there wasn’t done inclusively or collaboratively, and the 
relationships weren’t always upheld. I actually think more work needs to be 
done around the private side, to make the public side really valuable. I’d be 
really interested in attending another session like this, as sometimes at bigger 
networking events it’s difficult to be as candid or open as smaller roundtables 
(Helena 2019). 
 
This email covers the same territory as Emma’s first comment about the pressure to 
reflect objectively, so as not to make oneself accountable for anything that went awry 
during an event. It also speaks to another comment Emma made about the particular 
skill of holding and assimilating so much ‘information’ on the background of the 
event, contributors and audiences attending, while maintaining a calm exterior. 
Likewise, it seemed useful for Helena to hear other programmers talk about their 
more interior, vulnerable feelings – anxieties, difficulties or uncertainties – since 
other kinds of professional spaces do not permit a ‘candid’ account of the less 
desirable outcomes or ambiguous feelings. This is despite a lot of learning and 
education practitioners championing the value of ‘not knowing’, which appears in the 
literature (Fisher and Fortnum 2013) and is explicitly encouraged in the Learning 




Indeed, not knowing what to make of something, how to feel, or what to do in 
response, seemed to be a key characteristic of anecdotes brought into the 
workshops. Rebecca Fortum’s work on a particular sensibility that artists bring to the 
making process, whereby they ‘learn to live with this precarious sense [of] not 
knowing what it is we are making’ is useful here. As a private space to work things 
out, the artist’s studio supports this ‘not knowing’ what will emerge as a result of their 
experiments, so that a ‘knowing not knowing’ (my emphasis) becomes a creative 
working strategy (Fortnum 2008).  
 
In the semi-private space of these workshops, the discussion format was simply 
scaffolded to support not knowing about an anecdote or experience under 
discussion. Interpretations were naturally made but conclusions were staved off in 
favour of staying with, or sustaining, uncertainty. Given this, the practice of sharing 
anecdotes also involved a vulnerability and generosity mirrored in Turvey and 
Walton’s approach that encourages artists running workshops with schools at Tate to 
put ‘not knowing’ into practice in the art museum. They write that ‘[a]rtists allowing 
vulnerability or fallibility to be present in the process of looking at art in the company 
of others are acting with generosity […] There is an additional value in this approach 
in how it reflects the making process, holding and allowing [...] uncertainty’ (Daly, 
Turvey and Walton 2017 p.17). 
 
The unresolved quality of the experiences I gained as a public programmer similarly 
drives this research, and it has not always been easy to share these reflections with 
others. On the other hand, the peers I have presented to often related to feelings of 
uncertainty or ambiguity – for example, about not knowing whether something they 
organised was a ‘good’ event, or not. Helena’s comment that during ‘bigger 
networking events it’s difficult to be more candid and open’ speaks to this, and the 
fact that rarely are these kinds of professional spaces an investigation of practice 
that can speak to ‘the weirdness of programming’. Indeed, Helena’s reflection that 
‘more work should be done on the private side, to make the public side more 
valuable’ is itself an ambiguous comment to unpack. The workshop discussions 
often revolved around precisely how porous and interwoven the public and private 
sides of public programming are; so what does she mean by ‘more work’? Does she 
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advocate for more reflection on the public in private spaces? Or on the private and 
contradictory feelings that coexist when one is ‘in public’? The looping nature of 
these concerns were very much part of the process of these workshops and 
conversations, and the stories that emerged. 
 
Becoming the Anecdote  
 
What has been tested throughout this practice is the power of the anecdote as a 
place from which to begin theorising. Jane Gallop (2002) draws attention to the fact 
that we theorise from anecdotes all the time through conversations with friends, 
families, colleagues and others by sharing stories from our lives and interpreting 
them. Perhaps because such anecdotal theorising is an everyday practice, it is often 
overlooked as a serious mode of research. Indeed, anecdotal evidence or 
information is widely held to be untrustworthy because it emerges from personal 
narrative, rather than ‘proven facts’ or ‘hard evidence’ derived from scientific modes 
of research and data capture. As Gallop writes, ‘[t]o dismiss something as “merely 
anecdotal” is to dismiss it as a relatively rare and marginal case.’ However, for 
Gallop and others (including Jacques Derrida and James Fineman), the anecdote is 
an ‘exorbitant opening’, and as such, a very fruitful method of theorising. ‘Anecdotal 
theory would base its theorizing on exorbitant models [...] Exorbitant is associated 
with ‘the excessive, romantic, perverse, unreasonable and queer [...] from the Latin, 
“ex-,” out of, and “orbita,” route or orbit.’ (Gallop 2002 p.7) According to the dictionary 
definition, an exorbitance is both a deviation and an excess (Merriam-Webster n.d.) 
and, as such, appears to have no place in formal, professional fora. 
 
The stories I tell below are all tied to the notion of the ‘exorbitant’. Before we get to 
them, it is worth pointing out that as anecdotes about peripheral occurrences, they 
might be considered both not enough to include in scholarly research, and too much 
to mention in normative professional spaces. At the beginning of this research, I was 
often asked what ‘case studies’ I would be working with. It should be clear by now 
that rather than case studies of particular programmes, I chose to work with 
anecdotes about public programming itself. As discussed in Chapter Two, this mode 
of research is about paying attention differently and valuing the minor, the periphery, 
the uncategorisable. I framed the stories that emerged through the workshops and 
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conversations as anecdotes because they are not the official narrative that would 
ordinarily be told in a normative professional space, such as a debrief or network 
meeting. Therefore, the space created to share anecdotes not discussable 
elsewhere, operated in parallel to the kinds of professional spaces that already exist. 
In making the anecdote the focus of discussions, it could also be said that the 
‘exorbitant’ – the deviant, the excessive, the queer and the periphery – became 
central too. 
 
What this does, or rather undoes in relation to the public programmer in the 
contemporary art institution, is prioritise a kind of knowledge implicit in practicing this 
work not often formally shared with colleagues or indeed publicly. In September 
2019, I was invited by a national art museum as external consultant on a festival 
programme. During a post-event reflection meeting between myself and two 
programme managers working on access and family programmes, the importance of 
sharing anecdotal evidence emerged. Unprompted by me, they began discussing 
how small stories from the event had circulated internally, almost like rumour. We 
discussed how the stories and their circulation might provide a more interesting way 
of evaluating the programme’s reach and impact, beyond standard audience 
research. They emphasised the importance of anecdotal evidence saying that 
‘sometimes this is all programmers have to hold on to.’ For them, anecdotes not only 
provide context, but communicate subtlety and nuance in a way that more formal 
methods like evaluation forms cannot. But as previously mentioned, the power of the 
anecdote also lies in transgressing boundaries. These programmers reflected on 
how useful anecdotes of verbal feedback from participants, as well as their own 
observations, were in providing both overview and detail at departmental and 
interdepartmental meetings. They also explained that asking participants directly for 
written feedback can intimidate them into either writing something ‘official’ they think 
the museum wants to read, like an effusive missive about a transformative 
experience, or complaining about something like refreshment provision. As this 
research shows, both effusive missives and complaints are indeed worthy of 
consideration; the value of the anecdote, here, lies in what might be called its 
‘performed’ nature. Inviting participants into a conversation about their experience, or 
observing a conversation between participants during an event, often provides 
information that a written comment cannot capture. These insights highlight the use-
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value of collecting and sharing anecdotes to the practice of public programming, 
particularly the verbal transmission of feedback from public to institution, and 
between programmers themselves.  
 
As suggested in the meeting above, anecdotes are also useful because they may 
demonstrate a detail or make a wider point, with subtlety and nuance. The anecdote 
is not the official narrative, but a ‘short narrative of an interesting, amusing, or 
biographical incident’ (Merriam-Webster n.d.), linking it back to Manning’s ‘minor 
gesture’ (2016). To speak of anecdotes, or in anecdotes, then, is to be brief and 
entertaining and is also a form of relating. In fact, the sharing of anecdotes involves 
not just entertainment or information, but intimacy and risk. This is fitting because the 
word is derived from the seventeenth-century French word for ‘“secret or private 
stories”’ and ‘from the Greek anekdota, “things unpublished”’. From these early 
origins, anecdote had associations with ‘gossip’ and the ‘“revelation of secrets,”’ 
which later ‘decayed in English to “brief, amusing story”’ (Online Etymology 
Dictionary n.d.). 
 
Throughout the workshops and conversations, it struck me that the stories shared 
between professionals could also be a form of gossiping. The stock phrase ‘idle 
gossip’ suggests it is antithetical to labour and productivity, but this is misleading. 
From Butt we learn that the circulation of gossip in any professional field is as much 
part of the production of that community as more sanctioned and authorised forms of 
discourse (Butt 2005 p.1). Importantly, it is also a ‘performed’ informational form that 
exists in the voicing, or the telling of something from one person to another – in the 
‘intersubjective’. Though we can think of gossip as circulating in printed form and 
online through reviews, social media posts and comments, it is commonly associated 
with ‘body-to-body transmission’ (pp.18–19). As such, it is mostly deemed an 
unreliable form of evidence, information or truth, subject to distortion in its performed 
circulation. Gossip, therefore, is not a basis for a robust public judgement. As 
discussed above, anecdote is subject to similar judgements, but is an equally 
valuable informational source. Though seemingly excessive to the professional, 
which purports to be built upon the verifiable case study, following Butt I would argue 
that the anecdote is just as intrinsic to the formation of professional discourses and 




Though anecdotes may be dismissed as ‘beside the point’, their use-value often lies 
in ‘making a point’ that cannot be said or demonstrated otherwise. The recorded 
conversation with Emma began her reflection that during conversations with 
colleagues about events ‘some things become the anecdote that you tell, and then 
other things you just don’t really talk about again.’ I asked, ‘What does something 
becoming the anecdote do?’ and she answered by telling me a story about the first 
event she worked on after her internship at the museum finished. At a conference 
exploring a specific neurological condition and its potential as an empathetic model 
for engaging with art, a number of vulnerable adults were participating in the panels 
and the audience.127 As Emma explained: ‘several people participating had [the 
condition] and were therefore very exposed to the emotions and feelings of other 
people around them’. However, ‘it was all fairly standard though in terms of a 
conference’ with no special considerations made for physical needs of the kinds of 
people the event might draw. It was during the question-and-answer session of the 
final panel that this ‘oversight’ became clear, as Emma recounted in detail:  
 
There was one guy in the centre who had a kind of tatty, erm, looked home-
knitted jumper, erm, erratic hair, an older gentleman, and [he was given] the 
mic as the last question of the day. And he said: “So I’ve been living in a [...] 
psycho-symbiotic relationship with my mother for the past twenty-five years, 
until she died in a car crash.” [Pause]. Right, I mean what do you do with that 
[?] [Laughter] He clearly [...] had been experiencing [...] a very extreme 
response to whatever she was going through, erm [...] And there was just this 
absolute silence [...] for what felt like ages [...] And then the chair [of the panel 
discussion] finally said [in a grave tone]: “I’m sorry to hear about your mother. 
[In a brighter tone] Well, thank you everyone and we look forward to seeing 
you tomorrow for the second part of the conference.” [Laughter]. And it was 
just the most insane thing to happen! [Laughter]. And then he came back the 
next day, and we saw him eating a bag of iceberg lettuce in the [break] [...] 
That does become an anecdote, but also this example of: you just don’t know 
 
127 As defined by the Department of Health, a vulnerable adult is a person over eighteen unable to 




what people are gonna say in the moment [...] Something I notice [...] 
reflecting on that [situation] now we’re talking about it: they [the chair and 
panellists] just weren’t prepared. [Laughter] [...] working with the public you 
really don’t know what you’re gonna get. And there is a duty of care there 
(Emma 2019). 
 
My retelling of this anecdote is written as faithfully to the verbal record as possible, 
marking the points where Emma paused, changed her tone of voice and laughed. 
This mode of writing from speech – transcription, rather than summary – not only 
highlights how the anecdote was told during our conversation, but also the work it 
does. The story was unusual, intriguing and entertaining, and made one major point 
among several others. As I see it, the main point was that ‘working with the public 
you really don’t know what you’re gonna get.’ The public is unpredictable, and yet 
Emma also suggested, due to the content of the conference, there was a higher 
number of vulnerable adults in attendance than usual. Later we discussed the 
danger of a ‘general’ public programme as being that the people who come are not 
‘general’ at all – they are often quite particular to the content and contributors of the 
event – a community of interest. She reflected that some access and community 
practices (that she had extensive experience of) such as having a quiet space for 
resting, could be really usefully employed for public programmes ‘in general’. 
Secondly, those invited to hold these spaces as chairs or speakers don’t always 
have the flexibility and grace to respond to the unpredictable public – another 
overlooked and undervalued skill. But as the meta-data of Emma’s anecdote gives 
away, in this particular case, there was perhaps no appropriate response, yet there 
was ‘a duty of care’. 
 
Having worked with Emma, I know her to be a good storyteller and was looking 
forward to our conversation. Indeed, the time she spent describing this man, before 
delivering what he said, in a deadpan way, had quite a comic effect. The details of 
this small vignette are what made it a striking, amusing and useful anecdote in our 
conversation. True to Gallop’s formulation of the exorbitant anecdote, it is both 
diverting (or deviant) and excessive, especially in written form. However, there is, of 
course, a difficulty with writing this story, of rendering a private conversation between 
intimates in words to be read by unknown others. It could be an uncomfortable read: 
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descriptions of the man’s ‘erratic hair’, ‘home-knitted jumper’ and his unconventional 
lettuce lunch all painted him as an outsider, with possible mental health issues. I 
intuited that these descriptions were given to indicate the risk of giving him the 
closing question. But here we come up against one of the problems of programming 
in public institutions: isn’t a ‘public event’ (and aren’t the people hosting it) supposed 
to welcome all kinds of diverse voices and experiences? However, the descriptions 
of his appearance and actions outside of the question-and-answer scenario attempt 
to make clear that not only what the man said, but he himself, was deemed outside 
of, or somehow incongruous to, this ‘public’ environment. However, rather than 
focusing on how the story reflects the teller professionally, it might be more useful to 
think about what the vignette shows up about the kinds of public spaces and 
situations set up by large and small institutions. By virtue of their appearance as part 
of a ‘public programme’ of a public museum, it is assumed that these spaces are 
accessible and open to all, but often have very proscribed rules of engagement. 
 
The anecdote rested on the point that the public is unpredictable, but that there is 
still a ‘duty of care’ and a responsibility to respond appropriately. However, this is a 
paradox, because in many ways there is no appropriate response to such a personal 
declaration, which also made no demand to be answered. I recalled something an 
arts producer from Melbourne had told me about a recent phenomenon she noticed 
at public programme events at museums and galleries in Australia. During the 
question-and-answer session of discussions on contentious issues such as race and 
indigenous sovereignty, organisers are increasingly stating that they welcome 
‘questions only, no comments’. This could partly be due to the unpredictable nature 
of the public, but as it was told to me, is more to do with the predictable regularity of 
white supremacist views being platformed during question-and-answer sessions. Our 
short conversation about this strategy for minimising the risk of such comments, 
revolved around its inefficacy. Un-inviting ‘comments’ appears to give programmers 
and facilitators an opportunity to shut-down potentially offensive speech. Yet we also 
agreed that anyone wishing to speak at length or say something provocative, racist 
or offensive will often do so regardless, drawing on the standard right-wing response 
to ‘political correctness’, to claim their right to ‘free speech’. This small anecdote 
pointed again to a fear of the unpredictable public, revealing the complex and implicit 
rules of engagement that these spaces routinely employ.  
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Exorbitant Bodies  
 
Other anecdotes around exorbitant individuals and unpredictable publics arose 
through the final workshop held at Tate Britain in July 2019. While making initial 
observations afterwards with my colleague Miranda, she commented that a lot of 
examples revolved around ‘what happens when emotions breach how we think a 
public space should function.’ I noted this down verbatim, and during our later 
recorded conversation reflecting on the workshop she returned to this point: 
 
how [do] we understand the parameters of what is public and what is private, 
and what should be kept public and what should be kept private? And also 
how [do] our expectations of public space inform how we feel we should hold 
a space, so do we feel we have to keep certain kinds of behaviour outside the 
room? Or do we feel that we have to kind of encourage certain kinds of 
behaviour inside the room, and certain kinds of feelings and emotions? 
(Miranda 2019). 
 
To draw on the first half of Miranda’s reflection, perhaps what made the man Emma 
described so extraordinary was his comment that breached the boundaries of that 
particular public with something so acutely personal. Or was it his manner of 
dressing and behaving that marked him as ‘outsider’? Or a combination of these 
things? Still, the notion of someone on the periphery, outside of even a ‘general 
public’ seems counter intuitive to the construction of this mass group of people that 
can include ‘everyone’.  
 
Another story raised this same problem of the public programme, retold to me by 
Miranda during our reflective recorded conversation after the workshop she 
participated in. In a one-to-one conversation with Carol, producer at a literature-
based art organisation, Miranda learned about an incident that occurred during an 
intimate poetry reading at Carol’s workplace. Carol had begun with a description of 
her workplace and its location on a rather ‘public thoroughfare with windows’ onto 
the street in London. The event was disturbed when ‘a member of the public started 
knocking on the window and interrupted the intimacy of the space.’ The first reaction 
from Carol, and what she observed in the room, was a feeling of irritation over the 
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knocking ‘ruining the moment’. However, the incident – and its retelling to Miranda – 
prompted Carol ‘to think about how there were three dynamics: how the speakers 
would feel, how the audience would feel, and how the audience were functioning. 
And then also this idea of the outside world being the public. So that being a moment 
where [...] their ideas of public broke down.’ Despite the transparency of both the 
outside world to the event inside, and vice versa, it was this rupture that prompted 
the question: What public is the art organisation serving? Is the world on the other 
side of the glass ‘the public’? Is the public inside the event a different kind of public, 
or the same? This was intriguing since Carol’s contributions to the roundtable 
discussion expressed frustration with her organisation’s ethos to encourage ‘freedom 
of expression’ for everyone. This liberal position is very much part of a conception of 
an ideal general public – at odds with a living, embodied, differentiated public. She 
questioned how genuinely this can be supported when, as noted earlier, ‘multiple 
privileges and oppressions’ are at play in every situation, demonstrating awareness 
that ‘the public’ is not a homogenous group. 
 
Miranda continued with Carol’s description of the person knocking at the window, 
and what happened next.  
 
It became clear that this person banging on the window was perhaps a rough 
sleeper who was quite distressed and maybe had been using drugs or 
something. So one of the people from the organisation went outside, spoke to 
them and walked with them a little bit, and saw if they needed any help or if 
they knew where they were going [...] [Carol] had to kind of redefine their idea 
of what public they felt they were serving, and who was inside and outside of 
that public that they felt they’d engaged in the event, and then a public who 
they hadn’t engaged in the event, but who also kind of did engage in this way. 
The expectations we have on how people should behave [...] and also the 
element of care that you have to your speakers to make them feel 
comfortable, to your audience to make them feel comfortable and safe, but 
also to that person who’s not involved in any way and kind of orbits the event 
and then interacts in this way that’s kind of a breach of how you expect that 




Miranda described the moment as a ‘jolt’ and I picked up on Carol’s split sense of 
responsibility – of who or what should be prioritised in response to the disruptive 
moment. I suggested that there might have been a recalibration of the idea of the 
public or publics that the arts centre is serving, or responsible for including. Does ‘the 
public’ include everyone, or is there an outside to this group that is only ever 
notionally included? Drawing on experience, I added that at such moments you are 
forced to reckon with who or what should be prioritised by suggesting ‘there’s myself: 
how do I feel about this? There’s the audience who are there, there’s the contributors 
or the speakers [...] of course those things all intertwine, and then there’s the 
institution.’ Miranda then reflected on the ‘institutional drives to diversify and widen 
participation. In a way that is kind of a consideration of people who aren’t in the 
room, [...] are on the outside and who you want to engage.’ It didn’t sound like the 
participation of the person who knocked on the window was a desired engagement. 
But it did force a consideration – or recalibration – of who the organisation’s public 
might feasibly include. 
 
That ‘the public’ is abstract enough to include absolutely everyone is, of course, a 
fallacy that makes it function. ‘The public’ always has an outside, hence the 
existence or necessity of ‘counterpublics’ of race, class, gender, sexuality, sub-
cultural interests and so on that Warner describes (2005). If then, following Leo 
Steinberg (in Burton, Jackson and Willsdon 2016 p.xxv), all these publics have a 
function, then the function of the public called into being via the public programme of 
any institution serves to demonstrate its accessibility and openness to anyone. But it 
is moments like those described in the last two anecdotes that reveal a different 
reality. Some bodies disrupt or complicate this illusion, which is why they might be 
read as awkward, at odds, or indeed exorbitant. Indeed, Miranda’s phrase ‘that 
person who’s not involved in any way and kind of orbits the event’ was interesting 
given Gallop’s description of exorbitant as ‘“ex-,” out of, and “orbita,” route or orbit’ 
(Gallop 2002 p.7). 
 
The last two stories helped me think about who falls outside of even a ‘general 
public’, why, and how they disrupt the coherence or smooth running of a public 
event. Describing itself as ‘an institution-in-becoming and without constitution’ that is 
‘against the transformation of bodies into a mass, against the transformation of the 
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public into a marketing target’ (documenta 14 n.d.), Paul B. Preciado's Parliament of 
Bodies (2016–17) exampled a public programme imagining a space for bodies 
normally excluded from the possibility of full public appearance: queer, trans, black, 
migrant, neurodivergent, differently-abled. It also operated in the space left open by 
the failure of formal and identity politics to ensure this possibility (Preciado and Sagri 
2017). Judith Butler (2015) describes how the ‘plural and performative right to 
appear’ is often assumed to belong to everyone (p.11). However, she asks us to 
reconsider ‘the restrictive ways “the public sphere” has been uncritically posited by 
those who assume full access and rights of appearance on the designated platform’ 
(p.8). Perhaps exorbitant bodies are disruptive precisely because they are an 
uncomfortable reminder that the right to appear is not evenly distributed?  
 
In addition to their material and architectural limits, the spaces generated through 
public programming are bounded by time and specific codes of behaviour that make 
such appearance difficult, troubling or simply impossible for some bodies. As 
touched on in Chapter Three, some codes adhere to entering and exiting, others are 
about where one locates oneself according to one’s role, pays attention and 
participates. Though programmers might recognise how habitus (Bourdieu 1984) 
constructs an institution familiar and comfortable for some, and deeply unwelcoming 
for others, the problem of these codes and barriers repeatedly came up in our 
discussions. A story from the second workshop at Open School East in Margate in 
June 2019 underlined the illusion of openness that many art and cultural institutions 
wish – often with the best intentions – to uphold. The plenary discussion of this 
workshop revolved around expectations of how a public will behave, and how these 
are often intertwined with a vague, but rather rigid notion, of an event ‘going well’. 
Janet, a theatre director and arts programmer, related to this notion of unconscious, 
but nevertheless quite fixed intentions about how something should go through a 
story from her experience of co-directing a small theatre in a poor area of Margate. 
The venue, run out of a converted Victorian coach house, had ambitious aims of 
becoming a hub of arts and culture for the local community. Claiming to be ‘one of 
the smallest theatres in the world’, pictures of the interior on the website show a tiny 
black box theatre with room for eight red velvet seats per row. Once considered the 
up-market alternative to the populist sea-front, the theatre resides in a part of town 
noticeably run-down and home to several migrant communities. Due to its historic 
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buildings, cheap rents and property prices, it is unsurprisingly popular with creative 
and cultural workers from more expensive parts of the country, overwhelmingly 
‘DFLs’ – a colloquial acronym describing people ‘Down From London’, either for the 
day, or more permanently. Not wanting to be part of the rapid gentrification of the 
area without giving something back, from its inception, Janet explained how 
important it was for the theatre to be an open and inviting space for local residents, 
not just for ‘Margate newbies who would get it’.  
 
For one particular performance with an LGBTQ+ performance collective, she 
received a call on her mobile phone (also the box office number) from a long-term 
local resident who was making her very first visit to the theatre to celebrate her 
sixtieth birthday. When the woman arrived with her daughter, she was visibly excited 
and seemed under the influence of a substance other than alcohol. As the 
performance got underway, she couldn’t contain her excitement and kept getting on 
stage to try and kiss the performers. Throughout what sounded like an 
uncomfortable watch, Janet described a similar experience of the three-way split that 
Carol spoke about. Firstly, she felt responsible for the artists whom she had 
programmed and were dealing very professionally with this rather unusual, and 
uninvited, audience participation. She didn’t want to compromise the experience for 
the rest of the audience by allowing these frequent interventions to continue, but at 
the same time she wanted this woman’s first visit to the theatre to be a positive 
experience.  
 
I was impressed with the candid sharing of this story, because as Janet admitted, it 
exposed and tested the limits of her desire for the theatre to be open and accessible 
to everyone, particularly members of the local community. As discussed in Chapter 
Three, however, contemporary art institutions frequently use ‘local community’ to 
refer to working-class people living nearby whom they must engage, often for 
reasons outside of the benevolent desire Janet expressed. What wasn’t directly said 
in this example, but spoke loudly through Janet’s discomfort, was her desire to unite 
two kinds of ‘locals’ – Margate’s existing working-class community and the recently 
arrived DFLs, assumed to be more culturally literate – and how this tension played 
out in the moment as a culture clash. Janet’s dilemma could be articulated as: What 
do you do when faced with someone who does not know ‘the rules’ of the theatre? 
212 
 
And by the same token, why should everyone be expected to know what to do 
there? Despite Janet’s anxiety over her responsibility, the excessive response-ability 
of this new theatre visitor was in fact managed by the performers, and could even 
have formed part of the enjoyment of the rest of the audience. 
 
Breaching the Boundaries 
 
Accessing and understanding the rules of spaces came up across the conversations 
and workshops, pertaining not only to what you do and in what order, but what parts 
of the self are appropriate to bring in. As previously noted, the kinds of public events 
we were talking about are not only bounded by physical structures such as furniture 
and walls, but temporal limitations and behavioural codes. Indeed, as Miranda 
pointed out, many of the workshop stories revolved around a breaching of these 
boundaries of what we think a public event can legitimately hold. What gives these 
invisible boundaries their power? Ingold’s description of ‘ghost lines’ – the marking of 
geographical borders on the landscape with objects that trace an imaginary line – 
may be useful here. He recalls time spent herding reindeer near the border between 
Finland and Russia: ‘[t]he border was marked [...] in no other way save the 
occasional post. Had I attempted to cross it however, I would have been shot at from 
one of the many observation towers on the Soviet side’ (Ingold 2007 p.50). Taking 
Ingold’s notion of an imaginary line that has real effects, together with Bachelard’s 
notion that space is socially constructed through specific human actions and 
interactions in a particular place (Bachelard 1964), we may think of public events and 
the temporary spaces they create as criss-crossed with such ‘ghost lines’. These 
lines often follow the architectural or furniture layout, but all are ‘imaginary’ with real 
effects: they become visible or tangible only when breached.  
 
Despite the claims of new institutionalism and the desire amongst small and large art 
institutions alike to create different kinds of public spaces for multiple, diverse publics 
to engage, they are often no less codified than other more traditional spaces. We are 
still bound by a certain understanding of what it means to enter into a rarefied and 
privileged space of publicness. When people don’t share the same understanding (or 
habitus), they are very quickly excluded. This exclusion may not simply be physical 
‘outing’, it could be enacted socially or intellectually. The first-time theatre visitor’s 
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excitement for the performance appeared to be too much when it tipped over into 
physical contact, and was therefore an example of a dual breaching. According to 
Janet’s retelling of the story, the amorous response exceeded what it is appropriate 
to show of the self in the theatre, even during a queer cabaret performance. Not only 
were the kisses and hugs foisted on performers non-consensual, these interventions 
also breached the invisible boundary between audience and performers commonly 
referred to as the ‘fourth wall’, and the rule that audiences never access the stage 
without an invitation.  
 
A particularly striking example of the breaching of these architectural, emotional, 
temporal and physical boundaries, and the more subtle social exclusion that ensues, 
came via email. Inspired by my invitation, but not able to make the actual workshop, 
James had written up his most profound experience of a ‘disruptive moment’ during 
his time as public programme curator in a national art museum, along with two 
examples from other workplaces. With permission, I shared his email as part of my 
third workshop introduction. The main story was about an auditorium-based event in 
the art museum. Structured as a classic presentation leading to a conversation 
between a photographer and one of the art museum’s curators, followed by a 
question-and-answer session, it was scheduled to last one and a half hours. During 
the presentation James noticed ‘a woman started quite uncontrollably crying at the 
back of the auditorium and after a while it was impossible to ignore.’ The rest of 
James' email I will quote at length: 
 
[The photographer] addressed her and after a few moments recognised her 
as the younger sister of [a subject of one of the photographs] whom she 
hadn’t seen since a toddler 30+ years ago. She ran up the side of the 
auditorium and they hugged and cried for a long time, with other people 
clapping, others crying and it was quite the most amazing moment I’ve seen 
during a talk. 
  
The problem I’ve always struggled with when I think back to this is what then? 
It felt like everything that the talk could or should achieve had been done. But 
we were only twenty minutes in. The woman still couldn’t stop crying and 
wanted to talk to [the photographer]. [She] was clearly quite shaken and had 
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to compose herself to continue. The woman agreed to leave which felt odd. 
And all the while [the curator] didn’t have a clue what to do and if anything 
was fairly insensitive to the whole thing. The event sort of limped on but 
needlessly. I should have called it quits but the show must go on. It’s 
simultaneously the best and potentially my most awkward moment in an event 
(James 2019). 
 
It was clear that this unexpected turn of events had marked a profound moment in 
James’ work experience. He seemed to have been both moved and unsettled by it, 
and his ‘what then?’ question indicates he still didn’t know what to make of it. Aside 
from exemplifying the kinds of anecdotes I was interested in, my reading of James’ 
email during the workshop introduction had another resonance. It was later 
referenced by participants during a roundtable discussion about the rules of public 
spaces, and what happens when strong emotions are expressed. Miranda had 
shared an experience of a discussion where one of the panel had begun crying and, 
in lieu of the chair or other panellists responding, was offered a tissue by a member 
of the audience. This led to what felt like a very unfiltered response from someone 
else referencing James’ email: ‘some people just don’t know how to behave in 
public’. Another suggested that the person who ‘cried uncontrollably’ should have 
taken their emotional response outside the auditorium, or saved it for the comfort 
and privacy of their own home. In the workshop, there was a clear preference for the 
person who was crying to remove themselves, which is actually what happened: 
‘[t]he woman agreed to leave which felt odd’. James doesn’t state whether she was 
asked to leave, or did so of her own accord, but it is clear that an exclusion of some 
sort had taken place. 
 
While no one used the word ‘appropriate’ or ‘inappropriate’, the notion of ‘manners’ 
seemed implicit in this short workshop interlude. After all, manners are a social 
structure that ensure we don’t have to reinvent the rules of engagement each time. 
But does this imply that in this particular public situation, grief, as an emotional 
object, is a burden to others? I also wondered if this reaction would have been quite 
so bluntly put if James had been present to tell the story himself. For him it had been 
a kind of pinnacle that ‘achieved’ more than the rest of the event could, which ‘limped 
on but needlessly’. Yet he also admits ambiguous feelings: on the one hand it was 
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‘quite the most amazing moment I’ve seen during a talk’ and, on the other, 
‘potentially my most awkward moment in an event’. As a rather exuberant moment 
that clearly resisted categorisation as success or failure, and certainly bent the strict 
rules of engagement governing this auditorium-based event, it presents us with 
another example of public (mis)behaviour could be called queer. Despite not 
knowing how to respond, or how to feel about it now, James was also distinctly 
aware of his responsibility as public programmer, since the exhibition curator ‘didn’t 
have a clue what to do and if anything was fairly insensitive to the whole thing’. But 
he was also aware of his powerlessness: ‘I should have called it quits but the show 
must go on’. It seems evident here that the rules of the space, particularly those that 
govern the event’s duration, prevented him from stopping it. 
 
The saying ‘the show must go on’ is thought to have originated in the nineteenth-
century circus, to describe moments when ‘an animal got loose or a performer was 
injured, [and] the ringmaster and the band tried to keep things going so that the 
crowd would not panic’ (Rogers 1985 p.280). It migrated into theatre and is now 
broadly used to denote sticking to plan, persevering with something against all the 
odds for the greater good of ‘the show’. Here again the rules of the space are not 
only made explicit, but define the direction of what happens next. The person who 
cried and made others feel awkward, is made to feel awkward themselves and 
leaves the auditorium; the event continues. This throwaway, but explicit link between 
public programming and theatre, where the rules are stricter and more proscribed, is 
interesting to consider. Firstly, because it chimes with the multiple references to 
theatre and performance studies throughout this thesis, including several 
performances described at length. Secondly, because it links back to the unruly first-
time patron of Janet’s example and the professional response of the performers who 
kept the ‘show’ ‘on’ despite her unusual advances. I make these connections despite 
the literature reviewed in my Introduction explicitly shying away from any association 
with the theatrical, artificial or performed. This could be because the public 
programme classically prioritises presence, discussion, learning, process and 
authenticity. But with these references and examples I acknowledge and push 
further its inherent performativity and theatricality, demonstrating the importance in 
taking a wide-angle view on the kinds of public(s) and spaces created through this 




The event James writes about wasn’t ostensibly a ‘show’ but an ‘in conversation’ 
between a photographer and a curator. But the rawness of emotion expressed by 
both the audience member and the photographer demonstrated its realness and its 
theatricality. For some, it was poignant; for others, it was too showy. I use the term 
realness in conjunction with theatrical, show and showy because it is multivalent. 
Realness can be used to describe an impressive quality of likeness to reality 
especially in drag and ball culture. In other scenarios it can denote the hyper-
presence of reality. However, I argue that James’ comment ‘the show must go on’ 
also speaks to the public programme event as a ‘general performance’, following 
Hito Steyerl (2019). In it she describes the contemporary art world’s obsession with 
‘the endless production of seemingly singular events, the serial churning out of 
novelty and immediacy’. Yet despite this seemingly unquenchable thirst for the 
singular, the novel and the immediate – the hyper-real – Steyerl writes that ‘the 
happening of the event is also a general performance’. Such realness occurring 
during what was otherwise a very standard event was also an unexpected novelty 
that made it ‘singular’. The eruption of tears and subsequent reunion between the 
photographer and audience member performed the kind of intimacy ordinarily 
reserved either for privacy, or a sanctioned moment of public grieving such as the 
funeral. Incidentally, it was photographs of a funeral during the presentation that 
appears to have triggered the emotion of the audience member. 
 
How can we come to terms with this rare moment of intimacy interrupting a general 
performance of the standard ‘in conversation’ event? For two of the workshop 
participants reflecting on James’ story, the moment was indeed a show of emotion 
that did not belong in public. This brought in another point: How do we feel about 
emotions being expressed in public – how much is too much? It was clear that some 
might notionally allow space for more extreme feelings in their own programming, 
whereas others felt disquieted, even offended by the idea of it. To bring back an idea 
from Ahmed discussed in the previous chapter, an emotional object may be present 
in the room, but not everyone has the same relationship to it. The idea that someone 
deeply affected should only cry in private struck me as rather puritanical. On the 
other hand, those that feel uncomfortable about crying in public might feel it is a 
burden they are not equipped to deal with. For me, the response to James’ story 
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highlighted one of the things this practice of sharing ‘disruptive moments’ of public 
programming can put into the practice: it can make visible the bounded notions of 
what a public space or event ‘can legitimately hold’, to use Miranda’s term.  
 
It also brings us back to the strict demarcations of public and private that Hannah 
Arendt described in her book The Human Condition (1958). Arendt analysed 
Classical models of public and private to make sense of the modern world. Firstly, 
she distinguishes the private, domestic sphere where the labour of sustaining the 
body was carried out by women and household slaves in ancient Greece, from the 
public sphere, where men appeared to speak, act and could achieve excellence. 
Secondly, she describes the ‘human world’ as produced by the things that we make, 
which people have, and use, in common. Arendt refers to physical objects like tables 
that ‘gather […] [us] together […] relate and separate’ us (1958/1998 p.53), as 
making this ‘human world’ tangible. This notion can, of course, be extended to think 
about how intangible objects like concepts, ideas and images might gather, relate 
and separate us. In fact, this might very adeptly model what happened in James’ 
auditorium-based event. The private (feminised) labour of the body – grieving – 
erupting in the (masculine) public sphere was a breach too far for some attendees to 
my workshop. Such an ostensibly sexist reading might feel a little jarring today; 
however, Warner has also shown how such gendered notions of public and private 
still persist (2005). 
 
The temporal lines of this story are perhaps the most slippery to grasp. The incident 
rendered the restrictive temporal boundary of the event itself present as an 
imposition: James felt the conversation had already ‘achieved everything that it 
could’. But his desire to draw it to a close collided with the durational expectation set 
by the conventions of the institutional event, where the audience had paid a ticket for 
an event that elapses over a certain duration, and so it ‘limped on.’ The emotional 
outburst happened in the present, but was related to a past event – the funeral of a 
family member – and a (perhaps forgotten) acquaintance with the photographer. The 
photograph of a dead loved one triggered a shock of fresh grief for the relative in the 
audience, which was both ‘in time’ with the slide show but strangely ‘out of time’ with 
the event. To link back to the theme of the previous section, the incident was 
exorbitant in that it was characterised by an emotional excess. But also because it 
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transgressed the boundary that normatively separates ‘performer’ and audience 




In each of the stories above someone is locked out of participating, or seen to be 
participating in improper ways. If the museum’s fear of contaminating publics still 
haunts contemporary art institutions of all kinds, then ideal ways of participating 
inevitably structure the public programme. We have seen this fear of contamination 
forming when the Paris Salon opened its doors to the masses as documented by 
contemporary critics who described their curious and infectious bodies and 
behaviours, mapped by Thomas Crow (1985). Contemporary museum studies also 
addresses the ‘unruly and badly behaved public’ (Candlin 2008 p.279) that has 
dedicated ‘[a]n enormous amount of labour and resources [...] to ensure that visitors 
make rational responses’ and, as Fiona Candlin concludes, ‘[i]t is easy to interpret 
the construction of the rational museum in terms of exclusion’ (pp.290–91). The 
protagonists of all these stories seem to contaminate the ideal public space, by 
being, or doing, something out of place with its conventions, or even out of time, if 
we think of the example from James.  
 
A final story from a public programmer in a heritage museum highlights this most 
succinctly. Eliza, who attended the last workshop at Tate Britain, was my 
conversation partner. She set the scene by describing the pre-event atmosphere of 
the grand nineteenth-century reception room within a listed building that houses the 
museum. Because of tight restrictions of what can be brought into, and done, in this 
listed building, everyone entering must place their mobile phone and other valuables 
into a clear plastic bag. The event was taking place on an exceptionally hot day, and 
the room, like the rest of the museum, was not air conditioned. The event was sold 
out and the packed room was already pungent with the smell of perspiring bodies. 
Just before the talk was about to begin, someone in the audience began frantically 
rifling through her handbag. Pulling out the museum issued plastic bag, she promptly 




Despite the description leading up to this point, I wasn’t expecting this to be the 
outcome of the story. The dilemma this caused for Eliza was also described with 
careful detail. As the public programmer hosting the event, she was responsible for 
the well-being of the audience and had a duty of care to the sick woman. However, 
the women refused Eliza’s offer to sit in a cooler place where she may drink some 
water, insisting that she didn’t want to miss the talk. Eliza explained her surprise that 
someone who had just vomited in public, sitting in close proximity to others, wouldn’t 
want to leave the room out of embarrassment. Her concern for the woman’s 
neighbours, who couldn’t help but notice the smell, and might feel nauseous 
themselves, heightened Eliza’s anxiety and her own embarrassment. She mentioned 
to me a couple of times that she didn’t know whether she should ‘forcibly eject’ this 
woman from the event, or respect her wishes to stay seated. However, insisting on 
staying put, she even refused to let go of the plastic bag ‘in case she needed it 
again’. As a public programmer, Eliza felt bound by her duty of care to the physical 
and emotional well-being of the sick person (Charman 2005), but also to the others 
around her who might become sick. She was doubly embarrassed (blushing as she 
told the story) on behalf of the woman, who didn’t seem to feel any shame herself, 
and for having to deal with this unwanted bodily event happening right before the 
event she was hosting had started. The right thing to do in such a scenario remains 
unclear. Yet this story very clearly brings us back to the contaminating publics 
visiting the nineteenth-century Paris Salon, in particular, Pidansat de Mairobert’s 
1777 writings about ‘[a]ir so pestilential and impregnated with the exhalations of so 
many unhealthy persons’ (Miarobert in Crow 1985 p.4). Eliza’s story also reminds us 
that, as Mary Douglas famously described it, ‘dirt’ is only rendered visible through ‘a 
set of ordered relations and a contravention of that order’ (1966 p.36). Vomiting in 
the toilet would have been matter in place, but just as importantly, it would have 
been done in private. 
 
Tying this together with the other stories, the more complex point to make about 
them is the double ostracisation of the individual. Their personage and behaviour 
mark them as outside the particular public they are trying to access. But they also 
become the exemplary outsider who stands in for the unpredictable, unruly public 
that contaminates the ideal public space, either by bringing the outside in, or bringing 




Practice Makes Public 
 
The stories I recounted here largely spoke to three themes that I can paraphrase as: 
any notional public relies on an outside; the boundaries of public spaces become 
visible only when breached; the public is always unpredictable. All have implications 
for rethinking the kinds of spaces we, as a group of people working with various 
different public(s) and space(s), throughout the workshops, are engaged in creating. 
And by further implication, for rethinking the practice of public programming and what 
it can do. Putting a focus on the peripheral into practice through the workshops and 
conversations, we also played with the idea of ‘putting something into practice’. By 
bringing the anecdotal into focus, making peripheral phenomena central to our 
conversations, we were literally inserting something into the practice as well as 
practising something: a new way of paying attention.  
 
This was only possible through an expanded notion of what practice is. Eileen Daly, 
Leanne Turvey and Alice Walton (2017) describe artistic practice in terms that sit 
well alongside what was developed through the workshops and conversations. For 
them, an artist’s practice goes ‘beyond what might be exhibited or made public’ 
including ‘methods for collating ideas, their references, the paraphernalia of the 
studio, writings, questions, curiosities, uncertainties, the frayed edges, workings out 
and wrong turns [...] what they are reading and noting down or noticing, who they are 
talking to or with, is all part of their practice’ (p.16). To think expansively about public 
programming practice is also to acknowledge how the ‘frayed edges, workings out 
and wrong turns’ have as much a part to play as ‘what might be exhibited or made 
public.’ I cannot claim to have invented an anecdotal practice – the sharing of minor 
stories around events – because it happens throughout the institutional settings we 
discussed. However, the workshops and conversations were about making the 
anecdotal central to practice. Though certainly not a usual professional space, 
neither was the workshop entirely subversive. I call it para-professional space, 
because it operated alongside others, like the network meeting or professional 
development workshop. However, without the expressed aim of either forging new 
partnerships or improving practice, these workshops offered an opportunity to think 
together about the nature of creating public space(s) and becoming public(s). In so 
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doing, it traversed the line between professional and personal without becoming un- 
or anti-professional.  
 
These workshops might even be seen as a queering of the professional, by 
foregrounding the informal, anecdotal ‘edges’ of a public practice. Inviting 
professionals to relate ‘the antimonumental, the micro, the irrelevant’ (Halberstam 
2011 p.21), that which either escapes notice, or is not wanted as part of the official 
narrative of the event, was sideways to the usual model of professional networking 
and improving practice, at the very least. In addition, instead of presenting best 
practice and things that made us proud, we focused on experiences of uncertainty 
and moments not easily categorised into success or failure. The stories we 
discussed turned on moments of uncertainty and confusion instead, taking the ‘too 
much’ as that which exceeds the scene of publicness or professionalism. These 
were often unresolved and, though I have drawn my own conclusions here, what we 
learned from them was never fixed. Indeed, the resistance of anecdotes themselves 
to categorisation could be what makes this practice of centring them a queer one if, 
following Warner, we take queer as a ‘resistance to regimes of the normal’ (1993 
p.xxvii). 
 
But the power of anecdote is not only as a place to begin theorising (Gallop 2002), 
but also to begin formulating a normative ethics. Through the culture of anecdotal 
sharing online, such normative ethics formed through anecdotal practices can lead to 
policing ever more nuanced patterns of behaviour. The term ‘micro-aggression’ is 
only thinkable because of the sharing of small, personal experiences that have 
exposed systemic, everyday racist and sexist behaviours. The possibility of defining 
one’s personal experience and declaring its relevance to the lives of others is also 
the possibility to generalise. Micro-aggressions are now publicly discussable, 
especially in online fora. Yet they are also routinely dismissed and denied in sites of 
physical presence, in part due to their unverifiable anecdotal status issuing from 
personal experience (Sue 2010). The anecdote, then, not only transgresses 
boundaries by putting the private into the public, but also attempts a normative ethics 
through the possibility to connect, to relate and to generalise. This can be positive or 
negative, and I am not adjudicating this process here. Rather, I draw on it to show 
the work anecdote does in the practising of public(s). The possibility to speak of 
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micro-aggressions is also the possibility to ‘call’ them ‘out’ and to form a public 
discourse around them.  
 
So, what work did putting the anecdote into practice do in this para-professional 
space? Using Butt’s assessment of how gossip is the underpinning of any 
professional community, but also queers its professionalism (as inversion of its 
forms), the workshops and conversations showed how anecdotal practice is as 
integral to public programming practice as more sanctioned forms of reflexive 
discourse and practice – such as the case study, policy document or evaluation form 
– to create a kind of ‘private public’ of public programmers. Indeed, the looping 
layers of a private public of public programmers coming together to discuss the 
public in private, also refers back to Helena’s earlier point about ‘more work should 
be done on the private side, to make the public side more valuable’. The work of 
putting into practice the anecdote through these workshops and conversations, was 
to allow a counter-narrative to the strict, Arendtian notions of public and private that 
commonly persist, despite thinkers like Warner demonstrating their 
interconnectedness. Anecdotal practice is also a way to resist a generalised 
management style of governing subtle (and potentially transformative) processes, 
and their complete marketisation. As noted by the two programmers who described 
their experiences during a debrief meeting with me, attendees to their events are so 
often asked to account for themselves via a questionnaire, ticking boxes that 
‘capture’ them and render their data and opinions countable, reproducible, 
representable. But the unrecorded conversation and unwritten observation retold to 
colleagues via anecdotal practice is an alternative informational source that yields far 




What happens when public programmers come together and discuss the parts of 
practice not usually spoken about? This chapter mapped the usefulness of attending 
closely to the eventfulness of the public programme, via the ‘fullness’ of the event – 
the excess it produces, ordinarily left out of its formal appraisal. Can such an 
attentional shift help us materialise public as a process of becoming, rather than an 
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abstract group or static space, to tell another story about the museum’s relation to 
publicness? 
 
If the possibility of communing with strangers is a public’s key ingredient, in addition 
to attention (Warner 2005), these workshops brought together people both known 
and unknown to each other and myself, meaning they were neither fully public nor 
wholly private spaces. Applying a Warnerian reading, I suggest they were generative 
of a ‘counterpublic’ of public programmers engaged in both ‘practising’ public(s), and 
proposing how a staid, normative notion of publicness in both the liberal and 
neoliberal museum and contemporary art institution might be enacted otherwise. The 
title of this chapter, ‘Practice Makes Public’, is, of course, a reworking of the common 
idiom ‘practise makes perfect’ – commonly used as an encouragement to keep 
trying, because it is only through doing that anyone learns and refines. My 
application of Warner, who takes a social, temporal model of public(s) formation, 
demonstrates how the practice of public programming is a practising (or rehearsing) 
of the possibility of public(s) and public space-making. Crucially, as I hope to have 
shown through this thesis, the process is never perfect, and neither is it ever 
completed. What putting this shift of attention into practice revealed is that when we 
are public programming, we are practising public(s). But, what is it that is wanted to 
be made perfect through this practice? A perfectly open and accessible space, a 
public that includes everyone? If this is what we are practising for, as the workshops 
and conversations discussed show, it is not yet here. 
 
What the stories throughout this chapter did show, is that the spaces created by the 
public programme are not as accessible and open as they purport to be. Practising 
this attentional shift through anecdotal sharing, the shortcomings and boundaries of 
public spaces became visible, especially when breached by private emotions or 
internal bodily functions. It is often shown to be the case that certain people or 
groups are excluded, and the public programme frequently fails to be the ideal, 
equitable space for public becoming that is promised. This was sometimes because 
‘multiple privileges and oppressions are always in play’ (Carol 2019), and, as 
outlined in Chapter Two, equality might be desired but is not necessarily a feeling 
shared by everyone. However, when the liberal fallacy of public openness is 
revealed to be illusory, things start to feel queasy. This either requires the emotional 
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labour of acknowledgement, or an uncomfortable ignoring of the facts. Another 
illusory assumption challenged by the third workshop was that not everyone has the 
same motivation for being there. However, as one participant pointed out: ‘people 
attend events for all kinds of reasons – to have their views challenged or their 
personal boundaries tested, or to have them confirmed’. We neither come to such 
events for the same reasons, nor have equal access to contribute to them. Each 
story seemed to attest that, although we might desire openness and accessibility, 
any public called into being via a public programme is predicated on a notion of 
exclusion, despite the ethical underpinnings and values it is expected to uphold.  
 
So, if the public programme fails to be the ideal space of public becoming it is 
purported to be, what does it do? If, as Halberstam has written, failure can be ‘a way 
of refusing to acquiesce to dominant logics of power and discipline and as a form of 
critique’ (2011 p.88), I argue the value of the public programme lies in rehearsing of 
the possibility of an accessible space, to rethink what a public space could be, what 
is needed. More than this, if failure can also be recognised as a practice itself, we 
might ‘exploit the unpredictability’ of the public to uncover the already ‘embedded’ 
‘alternatives’ (p.88). This leaves us able to understand publicness as produced in 
and through a constant negotiation of the not quite enough, and the too much – of 
who and what is exorbitant. Though the stories were not ostensibly about exclusion, 
failure or awkwardness as such, all were couched in an idea of professional best 
practice contaminated by uncertainty. Might even the failure to be fully professional 
be the resistance that Halberstam suggests? 
 
Almost all the examples I dwell on in this chapter dealt with a breaching of what can 
be contained or legitimately held by the event. Thus, they reveal something much 
more profound about the nature of publicness than the events themselves ever set 
out to achieve. Each was experienced as a singular or ‘stand-out’ moment, though 
following Ahmed (2004), people will have related and responded to them differently. 
My hunch for doing this work, outlined in the Introduction, was that when we pay 
attention to the periphery, we might see publicness in the process of becoming. This 
means that we are no longer talking about a fixed space or state, but a mutable, 
intersubjective process. If publicness is a felt, contingent process, then talking about 
uncertain feelings, particularly those ordinarily harder to express, becomes essential. 
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For me, this demonstrates the use-value of the space created through That Awkward 
Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19), and acknowledges 
the important part feelings play in becoming public(s). Classic formations of 
publicness, as laid out in my Literature Review, rely on notions of speaking and 
acting according to certain established codes in particular places. But 
communication is also a form of relation, inextricably linked to an affective 
dimension: we cannot leave feelings out of the equation if we want to form more 
nuanced and truly accessible ways of becoming public(s). I will discuss these ideas 
in more detail in my overall thesis conclusion, but suffice to say feelings, particularly 
uncertain ones, were an important part of each and every workshop and 
conversation.  
 
Lastly, recalling the final discussion of Chapter Three, safe spaces and their 
impossibility also came up in the workshops and conversations. Those working with 
publics are always at the live end of thinking through these problems, 
inconsistencies and conflicts, and I learned that several colleagues now use the 
phrase ‘this is not a safe space’ to open some of their programmes. This subtle shift 
has of course taken place through the iteration – or general performance – of public 
programming, as an active response to the fraught moments of publicness produced. 
If public programming seeks to achieve the impossible – an accessible space of 
equal participation – then there might be something in the promise of public 
becoming that is still worth practising. If the space(s) created by public programming 
across a range of institutions are consciously rehearsing towards an ideal public 





Thesis Conclusion – Public Potentials 
 
This thesis issues from the art museum’s uncomfortable ties to publicness. If the 
museum emerged from the movement of private wealth into public hands (Duncan 
2013, Candlin 2010), today’s ‘corporate turn’ renders relations between 
contemporary art institutions and their publics ‘fragile and awkward’ (Möntmann 2008 
p.19). Some of this discomfort has been addressed by museum studies and new 
museology that emphasise the powerful social and political role of museums, 
acknowledging that their relationship to their public(s) needed to be re-thought. 
Reviewing new museology’s methods and impact, Max Ross describes how in the 
1970s ‘[p]olitical and economic pressures forced [museum] professionals to shift 
their attention from their collections towards visitors’ (2004 p.84). With this thesis, I 
propose subsequent attentional shifts. Firstly, a shift towards one of the museum’s 
key technologies for producing attention – the public programme. Then a further shift 
towards what is ordinarily unattended, or causing distraction there. This allows a final 
shift away from spatial notions of publicness, towards processual, sensual and 
temporal understandings of public(s) as in becoming, rather than always already 
there. This may break up, even queer, the here-to-fore monolithic and ideal public. 
Distributing our attention in this way across several planes can help us rethink the 
museum and contemporary art institution’s problematic relations to publics in new 
and unusual ways.  
 
With these shifts in mind, the public programme becomes a unique space to 
question assumptions often made about institutional publicness and the kinds of 
bodies that are able to appear (Butler 2015) as part of a ‘general public’. Despite 
reforms pointing out its assumed openness, but actual exclusivity (Fraser 1990), my 
Literature Review identified that there is still an over-reliance on spatial, architectural 
metaphors derived from a ‘bourgeois public sphere’ (Habermas 1989). But my own 
experiences of publicness in the art museum led me to question these spatial 
constructions and the assumptions of accessibility and equality that the word ‘public’ 
– as it connects with ‘programme’ – connotes. Additionally, the museum as ideal 
public space calls upon an ideal public, which is largely abstract and monolithic 
(Burton, Jackson and Willsdon 2016). Even where publics are pluralised, they are 
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still constructed as ideal, distinct groupings of people that may be marketed to, and 
extracted from.  
 
It is my contention that ‘public’ is both spatially and temporally constructed, 
happening through specific moments of embodied relation in particular situations and 
spaces. To understand it as such we must explore the felt, embodied and 
intersubjective dimensions of publicness, that the discourses reviewed at times 
suggested, but did not fully acknowledge. Most often I found key actors in the 
discourse reluctant to get specific about what actually happens during live 
programming, remaining at the level of case study or theorised example (such as 
Rogoff 2010). These circulate as forms of conventional public and professional 
discourse – as lectures, articles or books. I suggest that this is about distancing 
ourselves – whether as audiences, critics, artists or programmers – from failure or 
implication in fraught moments of publicness. However, the recourse to spatial 
models of publicness combined with shying away from the specific felt dimensions of 
becoming public(s) keeps them singular, othered, and largely unaccounted for in 
relation to practice. Thus, they are harder to relate to in practice. By helping us 
understand how it is produced and what is at stake, the attentional shifts I suggest 
can shape practice towards the creation of more meaningful spaces of publicness in 
the museum and contemporary art institution.  
 
I chose to address the messy contingency of becoming public(s) through an 
unflinching account of some ‘public problems’ thrown up by my own experience of 
the public programme, moments that left me feeling uncomfortable, awkward, or 
uncertain about how to respond. I used the term ‘disruptive moments’ to describe 
them (Dewitt and Pringle 2014), because they changed the course of the event they 
occurred within, or my thinking about it. Some disruptive moments were slight and 
internally registered, others a series of notable distractions, or more singular 
occurrences that opened an awkward space where different responses were 
possible.  
 
My examples are complemented by stories from other public programmers, gathered 
through the workshops and conversations that formed That Awkward Stage: Private 
Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19). Here a popular form of public 
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programming – the workshop – was employed to create a third, para-professional 
space, hovering between public and private. We explored publicness as an 
emergent process triggered by moments when, for example, the boundaries of a 
public event are breached by an exorbitant act or an outside(r), causing uncertain 
feelings about how to respond, and what we are part of. The differing roles of 
programmer and audience were inhabited and experienced as a challenge to the 
normative modes of production, attention and extraction of both the liberal and the 
neoliberal institution. The culmination of these workshops formed a key point of this 
research: recognising the public programme as a space of normative production that, 
through shifts in attention, could be queered to become a space where that 
normative production and its underpinning structural inequalities are encountered 
and explored. Understanding public(s) as in becoming, rather than always already 
there, is emphasised in relation to a possibility to create spaces where such 
becomingness is not just at issue, but is the issue to be effectively and affectively 
explored.  
 
It is important to reiterate that I did not do traditional audience research to figure out 
who makes up the public that attends public programmes in contemporary art 
institutions. Neither was I reviewing contemporary public programming practice, 
though I suggest this as one direction the research could lead, using these new 
coordinates for understanding and appraising them. Rather, I have put forward an 
account of what the process of becoming public feels like, using the public 
programme as a unique space to observe this temporal, intersubjective process and 
myself as the primary locus of understanding it. With each chapter themed around a 
central concern and set of examples, the entire thesis asks and answers how this 
might transform our framing of public programming within the contemporary art 
institution. 
 
What is Happening Now? 
 
We are not simply public, or part of one, only because we step into a museum 
auditorium, or, as is more common in 2020, log onto an online event. As I concluded 
this research, the Covid-19 global pandemic ground the world to a halt. My research 
took on a different valence as many of us slid awkwardly into living life largely at 
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home. Local and national ‘lock downs’ transformed our experience of togetherness, 
shifting it from physical proximity to virtual gatherings facilitated through video 
conferencing platforms. Amidst the chaos of the virus, the reality of Britain’s unequal 
society was brought into sharp relief as it killed People of Colour and those from 
lower socio-economic backgrounds in much larger numbers than white, middle-class 
and affluent populations. Against these unliveable conditions, the reality of police 
brutality and anti-Black violence in America erupted in multiple uprisings and protests 
responding to the murder of George Floyd. The summer of 2020 marked a huge 
upsurge in the action and support of the Black Lives Matter (BLM) movement 
globally. The UK’s own history of police violence against Black bodies was once 
again vociferously declared enough, through multiple protests of varying scales 
nationwide.128 Some of these led to statues of slave-traders and colonialists being 
toppled,129 triggering multiple petitions to parliament around how Britain’s colonial 
past should be taught in schools,130 and discussions about what to do with its public 
monuments.131  
 
Amongst all of this cultural institutions large and small tried to hold onto their publics 
as best they could, creating online content, and holding conversations around how 
the complexities of the moment might be reckoned with.132 Most acutely, the public 
programme became a testing ground for the solidarity with BLM that many national 
 
128 Black Lives Matter protests were accompanied by a backlash of counter-protests from groups on 
the far-right, including a gathering that turned violent against police in central London for the 
expressed purpose of ‘statue protection’ around monuments such as the Cenotaph on Whitehall 
(Cambell 2020). 
129 Most notably, the statue of Edward Colston in Bristol (BBC 2020). 
130 See https://petition.parliament.uk/petitions/326254 for the rejected petition Introduce the Slave 
Trade and colonial history in the National Curriculum, and list of similar petitions (Petition Parliament 
2020) 
131 These ranged across forms of mass and social media, from television broadcast news 
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-52996627 (BBC 2020) to newspaper opinion pieces by 
public historians (Olusoga 2020) and debates started by individuals. 
132 For example, Iniva’s workshop Exploring Identity: Experiences of Self & the Other – legacies of 
lockdown Georgina Obaye Evans (Iniva 2020); and Lisson Gallery’s panel John Akomfrah in 
conversation with Tina Campt, Ekow Eshun, Saidiya Hartman, which ‘examined the legacy of John 
Akomfrah's early films, such as Signs of Empire and Handsworth Songs, in the context of ongoing 
Black Lives Matter protests, the destruction of colonial monuments and the structures of institutional 
racism’ (Lisson Gallery 2020). Lisson Gallery is a commercial contemporary art gallery with a public 
programme. This nuance of practice – public programming by ‘private’ (commercial) galleries is not 
something I cover in this research. However, that it is fast becoming a staple of the commercial 
gallery’s repertoire (see also David Roberts Foundation n.d.) demonstrates the importance and value 
of this mode of curatorial practice. Public programming in commercial galleries could certainly form 
part a wider review of the nature and scope of contemporary public programming practice across the 
arts sector, which, I suggest, is one way to extend this research. 
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cultural institutions professed through hastily produced statements on their 
commitment to anti-racism.133 Take, for instance, the online conference titled 
Curating, Care and Community (2020) programmed by the Early Career Curators 
Group (ECCG), supported by Tate and Paul Mellon Centre.134 The event seemed 
inspired by a curatorial shift away ‘from caring for objects and collections to 
producing and managing social networks, collective energies and professional 
relationships’ (Reckitt 2016 p.6).135 During opening remarks, the ECCG 
contextualised their event by referring to BLM protests, and explained how a series 
of panels with art world professionals would explore different notions of care and 
community within curatorial practice. Organised by a group of white curators, the 
event included several People of Colour, which included an external facilitator acting 
as ‘host’.136 Yet it became quite clear that, despite their opening remarks, the group 
had failed to invite any Black contributors. This was directly addressed in the 
afternoon session when several participants asked why and how this had happened, 
especially in a moment when, as one participant framed it, ‘white people finally 
decided that Black Lives Matter’? How was this possible, with the privilege that a 
year-long professional development programme brings: time and money for personal 
research, an event budget and mentor support at their disposal? 
 
Silences. Swallows. Stuttering. Organisers visibly and audibly struggled to account 
for why their research and decision-making process had excluded Black curators, 
researchers or artists. Someone had forgotten to mute their microphone and was 
overheard telling someone else in disbelief: ‘It’s really kicking off right now!’ An 
embarrassing leakage perhaps, but also an indication of the variation in feeling about 
the unfolding situation. More importantly, it demonstrated how, though notionally 
gathered by a common interest, we were very much a community operating in 
 
133 These were equally swiftly critiqued: see Greenberger (2020) for an overview of these national 
institutions and the criticism that their BLM statements received. 
134 This group of 14 early-career arts professionals is selected and supported by the British Art 
Network (BAN), that is co-convened by Tate and Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art. The 
event was advertised on Tate’s website and ticketing website Eventbrite. 
135 As well as an ongoing concern for the Feminist Duration Reading Group that Reckitt co-organises, 
the event copy stated: ‘Curating, Care and Community will explore the increasingly urgent matter of 
how we care for ourselves, our colleagues, our collaborators and our audiences through our work in 
the arts, within and beyond institutions’ (Tate 2020). 
136 Though I name the group and organisations involved in this event, I keep individuals names 




difference, affecting personal response-ability to, and responsibility for, what was 
happening. The host issued a prompt reminder to ensure microphones were muted 
unless someone wished to speak, and another awkward silence followed. After an 
attempt to resume proceedings through restarting the afternoon panel, it soon 
became clear that the event could not continue as planned. The space was turned 
over entirely to questions about the lack of Black inclusion, and attempts by ECCG, 
Tate and Paul Mellon Centre representatives to answer them.  
 
Above everything I have discussed in this thesis, this was not simply an extremely 
awkward moment, it was an excruciating and powerful reckoning. As the ‘chat’ 
function of the platform was steadily filling up with questions, messages of solidarity, 
others of frustration about the disruption, and expressions of counter-frustration, I 
became painfully aware of my lack of participation, yet my own complicity in what 
was unfolding. I also felt strangely exposed in remaining a silent witness to the 
painfully inadequate repetition of the white organisers’ apologies. Not knowing what I 
could usefully add, nor wanting to appear as another guilty white face, or turn away 
from what was happening, I turned my camera off but stayed present.  
 
From Emergency to Emergence 
 
I do not wish to perpetrate more harm or extraction by bringing this extremely fraught 
situation into my conclusion. As was rightly pointed out by one participant, practices 
of care are deeply politicised and cannot be separated from racialised bodies, who, 
often without state or institutional support, care for one another’s well-being in radical 
ways. I include it to argue, along similar lines to Alberto Altés Arlandis’ (2019 p.71) 
description of attention in the museum that publicness is not a given or directed 
thing, but emerges through what happens, and the multiple responses to it. This type 
of occurrence, including the pain that surrounded and exuded from it, is the 
emergence of publicness that demands more of our time and attention. Neither do I 
wish to detract from the labour and energy put into events such as these, especially 
at a time when we are both dependent on, and learning how to use, very specific 
kinds of technologies. However, this deeply uncomfortable, but necessary moment 
reveals once again the challenge facing institutions that produce publics without 
necessarily being prepared for their embodied reality. My research suggests that the 
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ideal public(s) many institutions predicate their activities upon are largely fictional, 
and involve all kinds of implicit and explicit rules around arrival, form and behaviour. 
The examples I focused on in this thesis aimed to show that, in their fleshy reality, 
publics ‘are [indeed] queer creatures’ (Warner 2005 p.7), and highly unpredictable. In 
addition, as Laura Mulvey (1989) has highlighted, the ‘spectacle is vulnerable’, and 
can be disrupted by a handful of unruly actors. But my research proposes that 
programmers make such vulnerability a priority, and become accountable to the 
differing experiences of publicness that are created.  
 
The global pandemic of 2020 has shown all kinds of cultural venues across the arts 
struggling to hold on to their audiences. Once again, the public programme becomes 
the site and conduit to keep this relationship going, in the hope that it will sustain the 
institution beyond this global health and economic crisis. The result of participating 
via video conferencing platforms from homes, local coffee shops, or other spaces 
means that (I have noticed) some of the reserve and politeness expected of 
participation in institutional settings has been replaced with the accelerated 
discursiveness of Twitter and other social media platforms. Despite the technology 
used, the event mentioned above employed a traditional broadcast conference 
format, with little room for discussion despite its promise.137 The question of scale 
alone (the event drew some 150 participants) only emphasised the triangulation of 
exposure, togetherness and responsibility that forced a particularly intense and 
complex moment of publicness to emerge. Additionally, the traditional broadcast 
model that the organisers employed left them rather unprepared for the exposure of 
their failures involving representation, imagination and empathy in this very specific 
socio-political climate. In many ways what happened could not be mitigated. I do not 
even suggest that it should have been, given that majority white cultural institutions 
have sadly taken too long getting to grips with anti-racist practices and none of these 
critiques are bringing new information to light. And yet my research suggests that 
paying attention to the technologies employed to produce our attention in these 
spaces, the scale at which they are put to work, might have mitigated some of the 
 
137 The event copy suggested that ‘BAN members and the wider curatorial community are invited to 
share experiences and ideas in a supportive, reflective environment [...] There will be opportunities for 




harm felt by those asking questions about Black inclusion, and indeed those held to 
account, who were not left unaffected.  
 
Turning attention to the particular and relatively new technology of attention 
employed for this event, then, shows how it both facilitated the most major distraction 
– the written comments running parallel to speaker presentations – and produced a 
counterpublic within the public moment. With little time left for an ‘open’ question-
and-answer session after the presentations, the prominence and significance of the 
chat function speedily escalated, used out of necessity by those who felt outside of 
the public intentionally produced by the event. It soon became the only possible 
space for asking difficult questions that re-framed, problematised and, importantly, 
destabilised what was being said and who was saying it. The chat was also an 
important space for this counterpublic to gain traction, eventually de-railing the entire 
conference proceedings to force the white organisers to account (though they could 
not) for their failure at an inclusive, caring curatorial practice. What became clear 
was, indeed, how this form of coming together did not pay attention to the ‘multiple 
privileges and oppressions at play’ mentioned in Chapter Four, nor how these were 
being reproduced.  
 
In her timely and insightful study, curator and writer Jemma Desai (2020), herself a 
‘cultural worker embodied in difference’, draws on her own experiences in various 
professional roles and settings. She uses her discomfort to unpack the ways in which 
diversity policies uphold whiteness in cultural institutions, keeping out the very 
people they claim to welcome in. In this passage Desai writes about the importance 
of calling out institutions via online platforms: 
 
critiques that circulate online can be framed as ‘call outs’ rather than ‘call ins’. 
A ‘call out’ in its simplest sense is to criticize something or someone and ask 
for the critique to be addressed or responded to. They can be seen as loud, 
vocal missiles hurled at the institution. Such ‘call outs’ appear to be all 
powerful, the institutions, whose reputations are a key part of their ‘public 
relations’ appear ‘vulnerable’ to them. However, call outs are also often ‘calls 
in’ one of a limited ways to communicate, to be heard by an impenetrable 
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institution. By calling out, you ask for a way in (Desai 2020, original 
emphasis). 
 
Outlining the motivations and mechanics of private individuals calling out public 
institutions online, Desai’s description of the dynamic movement between private 
conversation and public discourse exposes how the capital of public reputation may 
be levied against the institution, but also used as a way in. The event I described 
above also happened online, but via live presentations delivered to the camera from 
individual home workstations, broadcast to an audience also watching at home. 
However, I suggest that the ‘call out’ I describe had a significant impact because of 
the hybridity of the space in which it happened. When ‘storms’ explode on the social 
media platform Twitter, we may not observe their affective registration on the bodies 
of individuals in real time, as was possible during this event. But it also appears to 
have had significantly more effect on the institutions called to account. Subsequent 
emails from the British Art Network to conference participants pledged to review 
recruitment and selection practices for the following year’s ECCG, as well as make 
resources available for healing and consultation with Black and other People of 
Colour negatively affected by the event. Whether or not these gestures will happen, 
in the fullness of their promise, or serve those negatively affected by the event, 
cannot yet be assessed, nor would it be my place to do so. If we are really interested 
in producing publics, we must also be interested in how those publics are produced, 
and what can happen when they emerge and take shape.138  
 
Another thread of this research is that the public programme produces much that is 
unaccounted for within standard forms of evaluation and knowledge production, or 
discourse around them. My research looked at the richness of anecdotal, para-
professional sharing of things that perhaps should not have happened, were not 
wanted, or were not planned as part of the event. Shifting our attention to what and 
who is producing it, and how, can have major effects, such as the initiation of 
Liberate Tate during an activist workshop at Tate Modern discussed in Chapter Two, 
whose actions eventually led to the cessation of a longstanding sponsorship 
 
138 In line with their theme, ECCG did appear to think through the physical comfort of those 
participating. But this was delivered largely via an extensive list of suggestions for using the video 
conferencing platform, emailed to participants in advance. 
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relationship between BP and Tate. Attentional shifts do not always lead to such 
radical outcomes, but my research also shows the micro-politics in paying attention 
to the subtle, exorbitant details of these public productions. Consideration of the 
extraneous details during these workshops and conversations held as part of That 
Awkward Stage: Private Workshops for Public Programmers (2018–19) also led to a 
nuanced understanding of what and who is outside of the specific notion of public 
(re)produced by the public programme.  
 
However, this research is not aimed at the reductive notion that simply widening 
access leads to happier, more compliant publics and convivial moments of 
publicness. Rather, I am asking us to think about, and then challenge, the ideal 
public and forms of publicness the museum and its extended spaces are predicated 
on when we are creating these events. My research also shows how these ideal 
notions work with a dominant positivity that Miranda Joseph says are perpetuated by 
practices and discourses of community in contemporary society (2002). This was 
particularly true in my critical analysis of Jamal Harewood’s The Privileged (2014) 
where I identified my greatest discomfort in feeling community with another white 
woman who volunteered for the task of commanding Harewood to eat. A community 
that I felt deeply ambivalent about being part of, but could not and cannot necessarily 
escape. This seemed to come full circle in the moment of reckoning for the institution 
during the ECCG’s online conference. Here, my belonging to a white community 
lambasted for its exclusionary anti-Black practices, left me feeling conspicuously 
associated with their painfully apologising, despite not having been part of the 
event’s organisation, and desperate to absent myself. Staying present to one 
another in an uncomfortable situation risks implication, but again this is when our 
publicness emerges, whether we expose ourselves with words or actions, or not. 
This conception of publicness may feel similar to agonistic pluralism, as defined by 
Chantal Mouffe (2013). But it differs in the sense that it emerges not only through the 
respectful maintenance of conflicting positions that are externalised, but also in the 
competing desires and internal conflicts that are felt but not vocalised. 
 
This event also picked up how, as a technology of attention at the art institution’s 
disposal and behest, the public programme is readily used by another one-way 
transmission model. The didacticism of broadcast models can easily be subverted by 
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counterpublics speaking back to institutions. Programmers in this research spoke of 
their discomfort in moments when they had to embody the institution, hold onto their 
personal values, and respond humanely to what is happening. Without the 
professionalism and distinction of roles and responsibilities, such programmes would 
not be possible. Yet as one curator who often works with marginalised groups 
informally suggested, we cannot truly hold spaces of emergent publicness unless we 
are unprofessional. The people I have met who do this work are deeply committed to 
an ethical practice, which is purported to be about professional accountability. Yet 
the moments when things break down often require a more personal accountability. 
The para-professional space I created found that holding any space involves 
understanding your personal relation to an immediate and emergent public – and 
inseparability from it – over and above the abstractions of the institution and its ideal 
public. I also heard this in the wavering voices of the ECCG conference organisers, 
struggling to keep their emotions – fear? shame? guilt? anger? – under control as 
they responded to the questions about the lack of Black speakers. While certain 
members accounted for their personal failures, their colleagues responsible for 
shepherding them appeared to speak more from, and for, their institutions. Yet, 
everyone’s voice shook. 
 
Conclusion – (Re)making Time and Space for Becoming Public(s) 
 
This final example highlights the problematic nature of impenetrable whiteness in 
cultural institutions, as both a structural and more immediate problem. But rather 
than assessing institutions against their anti-racist claims, what is more broadly at 
issue in this thesis is publicness as a fixed space or state, undergirded by a 
dangerously flattening universalism. My central research question is, If the public 
programme is a unique space to understand publicness as a process of becoming, 
what might this do to our understanding and use of this space? I include this 
example not only because it draws together all the ideas discussed in the thesis, but 
also to emphasise the necessity and potential of the public programme as a space to 
attend to its own assumptions and elisions. In addition, to show how such spaces 
might be repurposed to raise and work through (even workshop) the difficult realities 
of producing and becoming public(s) in an inequitable world. The questions my 
research asks about getting specific and becoming responsible for the kinds of 
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publicness we are producing are both its purpose, and its subtlety. Through the 
attentional shifts I propose, we notice how frequently an awkward and problematic 
whiteness shows up in such spaces. But at other times ableism, heteronormativity, 
neurotypicality, an intersection of all these, and other problems arise.  
 
I do not simply suggest that all events include a meta-moment of unpacking what we 
felt about everything that just happened. Rather, I have suggested how other models 
of thinking publicness – such as the unstable reality of queerness – might pose new 
possibilities for publics outside of a neoliberal marketing segmentation logic. 
Following Michael Warner (2005), Charles Coypel and Pidansat do Mairobert 
Mairobert in Thomas Crow (1995), I demonstrate the potential for queering the 
monolithic public to think about publicness as a sensuous becoming for all kinds of 
bodies, rather than a fixed or given state for certain bodies that have the privilege of 
appearing in public without thinking about it (Butler 2015). The rich potential of an 
embodied approach – the (teenage) awkwardness of appearing – allows me to call 
our attention to fleeting, yet important, feelings or desires such as wanting to turn my 
camera off. We may wish to forget our physicality in these moments, because it 
embarrasses us. But as Nicholas Ridout reminds us, a theatrical ‘encounter with the 
self’ can usefully become ‘the occasion for all sorts of anxieties’ to be discussed 
(2006 pp.8–9). The self-consciousness of publicness is not an embarrassing 
weakness to turn away from, but an occasion to explore the problematic 
assumptions involved in ideal notions of public(s) and publicness. When we 
understand becoming public as something uneasy and at times very fraught, we can 
recognise that the ‘plural and performative right to appear’ is not evenly distributed 
(Butler 2015 p.11).  
 
The issues and incidents I focused on were important when I started this research, 
and, as with the most recent example, simply keep coming up. With mounting 
pressures on art institutions to account for not only who they work with publicly, but 
also who makes up their staff, it is clear that we cannot continue thinking about the 
publics they produce nor the practice of public programming in the same way either. 
Understanding publics as emergent, rather than already pre-existing entities that we 
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may address, or, more problematically, extract from,139 this thesis aligns itself with 
the kinds of public programming that considers the stakes of appearance for non-
normative bodies like Paul B. Preciado’s Parliament of Bodies for documenta 14 
(documenta 2017), with specific needs and desires such as Live Art Development 
Agency’s ongoing DIY programme of ‘professional development projects by artists 
for artists’ (Live Art Development Agency 2020). Such programmes and spaces 
could even be extended to empower publics to reflect on their own publicness within 
them.  
 
I have also suggested that public programmers need more space, time and support 
to address how their practice produces publics and publicness, allowing moments 
ordinarily pushed aside to be the ones that direct practice, instead of just unsettling 
it. My contribution to knowledge is therefore specific: to shape practice towards the 
creation of more meaningful spaces of publicness. This research has been carried 
out with, and for, a specific set of practitioners in mind – public programmers like 
myself, operating in museums and contemporary art institutions large and small. Of 
course, I don’t simply identify myself under this professional denomination; my 
personal identifications – as a cis-gendered, white, able-bodied, middle-class woman 
and potential audience member – have also been brought to the research. As others 
before have done with the role of gallery or artist educator (Allen 2008), through the 
journey of this thesis, it has been important to own public programming as a specific 
curatorial practice and skillset, which is of unique value as much as it is amorphous, 
promiscuous, undefined and really rather queer at times. Feedback from workshop 
participants told me that the practice I created is both challenging and valuable to 
theirs. This gives me confidence that my research and this practice could be 
expanded collaboratively and nationally to produce a new knowledge network about 
public programming, even a new kind of accountability. A more extensive para-
professional network could continue, among other things, to explore how 
practitioners of public programming are also publics in relation to their practice. What 
might it mean to practice the public programme by attending to becoming publics 
rather than practising towards a given public? How can current practice develop in 
 
139 Extraction is not readily spoken about, yet one of the workshop participants admitted to feelings of 
discomfort around working in short-form ways with marginalised and vulnerable adults. 
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this direction? If produced in partnership with organisations invested in public 
programming, and combined with the concerns of this research, a collaborative 
review and fuller mapping of contemporary public programming practice might be 
possible, which, as stated in my Introduction, has not been the aim or scope of this 
particular study. Lastly, I argue that the continued value and relevance of public 
programming lies in its ‘general performance’ or rehearsal of the possibility of an 
accessible, inclusive and accountable brave space (Arao and Clemens 2013). 
Through this research, I hope to contribute both to a more sophisticated 
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